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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes that the scope of article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code' be expanded to regulate credit trans-
actions secured by the many different types of consumer and
business demand accounts, savings accounts, and nonnegoti-
able certificates of deposit. Article 9 expressly excludes the
"transfer of an interest in any deposit account, ... except as
provided with respect to proceeds."2 This proposal would de-
lete that exclusion. Concomitantly, the common law right of
depositary institutions to extrajudicially set-off claims against
deposit account collateral would be abolished and the law of
pledge and assignments now applied to security transfers of in-
terests in deposit account collateral would be displaced.3 By
thus bringing deposit account financing wholly within the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the article 9 goal of creating a unified,
comprehensive legal structure governing the hypothecation of
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to articles, sections, and
comments of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) are to the 1978 official
text. ALI & NAT'L CoNF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORI COM-
MERCIAL CODE: 1978 OFFICIAL TExT wrrH COMMENTs (9th ed. 1978).
2. U.C.C. § 9-104(l). Although article 9 does not apply to a security inter-
est in a "deposit account" as original collateral, it does allow a creditor with a
security interest in other personal property to trace its interest to a deposit ac-
count that has been augmented by identifiable "proceeds" received by the
debtor on the sale of the encumbered property. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
Article 9 defines a "deposit account" as a "demand, time, savings, passbook
or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association, credit
union or like organization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of
deposit." U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (e). The same definition is used in this Article.
3. Set-off is the cancellation of cross-demands between two parties. The
term commonly is used to cover both judicially supervised set-offs and auto-
matic extinction of cross-demands. "Set-off" in this Article refers to extrajudi-
cial set-off. See generally Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross Demands:
Compensatiofrom Rome to California, 53 CAL. L REv. 224 (1965).
A depositor's interest in the bank account is properly characterized as a
contract right to be repaid by the depositary institution. See sources cited in-fra note 32. Under the common law, such a chose in action can be pledged as
collateral when reified in an "indispensable" instrument, like a negotiable cer-
tificate of deposit or a savings passbook. See infra notes 130-33, 139, and accom-
panying text. Alternatively, a security assignment can be used to transfer title
to this form of intangible property. See E. FARNSwORTf, CONTRAcTs §§ 11.1-.11
(1982); see also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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all types of personal property 4 would be furthered. Moreover,
debtors and creditors would be freed from historic constraints
on the use of personal property as security. Although embod-
ied in the common law, such restrictions have been rejected by
the Code as inappropriate in modern commercial transactions.5
Depositary institutions hold substantial deposits and sup-
ply a significant portion of consumer and business credit. In
June 1983, commercial banks alone held approximately $1,300
billion in various demand, savings, and time deposit accounts.
When the savings capital for savings and loan associations, the
deposits of mutual savings banks, and the shares and deposits
of credit unions are added, the total is approximately $2,100 bil-
lion.6 Federal deregulation measures, including substantial re-
moval of interest rate ceilings, of minimum deposit restrictions
4. See U.C.C. § 9-102 comment This Article focuses on the inclusion of
deposit account financing within the article 9 framework and advocates the ab-
olition of the common law right to set-off as part of that reform. The question
of whether the common law right to set-off should be abolished where the mu-
tually indebted parties are entities other than a bank and its customer is be-
yond the scope of this Article. The priority rules that presently govern such
disputes, however, are discussed inf/ra at notes 315-26 and accompanying text
5. See generally 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, U.C.C. SERV.
(MB) § 5.05 (1984).
6. The following tables, based on Federal Reserve data, show total depos-
its in the monetary system, classified by type of institution and type of account
Total Deposits by Type of Monetary Institution
June 1983
Billions Percent
Commercial Banksa $1,329.5 61.3%
Savings and Loan Associations 603.2 27.8
Mutual Savings Banks 164.0 7.6
Credit Unions 71.6 3.3
Totalb $2,168.3 100.0%
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and of mandatory penalties for early withdrawals, 7 have en-
sured that these institutions will continue to be important sup-
pliers of financial services.8 Also, in June of 1983, commercial
Total Deposits by Type of Account
June 1983
Billions Percent
Demand Depositsa $242.1 11.6%
Other Checkable Depositsc 122.7 5.9
Money Market Deposit Accounts 367.3 17.6
Savings Deposits 326.3 15.7
Time Deposits-Small Denominationsd 723.9 34.7
Time Deposits-Large Denominationse 301.0 14.5
Total $2,083.3 100.0%
a. Exclusive of cash items in the process of collection, Federal Re-
serve float, and demand deposits due to other banks, U.S. govern-
ment, and official institutions.
b. Deposit by type of institution, based on "Last-Wednesday-of-
Month" series and "end of period" data; deposit by type of account
based on "averages of daily figures," not seasonably adjusted.
c. Includes negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) and automatic
transfer series (ATS) accounts at all institutions, credit union
share draft (CUSD) accounts at credit unions, and demand depos-
its at mutual savings banks.
d. Issued in amounts of less than $100,000.
e. Issued in amounts of $100,000 or more.
See 69 Fed. Reserve Bull. A15, A19, A30 (1983).
7. From 1978 to 1982, rising interest rates caused customers to withdraw
funds from traditional depositary institutions in order to buy shares of money
market funds. (A money market fund pools its shareholders' investments to
purchase relatively safe but large minimum denomination instruments such as
commercial paper or treasury bills.) See Whitehead, MMDAs and Super NOWs:
The Record So Far, Econ. Rev.: FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA, June 1983, at 20.
In 1980 and 1982 Congress enacted legislation creating the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC) and authorizing the committee to pro-
mulgate regulations allowing banks, savings and loans, and mutual savings
banks to offer accounts that would be competitive with money market funds.
Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 3501-3524 (1984); Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1464 (1984)). See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1204 (1984) for current
limits on payments of interest, minimum balance requirements, and early with-
drawal penalties.
8. Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, a member of the DIDC, re-
ported to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on
April 6, 1983:
In 1982, the DIDC took two major actions which have effectively
halted the outflow of funds from depository institutions. The DIDC...
authorized depository institutions to offer.., the Money Market De-
posit Account ....
Secondly, as a result of the deregulation schedule.., rate ceilings
have been removed from deposits with a maturity of 2- years and
over. In addition, a ceiling-free NOW, or transaction account, became
effective on January 5, 1983.
Testimony of Hon. Donald T. Regan Secretary of the Treasury Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Treasury News (Dep't of
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banks had approximately $1,100 billion dollars in loans out-
standing (excluding interbank loans); if lending by savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions is
added, the figure is approximately $1,700 billion.9
the Treasury press release, April 6, 1983), reprinted in NEw BANKS AND NEw
BANKERS 1983, 385, 387 (Practising Law Institute 1983) [hereinafter cited as Re-
gan Testimony]. During the four months following their authorization, $318 bil-
lion was placed in money market deposit accounts. See Whitehead, supra note
7, at 17.
Depositary institutions currently seek authority to offer a broad range of
"nonbank" services including marketing securities, commodities, insurance,
real estate, and travel services. The proposed Financial Institutions Regulation
Act, S. 1609, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), presently before Congress, would allow
the sale of such services through separate subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies. The bill is the successor to legislation introduced at the request of the
Reagan administration as the "Bank Holding Company Deregulation Act". See
Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs (Sept. 13, 1983), reprinted in 69 FED. RESERVE BumL. 757, 759 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Volcker Statement].
Sears Roebuck & Co., which in recent years has acquired a real estate firm,
a securities firm, and a savings and loan association, and which also owns All-
State Group Insurance companies, has opened financial service centers in
many of its retail outlets. Thus a customer can at a single location purchase
merchandise, buy stocks and bonds, real estate, and insurance, and use an au-
tomatic teller for banking transactions. See Financial Industry in Turmoil as
Reluctant Congress Stalls on Bank Deregulation Issue, 41 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep.
(Cong. Q. Inc.) 1899 (Sept. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Financial Industry in
Turmoil ].
Whether customers will make use of such "nonbank banks" remains to be
seen. A 1982 study of 2,362 consumer financial institution customers showed
that although six out of ten held either a Sears or Penneys credit card, only one
in five said they would obtain financial services from the department stores.
Most believed "that stores should be stores and banks should be banks." See
Survey, Customer Service Usage-Part I, The Unidex Report, May 1982, at 1-2
(publication of the Unidex Corporation).
9. The following table, based on Federal Reserve Board data, shows total
lending outstanding in June 1983 by type of institution:
Total Lending by Type of Monetary Institution
June 1983
Billions Percent
Commercial Banksa $1,074.6 63.1%
Savings and Loan Associations 472.1 27.7
Mutual Savings Banks 111.4 6.6
Credit Unions 44.9 2.6
Total $1,703.0 100.0%
a. Exclusive of interbank loans. Based on "Last-Wednesday-of-
Month" series. All other figures based on "end of period" data.
See 69 FED. RESERVE BuLL. A19, A30 (1983).
Of course, many of these loans are presently secured by real estate. See id.
at A30. A depositary institution, or any other mortgagee, has no obligation
under the common law to foreclose on such real property before pursuing other
remedies, including the right to set-off against the borrower's deposit accounts.
The mortgagee can bring an action on the debt, pursue its foreclosure reme-
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The wide variety of deposit accounts now available and
adaptable to the particular needs of individual consumers and
businesses should continue to attract a substantial volume of
deposits.10 Application of the general principles of article 9 to
dies, set-off, or pursue any other remedy successively or concurrently as long
as only one satisfaction is obtained. See generally 5 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 1554 (3d ed. Supp. 1984).
These broad rights of the mortgagee have been cut back by state statute in
a variety of ways. See 3 R. POwELL, REAL PROPERTY 467, at 616 (1981). A few
states have adopted "one action" rules, which require the morgagee to exhaust
the real estate collateral first and obtain any deficiency (the difference between
the balance outstanding plus expenses less the value of the encumbered real
property) in the foreclosure action itself. No subsequent action on the debt is
permitted. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PRoc. CODE § 726 (West 1980); IDAHO CODE § 6-
101 (1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1977). Such statutes also prohibit set-off un-
til certain procedural requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., McKean v. German-
America Say. Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 P. 656 (1897) (bank prohibited from apply-
ing demand deposit in satisfaction of mortgage indebtedness without first fol-
lowing statutory procedures). Several states bar or reduce deficiency
judgments. See, e.g., CAL. CrV. PRoc. CODE § 726 (West 1980); IDAHO CODE § 6-
108 (1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw § 1371 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21-36 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-19-04, -06, -07 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 686 (West 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2621.1 (Purdon 1969); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961). Presuma-
bly, the right to set-off could be used to recover whatever deficiency the state's
statute allows. See Woodruff v. California Republic Bank, 75 Cal. App. 3d 108,
110, 141 Cal. Rptr. 915, 916 (1977). See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHnmAN, REAL ESTATE FNANCE LAw §§ 8.1-.3 (1979).
10. Depositary institutions presently offer a wide variety of demand, sav-
ings, and time deposit accounts. There are regular checking accounts, NOW ac-
counts, and SuperNOW accounts, all of which permit unlimited checkwriting.
Federal Reserve banks are prohibited from paying interest on regular checking
accounts. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.2(a) (1983). The NOW and SuperNOW accounts,
technically savings deposits subject to negotiable orders of withdrawal but op-
erating like checking accounts, pay interest on balances. See id. § 217.1(e). The
SuperNOW accounts ordinarily pay a higher rate of interest (there is no fed-
eral rate ceiling) but require a $2,500 deposit to open the account; if the average
balance in any month falls below $2,500, the interest rate reverts back to the
NOW account rate. The NOW account rate is 5 1A%; there is no minimum bal-
ance requirement. See id. § 1204.108; Nichols, The New Accounts, the Current
Role of DIDC, and Some Thoughts on Sweep Accounts, in NEW BANKS AND NEW
BANKERS 1983, 55, 57-58 (Practising Law Institute 1983). NOW and SuperNOW
accounts are available only to individuals, certain nonprofit organizations, and
government entities, and not to business corporations or partnerships. See id.
§§ 217.1(e) (3), 1204.108. (Some institutions require a higher minimum balance
on the allowed nonpersonal accounts than on personal accounts.)
Financial institutions also may offer Money Market Deposit Accounts,
which are insured by the FDIC and pay interest at an even higher rate than
SuperNOW accounts. On October 19, 1983, the average rate paid by major
banks and by savings and loans on Money Market Deposit Accounts was 8.56%,
as contrasted with 7.32% on SuperNOW accounts. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1983, at
44, col 4. Federal regulations impose a $2,500 minimum initial and average
monthly balance requirement on Money Market Deposit Accounts, but there is
no interest rate ceiling as long as the balance remains above $2,500. No more
than three transfers per month can be made out of Money Market Deposit Ac-
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
this personal property would allow customers who keep a sig-
nificant portion of their net worth in this form to hypothecate
these valuable assets more efficiently in favor of lenders they
prefer." Abolishing the doctrine of set-off would eliminate the
advantages depositary institutions now enjoy over other lend-
counts by check payable to a third party. These accounts are available to any
depositor, including business corporations and partnerships. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 1204.122 (1983); Nichols, supra at 55-58.
Banks offer regular savings accounts on which there is presently an inter-
est rate ceiling of 5.75%. See 12 C.F.R. § 1204.117 (1983). Such accounts, not
payable on a specified date or at the expiration of a specified time after the
date of deposit, allow the depositor to make withdrawals subject to a 14-day no-
tice requirement which banks may impose at their discretion. See id.
§ 217.1(e). Savings deposits may not exceed $150,000 per depositor and are
available only to individuals, nonprofit corporations, and governmental units.
Id.
Banks also offer time deposit accounts that do not give the depositor the
right to withdraw funds for at least 14 days from the time of deposit. See id
§ 217.1(b),(c). In addition to negotiable certificates of deposit, a variety of non-
negotiable time deposits are available. For example, in October 1983, First
American Bank, N.A., Washington, D.C., offered statement savings accounts
($100 opening balance with interest computed daily), savings certificates
(purchased in amounts of $500 or more with interest rates dependent on the
length of time for which the certificate is issued and on federal regulations),
six-month certificates (purchased in amounts of $2,500 or more with fixed inter-
est based on the 26-week treasury bill discount rate), two and one-half year cer-
tificates (purchased in amounts of $500 or more with a fixed interest rate
established by the bank), and three and one-half year certificates (purchased
in amounts of $500 or more with interest based on the 13-week treasury bill dis-
count rate). The agreements governing these savings certificates state that
they are "nonnegotiable" and "nontransferable." They may, however, serve as
collateral for a loan from First American. (The only "negotiable" certificate of
deposit advertised is for $100,000.)
As a consequence of federal deregulation, all interest rate ceilings were re-
moved from 7- to 31-day time deposits with $2,500 minimum denominations and
from all 32-day or longer time deposits. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1204.121, .123 (1983).
Federal regulations continue to impose penalties for early withdrawals. Id.
§ 1204.103.
Banks have begun to pay more attention to consumers and small busi-
nesses as potential sources of funds. Financial institutions have discovered
that deposits made by small investors may be less volatile than funds provided
by large, open market investors. The small investor, whether because of inertia
or lack of information, is less likely to withdraw funds promptly when interest
rates drop or the bank receives bad publicity. This sanguinity is in part attribu-
table to federal deposit insurance, which guarantees small investors' accounts
up to $100,000 in the event of bank failure. Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1983, at Hl, coL
3.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 108-278, 279-373, 374-440. Recent fed-
eral reserve statistics show that "households" (including nonprofit organiza-
tions and private trusts) keep 17% of household net worth in the form of
deposits in financial institutions and money market funds. Wash. Post, Nov. 13,
1983, at G1, col. 1. Only 19% of household net worth is in the form of owner-
occupied housing. Id.
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ers when they extend credit to their own customers. 12
The trend toward national banking heightens the need for
this reform.' 3 As depositary and other credit institutions in-
crease their interstate activity, the nonuniformity of the current
law will become more burdensome. Moreover, if the common
law right to set-off is construed to reach a defaulting customer's
deposit account in a branch or related institution in another
state, the legal advantage that depositary creditors already en-
joy will be augmented.' 4
Section I of this Article shows how deposit accounts used
as original collateral have functional attributes similar to more
traditional collateral presently within the article 9 framework.
The relationship between the proposed "new" article 9 security
interest in such collateral and the contemporary right to set-off
is then explored. Both permit the creditor, upon default, to
foreclose extrajudicially on the debtor's chose in action against
the depositary institution. The security interest, however, is
consensual, whereas the common law right often arises by op-
eration of law. Because the right to set-off no longer serves its
historic function, and undermines fundamental article 9 poli-
cies, it should be expressly abolished. To the extent that de-
positary institutions need a unilateral, self-help remedy, they,
like other creditors, can bargain with the debtor for an article 9
security interest.
Section II explains how the article 9 requirements for crea-
tion of a security interest, when supplemented with the lowest
12. See infra notes 50-53, and accompanying text. See generally infra text
accompanying notes 108-278, 279-373, 374-440.
13. The Reagan administration favors the systematic removal of geo-
graphic restrictions on depositary institutions. See Regan Testimony, supra
note 8, at 11-12. Recently, haphazard exceptions to federal and state barriers
have multiplied. Citicorp and BankAmerica operate subsidiaries in every state.
Numerous depositary institutions have out-of-state loan production offices and
receive deposits from customers by mail. Id. South Dakota has passed laws
authorizing out-of-state bank holding companies to purchase state banks, and
Citicorp has announced its intention to do so. See Financial Industry in Tur-
moi4 supra note 8, at 1900-01; see also Volcker Statement, supra note 8, 69 FED.
RESERVE BuLL. at 764-67.
14. It may be difficult to ascertain whether one bank that is affiliated with
another is a "branch" bank. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.3D 683 (Supp. 1983).
Courts look at a variety of factors, including the extent to which the new facil-
ity operates "independently" of the older, established bank, as evidenced by
the extent to which the new bank depends on the older bank for capital and
management services, whether there are interlocking boards of directors,
whether the two facilities use the same bookkeeping and computer processing
services, the extent of common ownership of stock, and differences in loan lim-
its and interest rates at the two facilities. Id.
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intermediate balance rule, 5 would permit debtors and credi-
tors to bargain effectively concerning the dimensions of any en-
cumbrance against a deposit account. The requirements for the
common law right to set-off, which can be satisfied by no credi-
tor other than the depositary institution, are contrasted with
the requirements of article 9. The advantages of the article 9
framework over the common law of security assignments and
pledge are explained.
Section H also proposes that a creditor who retains the
"new" article 9 security interest in deposit accounts should be
subject to the Code's "public notice" requirements. Absent
prompt filing, such a creditor, like other secured creditors,
would risk subordination of its interest to later claimants seek-
ing recovery from the same deposit account. Neither the com-
mon law of set-off nor the common law of assignments imposes
similar notice obligations. Thus, the precise type of "secret
lien" that article 9's perfection and priority rules attempt to
eliminate survives in many modern banking transactions.16
In section Il, article 9's priority rules are applied to basic
contests over deposit account collateral. Application of article 9
eliminates needless factual and legal uncertainty under the
presently controlling statutory and case law. As shown in sec-
tion IV, contests over deposit account collateral under the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act17 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act18 also
would be more easily and fairly resolved if this recommenda-
tion were enacted. The benefits of bringing deposit account fi-
nancing under the article 9 "umbrella" carry forward into these
important federal commercial statutes.
Finally, section V explores how article 9's default provi-
sions would affect the rights of creditors and debtors in trans-
actions secured by deposit account collateral. A specific
proposal for supplemental protection of the consumer deposi-
tor-debtor is suggested.
15. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 237-78. Subsequent creditors, una-
ware of the depositary institution's inchoate right to set-off against the deposit
account, or of an earlier security assignment, may extend credit to the deposi-
tor on terms that do not adequately reflect their greater risk should the deposi-
tor-debtor default.
17. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6344 (1982)).
18. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. and amending scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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I. CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL REASONS FOR
INCLUDING SECURITY INTERESTS IN DEPOSIT
ACCOUNTS IN ARTICLE 9 AND FOR
DISPLACING THE COMMON
LAW
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
personal property law was not simple, uniform, or adequate.
The law of each state validated a variety of security devices,
each applicable to a different class of personal property.
Within a given jurisdiction, the formal rules governing the crea-
tion of each device, the rights of the secured party on default,
and the creditor's obligation to give notice of its interest to
other creditors or purchasers of the encumbered property all
varied with the categorization of the personal property. Differ-
ent priority rules then had to be applied to resolve disputes
among creditors competing for the same collateral. This intra-
state complexity was exacerbated by variations among states.
Not surprisingly, this tangle of rules and formalities did not
meet the needs of twentieth century lenders and borrowers for
a system in which all types of personal property could be effi-
ciently hypothecated.19
Article 9 was intended to correct that situation by creating
an integrated and uniform law applicable to security interests
in personal property. As explained by its sponsors, article 9
was to provide "a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions
can go forward."20 Security interests in deposit accounts as
original collateral, however, are excluded from article 9's
scope.2 1 Presently, the use of deposit accounts as collateral for
credit is governed by three separate bodies of common law,
modified by scattered state statutes: security assignment,22
19. See U.C.C. § 9-101 comment; 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 9.1 (1965).
20. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment; see also id. § 9-102 comment.
21. Id. § 9-104(l); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., infra notes 129, 130, 134-35, 147-53, 181, 186, 188-95, 197, 201, 207-
08, 248-49, 300-07, 343-47, and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNTRAcTs §§ 316-343 (1979) statutory note (compiling state statutes)
("Statutes or rules of court in most States require an action to be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest, as does Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In addition most states have statutes providing for set-offs
and other defenses against an assignee, and a number of States have statutes
relating to other aspects of the assignment of contractual rights.").
California and Hawaii have amended article 9, as proposed here, to cover
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral. See CAL. CoM.
CODE § 9104 (West 1964); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 490-9-104 (1976). These states,
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pledge,23 and set-off.24 Although the historical background and
conceptualization of these common law security devices are
quite different, all three serve the same function as would the
proposed "new" article 9 security interest in modern banking
transactions. Each permits the benefited creditor to establish
its priority vis-A-vis other claimants and to foreclose on the bor-
rower's deposit account in the event of default without seeking
a court judgment or other judicial process.
Article 9's coverage should be expanded to include security
interests retained in deposit accounts 25 as original collateral.
Under this proposal, article 9 would become the primary source
of law governing deposit account financing arrangements. The
creation of a workable article 9 security interest in deposit ac-
however, have neither enacted this Article's other modifications of article 9 nor
abolished the common law right to set-off. See, e.g., infra notes 72, 250, and ac-
companying text.
23. See, e.g., infra notes 129-33, 139-46, 182, 186, 198-99, 201, 247, 309, 341, and
accompanying text; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-113 (West 1981) (sav-
ings account pledged by delivery of passbook creates a lien against the savings
deposit); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:32 (West 1983) (written pledge of multiparty
accounts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 538 (West 1980) (authorization for sav-
ings banks to make loans secured by a "deposit or certificate issued by any fi-
nancial institution located in the United States"); OP. REV. STAT. § 722.266
(1983) (authorization for savings association to accept the pledge of a savings
account of someone other than the borrower as security for loan); I. GEN.
LAws § 19-11-5 (1982) (deposit pledged by delivery of j assbook with an "order
for its transfer"; to be effective against third parties the transfer must be made
on the books of the savings bank or the order for the transfer must have been
filed with the depositary institution); VA. CODE § 6.1-330.39 (1983) (interest rate
ceiling for loans secured by passbook, savings account, savings certificate, cer-
tificate of deposit, or any other evidence of a savings account).
24. See, e.g., infra notes 159-68, 183-84, 210, 320-31, 348-52, 386-88, 392, and ac-
companying text; see also CAT_ Crv. PRoc. CODE § 431.70 (West Supp. 1973) (set-
off validated); GA. CODE § 7-1-821 (1982) (set-off against a multiparty account);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-4-1.5.13 (Burns 1980) (set-off against a multiparty account);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1206 (1982) (bank's right to set-off matured claims against
any depositor); KY. REV. STAT. § 391.355 (1982) (set-off against a multiparty ac-
count); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2210 (1952) (set-off against deposit accounts lim-
ited); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515:7 (1974) (set-off of mutual debts or demands);
OR. REV. STAT. § 708.656 (1983) (set-off against multiparty account).
25. The Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "deposit account," stated
in § 9-105(1) (e), is adopted for purposes of this Article, see supra note 2. That
definition expressly excludes "an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."
See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (e).
Professor Harris has argued that a "non-negotiable certificate of deposit"
should be categorized as a "certificate of deposit" so that it would fall within
article 9's coverage. See Harris, Non-Negotiable Certificates of Deposi; 29
U.C.LJ.A L. Rev. 330 (1981). Under this recommendation, all forms of "deposit
account" collateral would be covered by article 9, eliminating the need to dis-
tinguish the many, constantly changing new types of accounts. Article 9's rules
governing negotiable certificates of deposit would, however, remain unchanged.
See infra note 262.
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counts, combined with abolition of the right to set-off and dis-
placement of the common law of security assignments and
pledge, would further the reform effected by the present ver-
sion of article 9. Deposit accounts would no longer receive un-
warranted special treatment within states and would be more
uniformly treated among states. Moreover, debtors and all
creditors, whether depositary or nondepositary institutions,
could make more effective use of these valuable assets as col-
lateral for extensions of credit.
In order to ascertain the appropriateness of this recom-
mendation from a conceptual and historical perspective, two
basic questions must be answered. First, is the expansion of
article 9 to cover deposit account collateral consistent with the
Code's formulation of what constitutes a security interest in
personal property? Second, assuming the enactment of a uni-
form article 9 procedure for asserting rights in deposit ac-
counts, does any independent reason remain for preserving
banks' common law right to set-off?
A. A "NEw" ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST IN DEPOSIT
AcCOUNTS AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL
Every day, banks enter into consensual financing arrange-
ments with their consumer and business depositors that would
be covered by article 9's comprehensive, functional definition of
a security interest, but for section 9-104(l)'s express exclusion
of the "transfer of an interest in any deposit account."26 The
parameters of typical article 9 secured transactions are based
on common characteristics of the independent pre-Code secur-
ity devices. 27 First, the debtor must owe an obligation to the
26. U.C.C. § 9-104(1); see supra note 2. A creditor may retain a security in-
terest in a deposit account in either of two ways. The deposit account might
serve as the original "back-up" for the loan. Alternatively, the security interest
might first attach to some other type of property, and upon sale of that encum-
bered property the depositor would receive cash or other proceeds which then
would be deposited in the deposit account. In this Article, the first arrange-
ment is described as a security interest in a deposit account as original collat-
eral. The second is referred to as a security interest in proceeds in a deposit
account.
The exclusion in § 9-104(l) does not extend to security interests in pro-
ceeds in a deposit account, see U.C.C. § 9-306, or to priorities in proceeds, see id.
§ 9-312.
27. The official comment to § 9-101 explains:
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security de-
vices, based largely on form, are not retained; ... the single term "se-
curity interest" substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms which
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secured party, normally a promise to pay money.28 Second, the
secured party must have a conditional interest in personal
property wholly or partially owned by the debtor. The condi-
tion enabling the secured party to take action against the per-
sonal property is the debtor's default on its obligation to pay.2 9
Third, the transaction creating the secured party's conditional
interest in property must be consensual. 30
A bank loan expressly secured by deposit account collat-
eral shares these functional attributes. Suppose a bank loans
$100,000 to a business customer and requires that the customer
maintain a compensating balance in its demand account in the
bank in the amount of twenty percent of the debt outstanding
on any given day, or that the customer assign or pledge a non-
negotiable certificate of deposit issued by the depositary insti-
tution with a face value of $20,000. Clearly, the debtor has an
obligation to the bank to repay money-the $100,000. Moreover,
the security arrangement is consensual. 31
had grown up at common law and under a hundred-year accretion of
statutes.
Under this Article distinctions based on form . . . are no longer
controlling. For some purposes there are distinctions based on the
type of property which constitutes the collateral ....
The scheme of the Article is to make distinctions, where distinc-
tions are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines.
Id. § 9-101 comment (emphasis added).
28. See id. § 1-201(37), which provides in pertinent part: "'Security inter-
est' means an interest in personal property... which secures payment... of
an obligation."
29. See id. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (c) provides that a security interest is "not en-
forceable ... unless the debtor has rights in the collateral." Section 9-501(1)
gives the secured party certain rights and remedies when the debtor "is in de-
fault under a security agreement."
30. Article 9's scope provision states: 'This Article applies to security in-
terests created by contract .... This Article does not apply to statutory liens
.... " Id. § 9-102(2) (emphasis added). Certain common law and statutory
liens are expressly excluded from article 9's coverage. See, e.g., id. § 9-104(b),
(c).
31. The discussion in the accompanying text focuses on bank loans where
the debtor agrees in the note or loan agreement that the deposit account is col-
lateral. The debtor's manifestation of consent may take many different forms.
The terms of the loan may require that the debtor maintain a specified mini-
mum balance in its deposit account. The debtor may execute a written assign-
ment of its interest in the deposit account and deliver that document along
with a symbolic writing or certificate to the lender. See, e.g., Kaw Valley State
Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank of Liberty, 567 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Mo. 1978). Al-
ternatively, the debtor may agree that the bank has the right to set-off against
whatever balance remains in the account upon default. As explained in a sub-
sequent section, a right to set-off operates upon default in a manner similar to a
security interest. See infra text accompanying notes 68-107.
Under the common law, the depositor need not agree to grant the bank the
right to set-off; the right arises by operation of law. See infra notes 70-71.
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But does the bank have a conditional interest in personal
property owned by the debtor? When a customer deposits
money in a bank, title to the funds passes to the bank and a
debtor-creditor relationship is established.32 In this example,
upon deposit of the $20,000 in the demand account or purchase
of the time certificate the bank becomes the owner of the
money and the depositor has a contractual right to receive pay-
ment from the bank of the $20,000, either on demand or after a
fixed period of time. The personal property owned by the de-
positor is the contractual right to receive payment from the
bank. This right to receive payment, already "earned" by the
depositor's transfer of funds to the bank, is subject to the
bank's conditional interest and would be classified if covered
by article 9 as a "general intangible."33
Although a deposit account thus falls within article 9's defi-
Nonetheless, banks may obtain debtor consent. For example, the promissory
note may include a set-off provision similar to the following model clause:
If Bank deems itself insecure or upon the occurrence of any default
hereunder Bank shall have the remedies of a secured party under the
Uniform Commercial Code and, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, Bank shall have the right, immediately and without further
action by it, to set off against this note all money owed by Bank in any
capacity to each or any Obligor, whether or not due, and also to set off
against all other liabilities of each Maker to Bank all money owed by
Bank in any capacity to each or any Maker; and Bank shall be deemed
to have exercised such right of set-off and to have made a charge
against any such money immediately upon the occurrence of such de-
fault even though such charge is made or entered on the books of Bank
subsequent thereto ....
T. QUINN & R QUINN, MODERN BANKING FoRms 107 (Supp. 1974).
A promissory note form in use at the National Bank of Washington during
1983 provides under its remedies section that:
Bank may set off against all other obligations of Maker to Bank all
money owed by Bank in any capacity to Maker; and Bank shall be
deemed to have exercised such right of set-off and to have made a
charge against any such money immediately upon the occurrence of
such default even though such charge is made or entered on the books
of Bank subsequent thereto.
32. See United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387 (1925);
Charles A. Eaton Co. v. Louis Mark Shoes, Inc., 37 F.2d 715 (E.D. Pa. 1930);
Gonsalves v. Bank of Am., 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105 P.2d 118, 121 (1940); Federal
Ins. Corp. v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 382 A.2d 958 (1977). See
generally 5B ICHmE, MAcHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 324 (repl. vol. 1983); 10
AM. JuR. 2D Banks § 339 (1963).
33. U.C.C. § 9-106 defines "general intangibles" as "any personal property
(including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, docu-
ments, instruments, and money."
An "account" is defined as a "right to payment for goods sold or leased or
for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper,
whether or not it has been earned by performance." Id. § 9-106. A depositor
does not earn its chose in action by selling goods or rendering services. In-
stead, it merely makes a deposit and therefore does not have an "account"
under § 9-106.
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nition of "personal property," it nonetheless may seem to be a
quite different, less valuable, and more uncertain form of collat-
eral than that envisioned by article 9's drafters. But closer
scrutiny confirms what the commercial practices of banks
plainly suggest-that deposit accounts today provide useful ad-
ditional collateral.34 Indeed, with the trend toward national
banking, the proliferation of different types of deposit accounts,
and the increasing popularity of one-stop financial service cen-
ters, the importance of this asset is likely to increase.35
The first apparent conceptual difficulty with deposit ac-
count collateral is that in some deposit account financing ar-
rangements the "account debtor," the entity obligated to pay on
the general intangible, is the same entity as the "secured
party" in the transaction.36 For instance, in the earlier exam-
ple, where the depositary bank both made the $100,000 loan and
retained a security interest in the $20,000 compensating balance
or in its own savings certificate, the bank was both "secured
party" and "account debtor."
Article 9, however, recognizes that a single entity may per-
form both roles. The only form of deposit account presently in-
cluded within article 9 is a negotiable certificate of deposit.3 7
Like the excluded forms of deposit accounts, a negotiable cer-
tificate of deposit represents the bank's promise to repay its de-
positor.3 8 A bank may retain an article 9 security interest in its
own negotiable certificate of deposit.3 9 Upon the customer's de-
34. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
35. The official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 explains that Code sponsors in-
tended that "[t] he Article's flexibility and simplified formalities" would allow
"new forms of secured financing" to fall within its scope. Banks' substantial in-
volvement in installment lending to consumers and small businesses is a re-
cent phenomenon. See Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 Omo ST. I.J. 577, 577
(1982). Currently, banks are actively seeking out such borrowers due to in-
creased deposits attracted by new types of accounts. See supra notes 6-10 and
accompanying text.
36. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (a) ("Account debtor"), (m) ("Secured party").
As explained in the accompanying text, this difficulty has needlessly trou-
bled commentators. See, e.g., Comment, Banking Set-Off. A Study in Commer-
cial Obsolescence, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 1585, 1586-87 (1972).
37. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (e), which excludes a certificate of deposit from
the definition of "deposit account." A certificate of deposit is an "instrument"
within article 9 if it satisfies article 3's formal requisites of "negotiability." See
id. §§ 3-104, 9-105(i). U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (a) provides that article 9, subject to the
§ 9-104 exclusions, applies "to aiiy transaction.., which is intended to create a
security interest in ... instruments."
38. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (c) defines a negotiable certificate of deposit as "an ac-
knowledgment by a bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay it."
39. There is no language in article 9 excluding instruments where a single
entity is both secured party and issuer.
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fault, section 9-502 allows the bank to collect directly from the
account debtor.40 In other words, the bank in its role as se-
cured party can extrajudicially "collect" from itself as borrower
by cancelling its obligation under the deposit agreement to re-
pay the defaulting depositor. If this Article's recommendation
were adopted, banks could enter into the same kind of financ-
ing transaction secured by any form of deposit account of their
customers. Outside creditors also could bargain with the
debtor for a security interest in the deposit account as original
collateral.4 ' Like a creditor who retains a security interest in a
negotiable certificate of deposit issued by another institution,
the secured creditor would collect in the event of default from
the third party obligor-the depositary bank.
The second apparent conceptual difficulty stems from a
more practical distinction, that deposit accounts seem more
susceptible to fluctuations in value due to the depositor's con-
trol and dominion than do other forms of personal property
covered by article 9. When checks are presented and finally
paid, or when the depositor withdraws funds, there is a reduc-
tion in the value of its right to receive payment from the bank,
which is the original collateral securing the loan.
But it was resolved even prior to the Code that -a creditor
does not lose its secured status by permitting the debtor to re-
tain control over collateral during the loan repayment period.
The Code's approach also leaves business judgments about the
value of any particular type of collateral to the secured party.
For example, despite the "precariousness" of nonnotification
nonrecourse accounts receivable financing, article 9 validates
such transactions and provides the "high risk" accounts finan-
cier with relatively clear rules concerning the creation and
perfection of its security interest, as well as its priority vis-a-vis
other creditors. 42
A comparison of the risks of nonnotification nonrecourse
40. U.C.C.§ 9-502 provides in pertinent part-
When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is
entitled to notify an account debtor or the obligor on an instrument to
make payment to him ....
... If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the se-
cured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
Id. § 9-502(I), (2).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 108-70.
42. The history of accounts receivable financing provides a useful analogue
supporting this Article's proposal. Professor Gilmore recounts that from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century it was believed that an interest in a chose
in action could not be conveyed. See 1 G. GrLMORE, upra note 19, § 7.3. But
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accounts receivable financing with the risks of deposit account
financing reveals that some creditors may prefer deposit ac-
count financing. If the collateral is accounts receivable and the
account debtors do not pay and are judgment-proof, the collat-
eral is worthless-there is no recourse against the principal
debtor. Moreover, if the principal debtor does not complete
performance of its obligations to the account debtors, the ac-
count debtors have no obligation to pay the secured creditor.43
This form of financing exposes the secured party to a substan-
tial risk of fraud: the principal debtor may not remit all pro-
ceeds collected to the secured party, it may exaggerate the
amount of its account, it may create wholly fictitious accounts,
or it may hypothecate only questionable accounts.4 4
during the nineteenth century, English decisions began to validate such assign-
ments, characterizing the assignees' interests as "equitable". Id.
The law governing accounts receivable financing in this country also was
judge-made until the 1940s. Id. § 8.1. In the seminal case of Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925), the Supreme Court held that nonnotification accounts re-
ceivable financing was "fraudulent" because of the principal debtor's continued
dominion over the accounts. Id. at 360-61. Following the Great Depression,
however, as accounts receivable financing became more important and preva-
lent, lenders attempted to get around the Benedict rule by devising arrange-
ments which appeared to require creditor supervision of the debtor's use of the
accounts. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 8.3; Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism
and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659, 667 (1968).
Dissatisfaction with the post-Benedict case-by-case resolution of accounts
receivable issues led states during the 1940s and early 1950s to enact laws sanc-
tioning these arrangements. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 8.6. Although a few
of the early statutes merely validated the common law right to assign such in-
terests, most statutes required the secured party to give public notice of its in-
terest. Id. § 8.7.
This pattern was followed in article 9. The Code validates nonnotification
nonrecourse accounts receivable arrangements, but the secured creditor must
give public notice of its interest to obtain the status of a creditor with a per-
fected security interest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-205, -302, -304, -305. Without such sta-
tus, the creditor will lose to other creditors both in and out of bankruptcy. See
id. §§ 9-301(1)(b), (3), 9-312; 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1) (1982).
If this Article's proposal were implemented, the development of deposit ac-
count collateral would parallel this history of accounts receivable financing.
The common law right to set-off is in many respects the functional equivalent
of a security interest in a deposit account. More traditional consensual liens
against deposit accounts are governed by the common law of pledge and as-
signments. The recommendation here is to create a statutory right that would
displace the common law. The codification of such a right would require that
the depositary institution give public notice of its interest See infra text ac-
companying notes 237-78, 396-440.
43. U.C.C. § 9-318(1) (a) provides that absent an enforceable waiver of de-
fense clause "the rights of an assignee [the secured creditor] are subject to...
all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor [the
principal debtor] and any defense or claim arising therefrom."
44. See B. CLARY, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1 11.1, .4, .5 (1980); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, §§ 41.1-.11;
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With deposit account financing, on the other hand, the ac-
count debtor-a licensed depositary institution--can be ex-
pected, absent insolvency, to repay its obligation under the
deposit agreement. To enter the credit business, the depositary
institution had to establish a minimum level of capital, exper-
tise, and overall creditworthiness to provide assurance that it
would meet its debts. Its commercial success may depend on
its public image for security and reliability. Moreover, with re-
spect to certain types of deposit accounts,45 there may be sig-
nificant legal or contractual limits on depositor withdrawals.
For example, if the collateral is a three and one-half year
nonnegotiable, nontransferable savings certificate, there is less
danger of dissipation than in the case where the depositor is
left in possession of a comparable negotiable certificate of de-
posit.4 6 The depositor may have no right to withdraw the
$10,000 in the nonnegotiable certificate before the maturity
date, or partial withdrawal may be prohibited, or early with-
drawal may cost the depositor six months' simple interest, even
if forfeit of that amount reduces the $10,000 principal.47 Yet ar-
ticle 9 covers the latter but not the former.
Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE
LJ. 217 (1964).
45. See supra note 10 (describing different types of deposit account
collateral).
46. The "terms and agreements" of the institution issuing the nonnegoti-
able certificate of deposit may specify that it is "non-assignable (except on the
Books of the Bank), non-negotiable, [and] non-transferable." See Terms and
Agreements, First American Bank, NA, Wash., D.C., at 6-7 (Oct. 1983). Under
the common law of assignments, contract terms expressly prohibiting assign-
ments of rights, even though narrowly construed, can render a purported trans-
fer ineffective. In the more usual case, the contract terms are construed to give
the obligor (the depositary bank) a right to damages against the assignor (the
depositor) but the assignment is effective. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNmACTs § 322(2) (b) (1979). The Uniform Commercial Code goes further and
renders all such antiassignment terms ineffective. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
Even where the assignment is effective, the nonnegotiable instrument is
more difficult to transfer because the assignee will not obtain holder in due
course status. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 7.6, at 211. Accordingly, the
contract right acquired by the assignee (the purchaser of the nonnegotiable in-
strument) is subject to any defenses or claims that the obligor (the issuer of
the nonnegotiable instrument) could raise against the assignor (the depositor).
See U.C.C. § 9-318(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1979). A
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument takes free of such claims and
defenses. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, -305, 9-309.
47. In August of 1983, the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
(DIDC) eliminated interest rate ceilings on time deposits with a maturity of
more than 31 days. 48 Fed. Reg. 38,455-57 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1204.123). In addition, the committee removed interest rate ceilings on time
deposits of $2,500 or more with notice periods of 7 to 31 days, id., and reduced
the minimum early withdrawal penalty for the deposit account described in the
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The risk of fluctuation in value, of course, is greater with
demand accounts than with certificates of deposit. But the pop-
ular interest-bearing checking accounts require, by law and
contract, maintenance of sizeable average monthly balances.4 8
In addition, the secured party and the depositor could negotiate
an individualized agreement circumscribing the depositor's
ability to draw down the account. The secured creditor, when
not also the depositary institution, could require, as a term of
the loan, that the debtor obtain the depositary institution's
promise to abide by the special agreement. Finally, the deposi-
tor, for its own business reasons, may need a sizeable general
account to handle daily receipts and disbursements 4 9
Deposit account collateral is preferable in certain respects
to some forms of tangible collateral. Difficult valuation
problems can be avoided as depreciation and obsolescence
need not be considered. In the event of default, foreclosure on
a deposit account is less costly than foreclosure on tangible col-
lateral. Particularly where the lender is the depositary institu-
tion, modem banking records of daily account activity facilitate
text from six months' interest to three months' interest, id. at 38,457 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. 1204.103(b) (3)).
Banks and thrift institutions are likely to continue to set minimums and
impose penalties by deposit agreement that exceed present or future legal re-
quirements. Depositary institutions primarily seeking wealthy customers, for
example, may establish higher minimums and penalties than lenders trying to
attract small depositors. See Ross & Murphy, Interest Deposit Caps Lifted on
Saving, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1983, Washington Business Weekly Magazine at 1,
col. 3. A survey of money market deposit and SuperNOW accounts offered by
176 commercial banks and savings and loans in the sixth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict in April 1983 showed variation in minimum balances, checkwriting privi-
leges and charges, penalties for below minimum balances, and interest
payments. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 15-23.
48. The DIDC voted in October 1983 to eliminate the $2,500 minimum bal-
ance on money market deposit and SuperNOW accounts by January 1, 1986.
Wash. Post, supra note 47, at 29, col. 3. But banks and thrift institutions may
continue minimum balance requirements. Today, some depositary institutions
insist on a $5,000 minimum balance, although the legal requirement is only
$2,500. See id.
49. Federal Reserve Board money stock figures show that of approximately
$2,100 billion in demand deposits, other checkable deposits, and savings and
time deposits held in all depositary institutions, approximately 16.8% is in
checkable demand deposits and another 17.4% is in money market deposit ac-
counts permitting limited check transfers. See supra note 6.
A Federal Reserve survey estimates that in June 1983 there were $289.5 bil-
lion of demand deposits (in commercial banks) owned by individuals, partner-
ships, and corporations. Nonfinancial businesses owned approximately 51%
($147.7 billion), consumers owned 30% ($86.9 billion), and financial businesses,
foreign individuals, and foreign partnerships or corporations owned the remain-
der. 69 FED. RESERVE Bu. A 25 (1983).
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inexpensive monitoring of the depositor's compliance with con-
sensual or legal restrictions on depletion of the account.
These observations are consistent with actual banking
practices. Borrowers who maintain deposit accounts in the
bank can obtain car loans at lower rates.5 0 The bank relies on
both the car and the deposit account as collateral. Bankers,
testifying before Congress in 1976 to urge their right to set-off
in bankruptcy proceedings, explained that the right to set-off is
taken into consideration when a loan is negotiated, particularly
when the potential borrower is "second tier" or "high risk"; that
the right to set-off is reflected in the cost of capital; and that
banks assume they will have a continuing relationship with
these customers.51 A 1972 survey of one hundred banks in the
Eleventh Federal Reserve District showed that "nearly 60% re-
quire compensating balances on some types of loans,"52 that
large banks have required such balances since before 1950, and
that there is an increasing trend among small banks to do so.
Two-thirds of the banks surveyed allowed their customers to
use either time or demand deposits to meet the collateral re-
quirements. 3 The Comptroller of the Currency recently
promulgated regulations creating an exception to national bank
lending limits for extensions of credit in cases where the lend-
ing bank has been assigned segregated deposit accounts as
50. For example, in November 1983 First American Bank, NA, in Washing-
ton, D.C., offered automobile loans to its customers at one percent below its
normal rate if the customer agreed to an automatic debit of the monthly loan
repayments from a deposit account maintained at the bank.
51. See A Capital Markets Analysis of Proposed Changes to the Bank-
ruptcy Act-the Impact on Commercial Bank Lending: Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2484, 2499, 2502, 2505, 2507, 2508
(1976) for the statement of John W. Ingraham, Vice-President and Senior Of-
ficer, Citibank, NA, New York, N.Y. Mr. Ingraham represented the Robert
Morris Associates Task Force, an association of 6000 bank loan and credit of-
ficers who in turn represent about 1650 banks holding 78% of the United
States's commercial banking resources. See id. at 2484, 2497; see also Commit-
tee on Developments in Business Financing (ABA), Structuring and Docu-
menting Business Financing Transactions under the Federal Bankruptcy Code
of 1978, 35 Bus. LAw. 1645, 1688-91 (1980) (Many institutional lenders require
borrowers to maintain cash deposits with the institution during the loan repay-
ment period-in part to help meet the institution's reserve requirements, in
part as a pricing mechanism, and in part to provide security for the loan by way
of set-off or through an assignment of an interest in the accounts.); Mackara,
The ABC's of the Prime Rate, MoNTmY REV.: FED. RESERVE BANK ATLAirNA,
July 1974, at 100-05 (describing use of compensating balance requirements to
establish effective lending rates).
52. Am. Banker, Mar. 31, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
53. See id.
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collateral.5 4
Why then does article 9 exclude security interests in de-
posit account collateral despite their functional similarity to
other financing transactions that are covered? The cryptic offi-
cial comment to section 9-104 recognizes that deposit accounts
"are often put up as collateral."55 But it goes on to state that
"[s]uch transactions are often quite special [and] do not fit
easily under a general commercial statute."5 6
When compared with other article 9 secured transactions,
however, deposit account financing ceases to appear so special.
Rather, deposit financing fits more easily into the Code's defini-
tion of a security interest in personal property than do other ar-
rangements, such as sales of accounts, that are forced into the
article 9 framework.5 7 The considerations that justify bringing
outright sales of accounts under the article 9 "umbrella" sug-
54. See National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,849, 15,856
(1983). To qualify for the exception the bank must take whatever steps are re-
quired under non-Code law to obtain a security assignment of the bank ac-
count, but it may not rely on its right to set-off. Id. at 15,849.
55. U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 7 (emphasis added).
56. Id. A subsequent law review article by Professors Kripke and Coogan,
both participants in the drafting of article 9, suggested without elaboration that
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral should not have
been excluded from the Code. See Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes
of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Depos-
its, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARv. L. REV.
229, 265 (1965).
Others have reached the same conclusion without specifying what addi-
tional changes in the Code would be necessary or recognizing that such a se-
curity interest should displace the common law right to set-off in banking
transactions. See, e.g., Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing
Under Article 9 (pt. 1), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 47-48 (1979).
57. In an outright sale of accounts, the principal debtor has no remaining
obligation to pay the secured creditor, and the secured party has complete title
to the personal property rather than a conditional property interest in it. None-
theless, U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (a) expressly covers sales of accounts. See U.C.C. § 9-
102(1) (a) comment 2.
Many consignments are also subject to article 9 filing requirements and pri-
ority rules. A true "consignment sale" is subject to § 2-326(3). See id. § 1-
201(37). In order for the consignor to protect itself from the claims of consign-
ees' creditors, the consignor ordinarily will make an article 9 permissive filing.
See id. §§ 2-326(3) (c), 9-408; see, e.g., In re Webb, 13 U.C.C. REP. 394 (S.D. Tex.
1973). See generally D. BAiRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON SECURY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 463 (1984). If the transaction
appears to be a consignment but was intended to create an article 9 security
interest, all of article 9's requirements apply. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2).
Article 9 also covers "phony leases"--leases intended to create security in-
terests but described in terms that suggest a bailment. See id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-
102(2). Commentators have forcefully argued that, at least with respect to pub-
lic filing requirements and priorities, true leases, like sales of accounts, should
also be brought within the scope of article 9. See Ayer, On the Vacuity of the
Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IowA L. REV. 667 (1983); Baird & Jackson, Possession
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gest additional policy reasons for coverage of deposit account
collateral. Both arrangements are commercially important and
create risks of "secret liens."5 8
The official comment to section 9-104 also proclaims that
loans secured by bank accounts are "adequately covered by ex-
isting law."5 9 This statement is not accurate. 60 Moreover, as
another commentator has suggested in an analogous context,
even if the non-Code law were "adequate," whatever that
means, bringing these transactions into the article 9 framework
would simplify, clarify, and make more uniform the law of se-
cured transactions. 6 1
The history of the exclusion of demand accounts from the
Code is slightly more illuminating than is the laconic official
comment. Beginning with the 1955 supplement to the 1952 offi-
cial draft of article 9,62 the Code sponsors expressly excluded
both bank deposit accounts and the banks' right to set-off
against such accounts.63 Professor Gilmore has stated that
banking groups were responsible for the exclusion of the right
to set-off;64 another commentator has surmised that they also
may have been the force behind the deposit account
exclusion.65
Professor Gilmore explains:
This exclusion [of the right to set-off] is an apt example of the absurdi-
ties which result when draftsmen attempt to appease critics by putting
into a statute something that is not in any sense wicked but is hope-
lessly irrelevant. Of course a right of set-off is not a security interest
and has never been confused with one: the statute might as appropri-
ately exclude fan dancing. A bank's right of set-off against a deposi-
tor's account is often loosely referred to as a "banker's lien," but the
"lien" usage has never led anyone to think that the bank held a secur-
ity interest in the bank account. Banking groups were, however, con-
cerned lest someone, someday, might think that a bank's right of set-
off, because it was called a lien, was a security interest. Hence the ex-
clusion, which does no harm except to the dignity and self-respect of
and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STA. L. REV. 175
(1983).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 237-78.
59. U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 7.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 279-373 (discussing priority battles
among assignees and competing claimants for deposit accounts).
61. See Harris, supra note 25, at 360-61.
62. ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNiFoRM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE: SuPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFIcIAL DRAFr OF TExT AND
COMMENTs 61-62 (1955).
63. See U.C.C. §§ 9-104(i), (j) (1955).
64. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 10.7, at 315-16.
65. See Harris, supra note 25, at 362.
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the draftsmen.66
This Article vindicates the banking groups' concern as Gil-
more reports it. The conceptual and historical distinctions
among the banker's lien, the right to set-off, non-Code security
assignments of interests in bank accounts, the pledge, and an
article 9 security interest in a deposit account as original collat-
eral are neither "confused" nor "ignored."67 Instead, if article 9
were expanded and displaced the common law of security as-
signments and pledge, banks and other creditors would be bet-
ter able to create consensual security interests in deposit
accounts. There would no longer be any need to preserve the
banks' right to set-off, which arises by operation of law. More-
over, because of the functional similarity between a security in-
terest (whether created by assignment, pledge, or under article
9 as proposed) and a right to set-off, the continued existence of
the common law doctrine of set-off would undermine the pur-
poses of article 9 and unacceptably favor depositary institu-
tions over other creditors.
Having concluded that there are historical, conceptual, and
practical reasons for including consensual arrangements in-
volving deposit account collateral in article 9, the relationship
between a security interest in such collateral and the bank's
right to set-off must now be explored.
B. THE BANx's RIGHT TO SET-OFF
The equitable doctrine of set-off provides that parties who
are "mutually indebted" to each other can extinguish their
cross-demands.68 In the credit context, the depositary institu-
tion is a "borrower" with respect to the funds deposited and a
"creditor" with respect to the advance given its customer. The
customer is a "creditor" with respect to the deposit made and a
"borrower" with respect to the loan received. If the customer
defaults, it may be unfair to require the depositary institution
to repay its obligation in full, particularly if the customer is in
difficult financial straits and likely to be insolvent before the
66. 1 G. GiLmORE, supra note 19, § 10.7, at 315-16.
67. The banker's lien arises by operation of law. Unlike either the right to
set-off or this Article's proposed security interest, the banker's lien is a charge
against all tangible and quasi-tangible property of the customer in the bank's
possession such as securities or commercial paper. The banker's lien does not
attach to the customer's chose in action against the bank arising out of the de-
posit agreement. See Note, Banking Setoff. A Study in Commercial Obsoles-
cence, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 1585, 1586-87 & nn.8-10 (1972); see also 5A MIcHE, supra
note 32, § 165.
68. See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
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depositary institution can prosecute a separate action on the
debt. Under the common law notion "that a man should not be
compelled to pay one moment what he will be entitled to re-
cover back the next,"69 the depositary institution can, without a
court order or customer consent, reduce unilaterally its obliga-
tion under the deposit agreement by the amount of the repay-
ment it should have received but did not.7 0
From a functional standpoint, the most important differ-
ence between an article 9 security interest and the right to set-
off is that the former is consensual while the latter usually
arises by operation of law.71 Foreclosure on an article 9 secur-
ity interest in a deposit account, like set-off, would provide the
creditor with a prejudgment, self-help remedy against the de-
positor's chose in action.
If article 9 were expanded to cover security interests in de-
posit accounts as original collateral, displacing the common law
of assignments and pledge, what should become of the common
law right to set-off? Lenders could be allowed both to create a
consensual security interest by using article 9 and retain the
common law right to set-off, enjoying all the rights and reme-
dies afforded by the Code and by the common law. 72 Alterna-
tively, lenders could be put to an election: if they create an
article 9 security interest, they waive their common law right.
Or, as is recommended here, the Code could provide expressly
that its coverage in article 9 of security interests in deposit ac-
counts as original collateral displaces altogether the right to
69. Loyd, The Development of Set-off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916).
70. See TeSelle, Banker's Right of Set-Off-Banker Beware, 34 OxrA. I-
REV. 40, 40-43 (1981).
71. See id. at 40; Murray, Banks Versus Creditors of Their Customers: Set-
Offs Against Customers' Accounts, 82 CoM. L.J. 449, 449-50 (1977); Note, supra
note 67, at 1587-88. But see supra note 31.
72. Such cumulative remedies are permitted under the present law, as
long as the depositary institution does not obtain more than a single satisfac-
tion of the debt. For example, if its customer pledges a deposit account as col-
lateral or executes an assignment of such deposit account in favor of the
depositary institution, on the customer's default, the bank can set-off or fore-
close. See infra note 452 and accompanying text Similarly, where the deposi-
tary institution retains an article 9 security interest in its own negotiable
certificate of deposit, it can either foreclose under article 9 or exercise its com-
mon law right to set-off. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501(1), -502.
In California, which permits the retention of an article 9 security interest in
all deposit accounts, depositary institutions also may assert an extrajudicial
right to set-off. See CAT. CIV. CODE § 3054 (West 1974); CAT_ CIv. Paoc. CODE
§ 431.70 (West 1973); see also Gonsalves v. Bank of Am., 16 Cal 2d 169, 173, 105
P.2d 118, 121 (1940); Arnold v. San Ramon Valley Bank, 184 Cal. 632, 636, 194 P.
1012, 1013 (1921). This Article proposes a more substantial revision of the law.
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set-off in modern credit transactions. 73
1. The History of the Right to Set-Off
Before concluding that the common law right to set-off
should be displaced, one must examine its origin and subse-
quent history to ascertain whether any policy favors its preser-
vation in the context of modern banking transactions. The
right to extrajudicial and nonconsensual set-off originated in
Roman law. The notion that one of two mutually indebted par-
ties can unilaterally extinguish cross-demands in advance of
trial developed in response to jurisdictional and procedural
problems that no longer exist-namely, the inability of parties
to join counterclaims before courts.74 Modern rules of civil pro-
cedure now permit such joinder. If creditors for other reasons
want the power to foreclose unilaterally on deposit accounts in
advance of trial, they should be required to bargain with their
debtors for such rights. Substitution of the article 9 framework
for the common law right of automatic set-off would accomplish
that result.
To understand the origins of the common law doctrine, con-
sider the plight of a depositary lender in Rome in 350 B.C. that
has no right to set-off. A depositor that has borrowed funds de-
faults and the lender refuses to repay the deposit. If the depos-
itor brings an action on the deposit agreement, the lender
cannot raise the question of the depositor's default in the same
case; accordingly, the depositor would win. Although the
lender may not owe anything when the reciprocal debts are
netted, it must bring a subsequent action to recover the
amount it would not have been ordered to pay had a procedure
existed for joining counterclaims. In the meantime, the deposi-
tor would enjoy the award from the first action.
Extrajudicial, nonconsensual set-off prevents the depositor
from thus recovering on the chose in action against the lender
without simultaneously answering for the depositor's own
breach of the separate loan agreement. The lender unilaterally
extinguishes its obligation to repay the deposit before the de-
positor even sues on the deposit agreement.7 5
73. A new Code section or an official comment could state explicitly that
the right to set-off was abolished. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
74. Comment, supra note 3, at 227.
75. See id. at 226-28.
As explained below and in subsequent sections of this Article, banks have
advantages over secured and general creditors by virtue of the common law
right to set-off. But in Roman times, the right to set-off was used to limit banks'
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Under modern rules of civil procedure, if the depositor
sues, the bank can join its cause of action on the loan as a
counterclaim.7 6 Then the court will supervise the set-off; both
parties will have notice and an opportunity to be heard on each
of their contractual claims. Yet the common law right to set-off
anomalously continues to coexist with these now adequate pro-
cedures for judicial resolution of all matters between two par-
ties. This result is possibly attributable to nothing other than
inertia and historical accident.77
But there is another equally plausible explanation. The
right to set-off is a powerful prejudgment self-help remedy. Al-
though its historic purpose was to aid parties who were "shut
out" of the judicial process, it is defended vigorously today by
creditors who, with good reason, believe it is in their best legal
and business interests to avoid going to court.
When a bank asserts its common law right, it simply halts
performance under the deposit agreement without notice to the
depositor or judicial hearing-refusing to honor the depositor's
checks or withdrawal requests. Only if the depositor later
brings an action and establishes that there was no default on
the loan will the bank be penalized. By contrast, if both claims
required judicial resolution, the bank would immediately lose
control of the deposit account. At best, by application to the
rights. Id. at 230, 234, 276 n.312. If a bank sued its depositor for defaulting on a
loan and failed to set-off the amount it owed the depositor under the deposit
agreement, it could lose its entire claim because of the overstatement. See
Loyd, supra note 69, at 542.
Automatic extinction of cross-demands helped maintain a system of feudal
justice in northern France during the thirteenth century. Lords would not tol-
erate the adjudication of claims concerning their land or vassals in the courts of
other lords as counterclaims. Automatic extinction avoided direct confronta-
tion while permitting consideration of both transactions. Comment, supra note
3, at 235-41. In contrast, procedures in the ecclesiastical courts, which did not
have such jurisdictional problems, were similar to modern procedures gov-
erning counterclaims; the secular courts permitted only judicially supervised
set-off, both claims were heard in a single proceeding, and the judge rendered a
single judgment. Id. at 242-44.
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
77. For example, in 1851 a California statute was enacted that included a
provision subsequently interpreted to permit extrajudicial nonconsensual set-
off. See Comment, supra note 3, at 258-64. The same statute also established
liberalized rules of civil procedure permitting joinder of counterclaims. It is not
clear whether David Dudley Field, who worked on an earlier version of the stat-
ute, intended this result. See id. at 252-57. In California today a bank can rely
on its equitable right to set-off, can create and enforce an article 9 security in-
terest, or can join its counterclaim when sued by the depositor on the deposit
agreement. See supra note 72; sources cited supra note 44; see also CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 427.10, 428.10-.30, .80 (West 1973) (permissive rules on joinder of
"crosscomplaints").
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court and following notice to the depositor and a hearing,78 the
bank might obtain prejudgment provisional relief.79 Until entry
of final judgment, however, the court, not the bank, would con-
trol the deposit account and would adopt measures preventing
dissipation by either party.8 0
Others have urged that, given concerns about procedural
due process 8 ' and the demise of restrictive rules of civil proce-
dure, extrajudicial foreclosure on deposit accounts should be
forbidden altogether.82 The proposal here is less draconian. By
substituting article 9 rights and remedies for the common law
right to set-off, creditors could still extinguish cross-demands in
deposit accounts without going to court, but only with express
advance consent from the debtor in the form of a written grant
of a security interest in the deposit account83 or by delivery of
an "indispensable instrument."8 4 Congress adopted a similar
78. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); see also Bernhardt v. Commodity Option Co., 187 Colo. 89, 528 P.2d 919
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
79. The states have their own individualized procedures for prejudgment
attachment or garnishment. Here the bank-by asking the court to sanction a
"freeze" of the depositor's bank account pending trial on the counterclaim-
would in effect be seeking attachment of the depositor's right, based on the de-
posit agreement, to repayment on demand. As with other more conventional
forms of attachment, the bank would have to file a bond and establish by affida-
vit a statutorily specified substantive ground. For example, the bank might be
able to show that its claim is for breach of a loan contract and that the deposi-
tor is unlikely to have a meritorious defense. See D. EPsTEin & J. LANDERS,
DEBTORS AND CREDrroRs: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-8 (2d ed. 1982).
80. See generally 7 C.J.S. Attachment §§ 180, 181, 229 (1980).
81. Due process requirements do not apply to extrajudicial set-off; courts
have uniformly held that neither the exercise of the common law right to set-off
nor self-help repossession under article 9 constitutes "state action." See, e.g.,
Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) (self-help
repossession not "state action"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Kruger v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (set-off
not "state action").
82. See, e.g., Note, supra note 67. New York prohibits set-off against de-
posit accounts containing direct deposits of social security or "supplemental se-
curity income" payments. N.Y. BANING LAw § 9-g (McKinney Supp. 1983).
83. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (a); see also infra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text. This approach is consistent with the early common law and chancery
practice in England; set-off was permitted under judicial supervision or extraju-
dicially where there was an accord between "mutually indebted" parties. Com-.
ment, supra note 3, at 248-52.
84. The Restatement of Security defines "indispensable instrument" as
"the formal written evidence of an interest in intangibles, so representing the
intangible that the enjoyment, transfer or enforcement of the intangible de-
pends upon possession of the instrument." RESTATEMENT OF SEcunrn § 1 com-
ment e (1941).
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approach in the Fair Credit Billing Act,85 which prohibits a
bank from setting off a debt arising from a consumer's use of a
bank credit card, unless the cardholder has earlier authorized
payment of such obligations out of the deposit account.8 6
In taking this intermediate approach, the assumption is
that the use of secured transactions, facilitated by article 9, en-
hances the social welfare of all creditors and debtors. Some
scholars disagree.8 7 They question whether article 9 in its pres-
ent form is economically efficient and whether it unfairly redis-
tributes wealth from unsophisticated creditors, who do not
request security for a variety of reasons including ignorance
and industry custom, to sophisticated creditors, who make use
of the Code's generous provisions.8 8
Even these critics presumably would agree that substitu-
tion of an article 9 security interest for the doctrine of set-off
would reduce the social costs of borrowing. So long as a depos-
itary institution has the option to rely on set-off, it enjoys the
85. Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
86. The pertinent provision of the Fair Credit Billing Act states:
(a) A card issuer may not take any action to offset a cardholder's in-
debtedness arising in connection with a consumer credit transaction
under the relevant credit card plan against funds of the cardholder
held on deposit with the card issuer unless-
(1) such action was previously authorized in writing by the card-
holder in accordance with a credit plan whereby the cardholder
agrees periodically to pay debts incurred in his open end credit ac-
count by permitting the card issuer periodically to deduct all or a
portion of such debt from the cardholder's deposit account, and
(2) such action with respect to any outstanding disputed amount
not be taken by the card issuer upon request of the cardholder.
(b) This section does not alter or affect the right under State law of a
card issuer to attach or otherwise levy upon funds of a cardholder held
on deposit with the card issuer if that remedy is constitutionally avail-
able to creditors generally.
Id. § 169, 88 Stat. at 1515 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 1666h (1982)).
Congress considered but rejected an outright prohibition against all set-offs
because some banks offer a combination check credit and credit card plan at
lower finance charges for consumers and lower discount rates for participating
merchants. See S. REP. No. 92-750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (April 17, 1972).
Maryland prohibits automatic set-off against savings and checking accounts
where the depositor used borrowed funds to finance the purchase of consumer
goods and did not previously consent to set-off. See MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN.
§ 15-702 (1983). Louisiana, North Dakota, and South Carolina also require some
form of debtor consent See 1 W. SCHUCHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING
LAw § 11.04 n.8 (1983).
87. See Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review
of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1981).
88. Id.
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economic advantages of being a secured creditor and more,
without paying any of the costs.
Creditors who retain article 9 security interests can reduce
the risks and costs of default. Like unsecured creditors, they
cannot accurately estimate the likelihood of default, the
number and size of competing claims against the debtor's as-
sets should default occur, or what the debtor's worth will be.
By taking a security interest, however, they can predict with
some precision the priority of their claims in the encumbered
portion of the debtor's pool of assets.89 The debtor may, of
course, dissipate that collateral in advance of default. But it is
less expensive for secured parties to monitor the encumbered
property during the loan repayment period than it is for un-
secured creditors to keep track of all the debtor's property.90
Finally, should default occur, collection costs for secured credi-
tors are reduced. Without going to court, they can foreclose on
the collateral and retain or sell it to satisfy the obligation out-
standing.91 The creditor with a common law right to set-off also
enjoys these benefits.
There are, however, some costs in obtaining an article 9 se-
curity interest. In a perfect market, the risk-averse creditor
must bargain with the debtor to obtain the security interest
and must pay for it in the form of a lower interest charge, a
larger advance, or some other term of value to the debtor.92 In
addition, the secured creditor bears the expense of giving pub-
lic notice,93 enabling subsequent creditors to assess the
debtor's debt/collateral ratio and to increase their charges for
lending if appropriate and permissible under state law.
But the depositary institution with a right to set-off pays
virtually none of these costs. If the depositor borrows from the
bank where it keeps its deposit accounts, the right to set-off
arises automatically without bargaining.94 Other creditors are
unlikely to compete to lend on the security of deposit account
collateral because common law priority rules, both in and out
of bankruptcy, favor only the creditor who can obtain the right
to set-off-the depositary institution.95 The depositary bank
does not give public notice of its inchoate interest in the de-
89. Id. at 7-8.
90. Id. at 9-10.
91. Id. at 28 n.50.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Article 9 reduces such costs. Id. at 5.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 108-70.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 108-278, 279-373, 374-440.
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posit account. Subsequent creditors, accordingly, may charge
the debtor an artificially high interest rate to cover the possibil-
ity that the debtor may at some time borrow funds from the de-
positary bank.96
If this Article's recommendation were enacted, depositary
institutions would continue to enjoy the rights and remedies af-
forded other secured creditors under article 9 but would have
to pay for those advantages. 97 To accomplish this result, the
doctrine of set-off, now a historical anachronism, would be abol-
ished, even as an alternative to the "new" article 9 security in-
terest in deposit accounts as original collateral.
2. The Analogy to the Code's Treatment of Service Lienors
Examination of the policies that led Code sponsors to rec-
ognize the continued validity of the common law and statutory
service lien structure helps illuminate why a similar continuing
role for the common law doctrine of set-off would be inappro-
priate. A mechanic who repairs an automobile "on credit" can,
by agreement with the customer, create an article 9 security in-
terest and simultaneously hold a statutory lien for the repair
bill under non-Code law. The mechanic who fails to obtain an
effective security agreement can still assert rights hs a statu-
tory lienor.98 An official comment explains that the drafters of
the Code thought it "unnecessary" to try to codify service liens
because the present law is "in considerable part determined by
local conditions."99 The comment also notes that these transac-
96. See infra text accompanying notes 237-78.
97. The preceding analysis assumes that the depositor-borrower will act
rationally to maximize its economic welfare. Inertia, "sentimental" attachment
to the depositary bank, or other noneconomic factors may lead to continued
borrowing from the depositary institution at a higher than necessary rate.
Were article 9 available to creditors, reducing the transaction costs in-
volved under the more uncertain and inadequate common law of assignments,
an overall increase in the use of deposit account collateral in consensual credit
transactions could result. See generally infra text accompanying notes 108-278.
Critics of article 9 might be disturbed by such a consequence even if they
would approve of abolishing the right to set-off.
98. See generally B. CLanx, supra note 44, 1.8[2], [3]. In some cases, ar-
ticle 9 defers to the priority rules established by this non-Code law. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-310.
99. U.C.C. § 9-104(c) comment 3. With increased urbanization, one can
question whether the drafters actually believed that regional variations neces-
sitated different combinations of liens. See 2 G. GMoRE, supra note 19, § 33.1,
at 872-73. Perhaps they were only seeking to avoid confrontation with political
representatives of industries and with tradespersons favored by the service
lien structure out of a concern that enactment of article 9 might otherwise be
jeopardized. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 10.4, at 306; 2 G. GIMoRE,
supra note 19, § 33.2, at 874. Similar considerations led to the omission of po-
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tions are "far removed from ordinary commercial financing."' 00
The tradespersons and other beneficiaries of the noncon-
sensual, non-Code protections clearly are not professional lend-
ers directly involved in commercial credit transactions. The
mechanic is in the business of repairing automobiles; the in-
vestment of labor and parts in advance of full payment, al-
though arguably an extension of credit, is peripheral to the
central undertaking. Neither the mechanic nor the automobile
owner views the relationship as a credit transaction and they
are unlikely to bargain concerning collateral. lo' Under such cir-
cumstances it is appropriate to supplement consensual ar-
rangements with statutory liens protecting mechanics against
the risk of default, particularly because the state may want to
ensure the continued viability of businesses such as automo-
bile repair shops.
The continued "special protection" of the service lienor is
also rationalized in terms of the limited harm such liens cause
article 9 creditors. Although an earlier article 9 creditor may
lose its priority to the mechanic,102 it purportedly benefits from
the increase in the automobile's value attributable to the repair
work.103 Nor are subsequent article 9 creditors greatly disad-
vantaged. Non-Code law usually requires the mechanic or
other lien beneficiary to give public notice by either retaining
possession of the collateral or filing in a designated public
record.104
In contrast, there would appear to be no justification for
the continued existence of the right to set-off if article 9 were
expanded to cover security interests in deposit accounts as
original collateral. There are no "local conditions" that affect
these major depositary institutions' rights to foreclose on de-
posit accounts. The primary business of these banks and thrift
institutions is to extend credit to, and take billions of dollars of
deposits from, consumers and businesses. 05 In all other as-
tentially controversial provisions concerning protections for consumer debtors.
Kripke, supra note 35, at 583.
100. U.C.C. § 9-104(c) comment 3.
101. In addition, although a typical article 9 creditor is expected to search
public ifies for earlier interests in advance of extending credit, the drafters
thought it unrealistic and unfair to hold small tradespersons to that standard. 2
G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 33.3, at 878.
102. See U.C.C. § 9-310.
103. See id. comment. Note, in contrast, Professor Gilmore's skepticism
over whether this "benefit" is often realized. See 2 G. GILMOIR, supra note 19,
§ 33.3, at 878-81.
104. See 2 G. GiLMORE, supra note 19, § 33.3, at 874.
105. See supra notes 6-10.
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pects of their business, they insist that they be allowed to con-
duct relationships with their depositors on a consensual
basis.106 Surely these professionals do not need a common law
set-off right to augment their carefully drafted agreements with
borrowers.
Moreover, preserving the right to set-off, unlike the service
lien, would present substantial problems for nondepositary
creditors who do not enjoy set-off's benefits. The volume of de-
positary institution lending makes frequent conflicts likely be-
tween creditors claiming a right to set-off and nondepositary
institutions that would have, at best, only the rights and reme-
dies of secured creditors under article 9. Also, depositary insti-
tutions, unlike service lienors, do not enhance the value of
collateral. Finally, different priority rules govern disputes
among creditors when the common law right to set-off is as-
serted. 0 7 Depositary institutions would thus obtain an unfair
advantage over other creditors if they could "pick and choose"
among priority rules, both in and out of bankruptcy, in order to
maximize their recovery from the debtor.
In sum, depositors should be able to grant article 9 security
interests in their deposit accounts to creditors of their choice.
Such consensual financing arrangements, now governed by the
common law of assignments and pledge, can be brought within
the article 9 structure without distorting its theoretical under-
pinnings. For this reform to be effective, however, the common
law right to set-off must also be displaced. It has outlived its
historic equitable purpose. In its modern application, it gives
depositary institutions a powerful extrajudicial remedy against
valuable assets which is not granted by the express consent of
the debtor. Unlike holders of other statutory or common law
liens, such as service liens, the creditors who enjoy this doc-
trine's benefits are professional lenders needing no such "spe-
cial" protection.
106. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) provides in pertinent part:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care... ; but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which such re-
sponsibility is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
Banks customarily incorporate their laws and bylaws into deposit agreements
with their customers.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 279-373.
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II. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATING AN ARTICLE 9
SECURITY INTEREST IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS; THE
DIMENSIONS OF SUCH SECURITY INTERESTS; AND THE
METHOD OF PERFECTING SUCH INTERESTS
This section develops specific recommendations for making
deposit account collateral subject to the provisions of article 9.
In order to effectuate the article 9 goal of creating a unitary and
comprehensive security interest, article 9 rules for other types
of collateral are followed except where changes are necessary
because of the unique characteristics of deposit account collat-
eral. Comparisons are drawn to rules governing banks' com-
mon law right to set-off, as well as to the common law of
assignments and pledge, which presently govern consensual
liens against deposit accounts.
A. THE CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN DEPOSIT
AcCOUNTS AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL
Section 9-203(1) sets forth three general prerequisites for
creating an enforceable article 9 security interest, each of
which could be applied appropriately to deposit accounts as
original collateral.108 First, the depositor must sign a written
security agreement or deliver the collateral to the creditor. 0 9
Either act evidences the depositor's consent to the lien o and
108. If these requirements are satisfied, the security interest "attaches" and
is enforceable against both the debtor and third parties. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
109. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) provides in pertinent part:
[A] security interest is not enforceable... and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which con-
tains a description of the collateral ....
110. A consumer-debtor may not understand that signing a detailed, stan-
dard-form article 9 security agreement, or a combined security agreement and
promissory note, grants a security interest or that such a manifestation of "con-
sent" authorizes the creditor upon default to appropriate the collateral These
problems arise under article 9 with respect to all forms of collateral and would
be a matter of concern if article 9 were expanded to cover deposit account col-
lateral. See generally Credit Practices Rule: Statement of Basis and Purpose
and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740 (1984); Fed. Trade Comm'n, Report
of the Presiding Officer on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices
134-39 (Aug. 11, 1978).
Different solutions to this problem have been proposed at both the state
and federal level that could easily be extended to protect depositors who hy-
pothecate deposit accounts under an expanded article 9. For example, Kansas
requires that the security agreement warn the consumer not to sign the agree-
ment before reading its terms; the security agreement also must disclose that
the consumer may prepay the unpaid balance without incurring a penalty. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-3-202 (1981). The Truth in Lending Act, P.L. 90-321, 82
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eliminates the need to resort to parol evidence in the event of a
dispute concerning the parties' intentions."' The depositor
could enter into such a security agreement with, or deliver pos-
session of the collateral to, either a depositary institution or an
outside creditor. Moreover, if the depositor chose to use a se-
curity agreement, it could grant security interests in its deposit
account as original collateral to more than one creditor, either
simultaneously or sequentially.112
Article 9 requires that the written security agreement in-
clude a general description of the collateral1 3 sufficient to "rea-
sonably" identify "what is described."14 A somewhat more
stringent description requirement should be enacted for de-
posit account collateral. Additional information is necessary to
Stat. 146, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.), and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, require disclosure of all "se-
curity interests," but the right of set-off need only be disclosed in connection
with credit card transactions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(a) (7), 1638(a) (10), 1666h
(1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a) (25), 226.6(c), 226.12(d) (1983); see also Truth in
Lending: Official Staff Commentary, 46 Fed. Reg. 50288, 50296 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Official Staff Commentary I (Federal Reserve Board official staff interpreta-
tion of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a) (25)). The federal act requires neither
separate "authorizing language" nor separate signatures or initialing. See, e.g.,
Official Staff Commentary, supra, at 50314 (interpreting 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.12(d) (2)). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Credit Practices Rule,
49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 444), makes the retention
of a non-purchase money security interest in specified household goods a viola-
tion of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
§ 444.2(a) (4)).
Depending on the nature of the consumer credit protection statute, the def-
inition of what constitutes a "consumer deposit account" could vary. For exam-
ple, a state could require inclusion of the "Kansas disclosures" in any security
agreement covering a deposit account used "primarily for personal, family or
household purposes." See U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (definition of "consumer goods").
On the other hand, in applying the FTC Credit Practices Rule's prohibition
of non-purchase money security interests, the size, as well as the purpose, of
the deposit account might be taken into consideration. See, e.g., U.C.C.C.
§ 1.301(15) (1974) (definition of "consumer loan"). Thus, for example, the rule
might proscribe retention of a non-purchase money security interest in a de-
posit account used primarily for household purposes, with a balance of less
than $5,000 on the day credit was extended.
111. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (a) thus operates as a statute of frauds for secured
transactions. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 11.4, at 345-46; U.C.C. § 9-203
comment 5.
112. As explained below, see infra text accompanying notes 237-78, a subse-
quent potential creditor could discover the earlier creditor's interest in the de-
posit account by searching public records. With that information, the
subsequent potential creditor could either abandon the deal, enter into an
agreement with the debtor (secured by the deposit account) on terms that re-
flect the higher risk, or attempt to obtain a subordination agreement from the
earlier creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-316.
113. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
114. Id. § 9-110 ("any description of personal property ... is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described").
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enable the depositor and its creditors to allocate the value rep-
resented by the balance in the account in a manner that will
neither invite subsequent disagreements between the parties
nor mislead third parties.115 Specifically, article 9 should re-
quire that the security agreement's "description" of deposit ac-
count collateral include, at a minimum, the name of the
depositary institution, that institution's identifying number for
the account hypothecated, and the sum within the account allo-
cated to secure the particular loan.116
Compliance with these formal requirements would not be
overly burdensome for creditors. Depositary and nondeposi-
tary creditors presently take article 9 security interests in tan-
gible,117 quasi-tangible,"i8 and intangible1 9 property. These
creditors have standard form security agreements and guide-
lines for the negotiation of individualized security agreements.
Most of these forms and guidelines, with minor modifications,
could be used for security interests in deposit accounts as origi-
nal collateral. Advances or lines of credit will often be secured
by more than one form of collateral. Only one security agree-
ment need be executed. 120 The description of the deposit ac-
count collateral could simply be added where the more
traditional collateral is now listed. Given the sophistication
and accuracy of bank record keeping, neither a depositary cred-
itor nor an outside creditor (through the debtor) would have
difficulty obtaining and accurately recording the necessary
115. Consider, for example, the debtor who decides to hypothecate $2,000 of
the value of a $10,000 deposit account to the depositary institution to secure a
$3,000 advance and another $5,000 of the value of the same deposit account to
an outside creditor who provides a line of credit on more favorable terms. Each
creditor needs to discover the existence and size of the other's interest in the
account. Moreover, this information is necessary to permit application of com-
mon law tracing rules to commingled funds.
116. It is proposed that these additional requirements be added as a second
sentence to the present U.C.C. § 9-110. That section's guidelines apply both to
security agreements and financing statements. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1); 1 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 19, § 11.4, at 348-49 n.7. This Article recommends, see infra
text accompanying notes 237-78, that filing of a financing statement be required
to perfect a security interest in deposit accounts as original collateral; ready ac-
cess to this minimal identifying information would be helpful to third parties
using the public notice files.
117. Tangible property covered by article 9 includes "all things which are
movable ... or which are fixtures." See U.C.C. § 9-105(h).
118. Quasi-tangible personal property covered by article 9 includes "docu-
ments," "instruments," and "chattel paper." See id. § 9-105(b), (f), (i).
119. Intangible property includes "accounts" and "general intangibles." See
id. § 9-106.
120. One of the significant improvements of article 9 over pre-Code security
law is that only one set of formalities to create an encumbrance must be satis-
fied for most types of personal property.
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identifying information.12 1
A second prerequisite to creation of an article 9 security in-
terest is that the debtor have "rights in the collateral."'
1 22 Arti-
cle 9 defers to other articles in the Code and to non-Code law
for resolution of issues concerning the debtor's ownership or
other authority to hypothecate collateral.123 A similar approach
could be followed in ascertaining whether the debtor had the
right to encumber a deposit account and, if so, to what extent.
Thus, non-Code law would govern questions such as whether
one of two signatories on a joint checking account could grant
an article 9 security interest without the other's consent;
whether a partner could encumber a partnership's nonnegoti-
able savings certificate in order to obtain a personal loan; or
whether a trustee would exceed its authority by signing a se-
curity agreement covering the trust's deposit account.
124
Article 9's final prerequisite is that the secured party give
"value," ordinarily in the form of money advanced or delivery
of goods on credit.125 As with other more traditional collateral,
there is no need in a commercial statute to regulate gifts of in-
terests in deposit accounts.126
121. The text of U.C.C. § 9-110 and the accompanying official comment make
it clear that article 9 rejects the "serial number" test which was employed in
pre-Code chattel mortgage cases and statutes. See B. CLARK, supra note 44,
1 2.9[5] [c]; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 11.4. The proposal here for more de-
tailed descriptions of "deposit account" collateral may be reminiscent of the
earlier standard. Depositary institutions, however, unlike the vast array of
manufacturers, retailers, and others covered by chattel mortgage statutes, have
independent business needs to identify individual accounts by number and to
keep accurate daily records of the transactions in such accounts. Moreover, the
liquidity, divisibility, and fungibility of this type of collateral necessitates a
more detailed description of the parties' intent concerning the scope of the en-
cumbrance. Minor errors in description, however, need not be fatal. For exam-
ple, if one digit of the deposit account number reported on the security
agreement or financing statement was in error but no one was seriously misled
the description would be sufficient. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8).
Colorado requires greater detail in describing consumer goods than other
forms of collateral. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-9-110 (1973).
122. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (c).
123. See B. CLARK, supra note 44, 2.4.
124. These and similar questions arise in cases where a bank wants to set-
off against joint accounts, partnership accounts, and trust accounts. See infra
note 166 and sources cited therein.
125. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b). U.C.C. § 1-201(44), incorporated into article 9,
contains a broad definition of "value," including executory promises and "any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." Compare this broad defi-
nition with U.C.C. § 3-303 (a narrower definition of "value" for determining
"holder in due course" status).
126. Such gifts would continue to be governed by the common law of as-
signments. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332 (1979) (revo-
cability of gratuitous assignments).
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Once all three of the foregoing requirements are satisfied,
in any order, the creditor holds an enforceable, attached secur-
ity interest.127 If these article 9 requirements were to displace
the common law requisites for effective transfer of an interest
in a deposit account, there would be little disruption of current
commercial practices and the law would become more certain
and more accessible. Under the present Code, the require-
ments for creating a security interest in a negotiable certificate
of deposit are the same as for other collateral; under this propo-
sal, the same requirements would apply to security interests in
all deposit accounts.128
There is considerable confusion and nonuniformity under
the common law of security assignments and pledge, as modi-
fied by state statutes, concerning how interests in deposit ac-
counts can be conveyed so that, at a minimum, the transfer
would be effective between the lender and the borrower.129
Part of the confusion stems from the functional similarity but
metaphysical difference between a common law pledge and a
security assignment.130
127. See U.C.C. § 9-203.
128. See id. §§ 3-104(1), (2) (c), 9-102, -104(b), -105(l) (e), -105(1) (i); see also,
e.g., Southview Corp. v. Kleberg First Nat'l Bank, 512 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974). One commentator has urged that a nonnegotiable certificate of de-
posit be treated as a certificate of deposit within the meaning of article 9,
thereby permitting retention of an article 9 security interest in such collateral.
See Harris, supra note 25. A number of courts have reached this result without
adequate analysis of the statutory basis for their conclusion. Id. at 331 nn.6-7.
Under this Article's proposal, nonnegotiable certificates of deposit, as well
as checking accounts, NOW accounts, savings accounts, money market deposit
accounts, and other similar arrangements, would all be categorized as "deposit
accounts" but would nonetheless fall within article 9's scope. California follows
such an approach, excluding only the negotiable certificate of deposit from the
definition of "deposit accounts." See CAL. COM. CODE § 9105(1) (e) (West Supp.
1984).
California and Hawaii, the only states permitting retention of an article 9
security interest in all deposit account collateral, did not change the require-
ments for creating such interests. See CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9104, 9203 (West
1964); HAwAI REV. STAT. §§ 490:9-104, -203 (1976). But, as discussed elsewhere
in this Article, these states have not enacted the Article's other suggested mod-
ifications to article 9 nor have they abolished the common law right to set-off.
129. With exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 279-373, the lender
who either creates a common law pledge or a security assignment ordinarily
accomplishes, by the same acts, what is necessary to protect its rights (to the
degree possible) against competing claimants. The lender who is a pledgee
gives general public "notice" of its encumbrance to potential creditors and pur-
chasers, who might otherwise rely on the same deposit account collateral, by
retaining possession of the property during the loan repayment period. Anom-
alously, the giving of such notice is not important in most jurisdictions with re-
gard to the rights of the common law assignee against successive assignees.
See infra text accompanying notes 248-49.
130. As explained in the Restatement of Security:
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The pledge, a special kind of lien, is created by a bailment
of the collateral (here a chose in action) to the secured
party.131 Title to the collateral remains in the depositor during
the loan repayment period; the secured party receives mere
possession.132 When the loan is repaid, the bailed collateral is
returned. If the loan is not repaid, the pledgee has an express
or implied right to foreclose on the property to satisfy the out-
standing debt.133
In a security assignment of a chose in action, title to the
property is transferred to the lender. A present but conditional
transfer is made; the assignee receives title to the depositor-as-
signor's contract claim against the depositary institution, but
that right of payment is subject to the condition that the as-
signor default on the loan. 3 4 If the loan is repaid, the claim as-
signed reverts to the depositor; if the depositor defaults, the
assignee's right becomes enforceable and it can demand pay-
ment from the depositary bank to satisfy the outstanding
balance.135
Thus a pledge requires immediate delivery of possession,
whereas a security assignment requires immediate delivery of
The early common law recognized pledge interests only in tangible
chattels. Modern law allows pledge interests also ... in intangibles.
With the development of the rules as to the assignability of choses in
action... and the consequent availability of choses in action to secure
the performance of duties, the distinction between pledges and other
security devices has often been obscured. . . . [T]he protection[s] ac-
corded the creditor with a security interest in personalty [are] much
the same whatever the name given the security device .... Security
assignments of contracts are often called pledges, although they consti-
tute title, rather than possessory, security.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURrrY § 1 comment a (1941). See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
19, § 1.2; see, e.g., Watson v. Stockton Morris Plan Co., 34 Cal. App. 2d 393, 389-99,
93 P.2d 855, 858 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
131. See Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452, 468-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 1
(1941).
132. See sources cited supra note 131; Malone v. Price, 138 Ga. App. 514, 226
S.E.2d 623 (1976).
133. See Moss Indus., Inc. v. Irving Metal Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 704, 61 A.2d 159,
162 (1948); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 48 (1941).
134. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines an assignment as "a
manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer [title] . . .by virtue of
which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in
whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1979). The Restatement validates
the conditional assignment and explains that such a transfer "does not wholly
extinguish the assignor's right until the condition occurs." Id. § 331 comment b;
see Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 472-73; A. CORBIN, CORBIn ON
CONTRACTS §§ 875, 881 (1951).
135. See A. CORBIN, supra note 134, §§ 875, 881.
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title, even if conditioned on a future event. 3 6 But both security
devices have identical practical consequences for the relation-
ship between the depositor-debtor and creditor at the time of
default or repayment. In the case of default, the lender has or
obtains title and possession; in the case of repayment, the de-
positor regains title and possession. Perhaps for this reason,
article 9 rules concerning how and when a security interest be-
comes enforceable between the debtor and lender disregard
the location of title.137
The common law formalities for creating each of these se-
curity devices overlap, making it difficult in some cases to as-
certain which device the parties intended to create.138 A pledge
may be created by delivery of the collateral with an accompa-
nying writing setting forth the terms of the bailment; a security
assignment may be made by an identical delivery and an agree-
ment setting forth the terms of the assignment.
In addition, there is uncertainty about what the formal req-
uisites for the two devices are. If the parties want to create a
pledge the collateral must be delivered. But delivery of an in-
tangible, such as a depositor's chose in action, can only be ac-
complished if the intangible is represented by a "symbolic
writing" or "indispensable instrument." 3 9 In the deposit ac-
count context, the use of electronic funds transfers, combined
with the proliferation of new types of accounts, makes it in-
creasingly difficult to ascertain whether there is such a writing
and, accordingly, whether any particular deposit account can
be pledged.140 It is clear that a negotiable certificate of deposit
or a savings account accessible solely by means of a passbook
can be pledged by delivery of the certificate or the passbook to
the lender.141 On the other hand, delivery to the lender of a
book of blank checks for a standard checking account would
136. See generally Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. 452.
137. Article 9 broadly provides: "[Ejach provision of this Article with re-
gard to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in
the secured party or in the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-202; see also id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-
203 comment 4.
138. See supra note 130. See generally 1 G. GnMoRE, supra note 19, §§ 1.1,
.2.
139. See Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank 406 F. Supp. at 469-72, 477-79; 1 G. GiL-
MORE, supra note 19, § 1.3; RESTATEMENT OF SEcurrY § 1 comment e (1941).
140. See Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 469-72, 477-79. See gener-
ally Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE U.J. 1012, 1036-
53 (1978).
141. See, e.g., Walton v. Piqua State Bank, 204 Kan. 741, 775-57, 466 P.2d 316,
328-29 (1970).
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not create a pledge.142 But what about an automatic teller card
that accesses both demand and savings accounts? Is the
monthly statement for a Money Market Deposit Account, al-
lowing only three transfers by check per month, the equivalent
of a passbook? What about a telex key and code used by a de-
positor to give instructions to a bank in international
transactions?143
It is not even clear what the focus of this inquiry should be.
The Restatement of Security emphasizes the indispensability of
the writing, explaining "[i]f the instrument cannot be pro-
duced, the interest which it represents can be effectively as-
serted only by accounting for the absence of the instrument
and obtaining as a substitute for it, either a duplicate or some
form of court decree." 4 4 Gilmore suggests that any instrument
for the payment of money that professionals use in institu-
tional commercial transactions should suffice, as well as any in-
strument executed with formality that suggests on its face
"that the parties looked on it as a serious undertaking."145 A
federal district court recently adopted a more pragmatic view,
examining whether possession of the particular writing was
likely to result in subsequent creditors learning of the earlier
encumbrance. 46
If a security assignment, rather than a pledge, is intended,
lenders must satisfy Statute of Frauds requirements. Although
an oral assignment is valid under the common law,' 47 an oral
sale of a contract right is not enforceable under the Code "by
way of action ... beyond five thousand dollars in amount or
value of remedy." 4 8 In addition, some state statutes specifi-
142. Without more, the delivery of a check does not operate as an assign-
ment of a deposit account. See U.C.C. § 3-409. See generally B. CLuAnx, THE LAW
OF BANx DEPosrrs, COLLECTIONS AND CREDrr CARDS 3.1[2] [a] (1981).
143. See Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 470 n.13 (telex key and
code insufficient where purported pledgee had not established that it would not
take instructions from the debtor by mail or other media).
144. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § I comment 3 (1941).
145. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 1.3, at 16-17.
146. See Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 469.
147. See, e.g., Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F. 2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1963)
(oral agreement sufficient); Marx v. Maddrey, 106 F. Supp. 535, 541 (E.D.N.C.
1952) (oral agreement effective between depositor and assignee but not against
third parties); Willow City Farmer's Elevator v. Vogel, 268 N.W.2d 762, 764-65
(N.D. 1978) (oral assignment of checking account is valid as security); cf. Wal-
ton v. Piqua State Bank, 204 Kan. at 756-57, 466 P.2d at 329 (a written assign-
ment or delivery of a savings account passbook will suffice but an oral
agreement is not effective between the parties). See generally A. CORBIN,
supra note 129, at § 879; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 324 (1979).
148. U.C.C. § 1-206(1). See E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 3, § 11.4.
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cally provide that a security assignment of a savings account
requires delivery of the passbook with a written order for trans-
fer, irrespective of the amount in the account.14 9
Antiassignment clauses in agreements between depositary
banks and their customers introduce another element of uncer-
tainty. Such clauses are unenforceable if the transaction is
within the scope of article 9.150 But under non-Code law gov-
erning the conveyance of title in deposit accounts, express an-
tiassignment clauses, although narrowly construed, may be
enforced by specific performance.151
Yet another troubling issue under the common law of se-
curity assignments is whether a purported assignment suffi-
ciently divests the assignor of control and interest in the right
transferred. 5 2 A court may conclude that the language of the
"assignment" merely reflects a promise to pay the purported
assignee out of a designated fund or an instruction to the de-
positary bank to make such payment. 53
Not surprisingly, prudent lenders, faced with these uncer-
tain legal requirements, and possibly for business reasons as
well, often insist on both a written security assignment and a
pledge effected by delivery of a "symbolic writing" representing
the deposit account. 5 4 Under article 9, these lenders could pro-
tect their legal interests fully without requiring the depositor to
forego all use of the deposit accounts during the loan repay-
ment period. A written security agreement when combined
with a public filing pursuant to article 9 would give the lender a
fully enforceable interest against the debtor and protection
from competing subsequent creditors, whether or not the
debtor delivers any "symbolic writing" or "indispensable in-
149. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-113 (West 1981); ILL GEN. LAWS
§ 19-11-5 (1982).
150. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4). But see J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 306
(2d ed. 1974).
151. See, e.g., Rosenstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 304 N.C. 541, 544-45,
284 S.E.2d 504, 506-07 (1981) (prohibition in savings passbook of assignment of
passbook does not restrict assignment of underlying chose in action); see also
A. CoRBniN, supra note 134, §§ 872-873; J. MURRAY, supra note 150, § 306; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 322 (1979).
152. See, e.g., Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 472-73. See gener-
ally A. CoRBnn, supra note 134, §§ 877, 879-880.
153. See, e.g., Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. at 473.
154. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 355 F. Supp.
165, 167 (D.D.C. 1973), affid mem. 489 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Walton v. Piqua
State Bank, 204 Kan. at 757, 466 P.2d at 329; Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust Co.
v. Commercial Bank of Liberty, 567 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Harris, supra note 25, § 1.6, at 23.
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strument."155 Thus, the parties would have the freedom to
agree that the depositor should be left in possession of the de-
posit account, thereby fostering greater efficiency in the deposi-
tor's financial affairs and increasing the likelihood of
improvement in its financial position and repayment of the
loan.
As presently drafted, section 9-203(1) (a) gives parties the
option of creating a security interest by delivery of the collat-
eral pursuant to agreement. In the deposit account context,
this alternative presents interpretive difficulties similar to
those under the common law of pledge; one must determine
what deposit accounts are to be reified. 5 6 Serious considera-
tion should be given to eliminating this method of creating a se-
curity interest, thereby promoting uniform treatment of all
deposit accounts. 57 Alternatively, the text and official com-
ments to the Code should provide guidance about what consti-
tutes an indispensable or symbolic writing.
A comparison of the Code's requisites for creating a secur-
ity interest in a deposit account with common law require-
ments for establishing a depositary institution's inchoate right
to set-offi58 also reveals how the law governing deposit account
155. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, -301(1) (b), -302(1), -303(1), -312. See generally infra
text accompanying notes 237-78, 279-373.
This Article proposes that a creditor who wants to protect its interest in de-
posit account collateral created under § 9-203(1) against competing subsequent
creditors, as well as against the depositor, must give "public notice" of the in-
terest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1), -303(1). Although the sometimes ambiguous pro-
cedure of taking possession of the symbolic writing representing a deposit
account will suffice to create a security interest good against the depositor, this
Article recommends that if the secured creditor seeks priority over competing
claimants, it must fie a financing statement in the public records. See id. § 9-
302(1). Otherwise third parties, not involved in the initial choice, could be
harmed by subsequent disputes about whether an "indispensable instrument"
had been delivered.
156. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
157. See D. BArD & T. JACKSON, supra note 57, at 183-89.
158. The term "inchoate right to set-off" is used to describe the occurrence
of all the preconditions for the exercise of the set-off remedy. Under article 9, a
creditor with a security interest may occupy one of three statuses: it may be
secured but unperfected, or it may be secured and perfected, or it may be se-
cured and have effected foreclosure on its interest. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-
503. In contrast, there are only two possible statuses under the common law of
set-off. Once "mutual indebtedness" arises, the bank has an inchoate right to
set-off. The exercise of that right is the equivalent of foreclosure on an article 9
security interest. The bank's right to set-off is unaffected by whether it gives
notice to other creditors; thus there is no status equivalent to that of a secured
party with a perfected security interest. It is the absence of this status in the
common law scheme that makes it difficult to resolve priority battles between
the bank with a right to set-off and an article 9 secured creditor, the Internal
Revenue Service with a tax lien, or the trustee in bankruptcy with its powers of
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financing would become more flexible, certain, and equitable by
expanding the scope of article 9. It is useful to begin with the
requirements that are similar.
Courts uniformly hold that the inchoate common law right
to set-off against a deposit account arises only where there is
"mutual indebtedness" between the depositor and the credit
institution.159 One aspect of this requirement is that a mature
obligation must run from the depositor as "obligor" to the
credit institution as "obligee."160 Ordinarily, this obligation is
the depositor's promise to repay a loan with interest. Should
the depositor default, one-half of the mutual indebtedness re-
quirement is satisfied.161 Courts recognize the power of the
parties to define by agreement what constitutes a "default."162
Thus, the mutual indebtedness requirement parallels the arti-
cle 9 requirements that the credit institution give "value"163
and that the debtor be in default before foreclosure.l6 4
The other half of the mutual indebtedness requirement is
that an obligation must run from the credit institution, now the
"obligor" on the deposit agreement, to the depositor, now the
"obligee."165 To ascertain the "true obligee" in any particular
case, a court must confront the same issues that arise under ar-
ticle 9's requirement that the debtor have "rights in the
collateral."166
But there the similarities end. The mutual indebtedness
avoidance under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See infra text accompanying
notes 279-373, 374-440.
159. See TeSelle, supra note 70, at 41; Hagedorn, Bank Setoff in Washing-
ton-Is It a Right Without Restriction?, 15 GoNz. L. REV. 989, 989-91 (1980); An-
not., 68 A.L.R.3D 192, § 2[a] (1976); see also B. CLARY, supra note 142, 11.6.
160. See B. CLARY, supra note 142, 11.6.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 430 F.2d
574, 577 (5th Cir. 1970); In re Leon Keyser, Inc., 98 N.H. 198, 200, 96 A.2d 551, 552
(1953); Baldwin v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 327 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
163. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
164. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) provides in pertinent part: "When a debtor is in de-
fault under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies
provided in this Part .... " (Emphasis added).
165. See sources cited supra note 159.
166. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (c); see also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying
text. On the question of whether the bank can set-off against one of two signa-
tories on a joint account, see B. CLAm, supra note 142, 11.6[4]; Hagedorn,
supra note 159, at 1002-04; TeSelle, supra note 70, at 45-46; Annot., 68 A.L.R.3D
192 (1976); against a partnership account, see TeSelle, supra note 70, at 46;
against a special purpose account, see id. at 46-48; Hagedorn, supra note 159, at
993-96; against the deposit account of a deceased debtor, see Murray, supra
note 71, at 457-58; TeSelle, supra note 70, at 50; and against a trust account, see
Hagedorn, supra note 159, at 1004.
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requirement of set-off can only be satisfied when the credit in-
stitution that loans money to the depositor is also the deposi-
tary institution. Thus the common law right to set-off, unlike
the article 9 security interest (or the common law pledge or as-
signment), is limited to one class of favored credit institutions.
Even more significantly, the right to set-off, unlike an arti-
cle 9 security interest, arises by operation of law.167 There is no
requirement that the depositor manifest consent, in writing or
otherwise.168 Simply by accepting credit, the depositor is
deemed to have granted the depositary institution, and that in-
stitution alone, a right to the full value of all its general deposit
accounts in that institution in the event of default. Moreover,
priority rules both in and out of bankruptcy favor the bank,
with its right to set-off, over other creditors with competing
claims16 9 and thereby discourage outsiders from competing to
lend against this collateral. Of course, borrowers can avoid the
banks' right to set-off by creating special, segregated deposit ac-
counts or by not entering into credit arrangements with institu-
tions where they maintain deposit accounts. But many
borrowers are not aware of their exposure to the bank's right to
set-off. Even for sophisticated borrowers, the cost of avoiding
creation of the right to set-off could be substantial-the loss of
the added convenience and other advantages of "one-stop fi-
nancial services," widely advertised by the banks
themselves.170
167. See generally sources cited supra note 159.
168. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 142, 1 11.1 (1981). In a few states,
statutes expressly require debtor consent but mere reference to set-off in the
terms and agreement of the bank, incorporated by reference in the signature
card, will suffice. Biby v. Union Natl Bank, 162 N.W.2d 370, 374-76 (N.D. 1968);
see supra note 86.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 279-373, 374-440.
170. See Hilder, New One-Stop Financial Accounts are Growing in Popular-
ity, but it Pays You to Shop Around, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 60, col. 1.
Banks often advertise packages of services. For example, in September
1983, the National Bank of Washington offered customers with both a checking
account and $2,500 in a regular savings account, or $10,000 in either a Money
Market Account or a certificate of deposit, a package of ten services, including
"no-service charge checking, distinctive checks at no charge, leather checkbook
cover at no charge, preferred CHEXTRA rate (at least 2% less than prevailing
rate), specially designed NBW National Bankcard, special consumer loan tele-
phone line, traveler's checks at no charge, quarterly newsletter, financial plan-
ning seminars, American Express Gold Card.. .. "
As explained by Secretary of the Treasury Regan:
The sophisticated consumer today would like to include in his sav-
ings and investments such things as a NOW account for liquidity pur-
poses, a money market deposit account to earn a higher rate of interest
on slightly less liquid funds and securities or even an insurance or an-
nuity contract for long term savings and investment. He would like to
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Substituting an article 9 security interest in deposit ac-
counts as original collateral for the common law of assign-
ments, pledge, and set-off would thus allow depositors to decide
for themselves under what circumstances, and in favor of
whom, to hypothecate these valuable assets.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST IN
DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL
An article 9 secured party may, by agreement with the
debtor, retain a "floating lien": a security interest of substantial
and elastic dimensions. If the security agreement includes an
"after-acquired property" clause,'17 the collateral securing the
obligation expands automatically to encompass designated
types of property later acquired by the debtor. 7 2 If the parties
agree to a "future advances" clause,17 3 additional funds subse-
quently advanced by the creditor are automatically secured by
the collateral described in the original security agreement; no
second security agreement need be executed. 7 4 If the debtor
disposes of encumbered original collateral, the creditor is pre-
sumed to have a security interest in the "proceeds" received by
the debtor. 7 5 If such a sale of collateral breaches the security
agreement, the secured party's interest in the original collateral
may continue even when the property is in the hands of third
do all these things without having to travel to several different financial
institutions. He would like all the services offered at one institution
and would like the ability to shift his funds from one type of invest-
ment to another.
Regan Testimony, supra note 8, at 7, NEW BANKS AND NEW BANKERs at 390.
Recent consumer surveys show that individuals select the depositary insti-
tutions where they maintain a checking account primarily on the basis of loca-
tional convenience and the availability of a wide variety of services. The
majority of individuals maintain two or more accounts at the place where they
keep their checking account. See Survey, Customer Service Usage-Part II,
The Unidex Report, June 1982, at 1-2 (publication of the Unidex Corporation).
171. An example of an "after-acquired property" clause would be a clause in
the agreement covering "all equipment now owned or hereafter acquired by the
debtor."
172. No new security agreement need be executed. See generally B. CLAR,
supra note 44, 10.1[11.
173. A typical "future advances" clause might provide that "the above de-
scribed collateral secures the payment of $10,000 plus interest and the payment
of all other indebtedness at any time hereafter owing by Debtor to Secured
Party."
174. See U.C.C. § 9-204(3). See generally B. CLARY, supra note 44, 1 10.1[3].
Courts may refuse to construe a broad, "dragnet" future advances clause as
covering a second advance if the second loan's purpose is dissimilar to that of
the first advance, if its form is different, or if too great a time period has elapsed
between the two advances. Id.
175. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(3), -306(2).
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parties.176 Should article 9 be expanded to cover deposit ac-
count collateral, its provisions, with minor modifications includ-
ing the addition of common law tracing rules, would provide a
framework in which depositary and nondepositary credit insti-
tutions could bargain for similar floating liens over noncon-
sumer deposit accounts.
If depositors and creditors are to be free to bargain regard-
ing the use of deposit accounts as collateral, a rule for separat-
ing different entities' interests in commingled funds must be
adopted. One such rule is the lowest intermediate balance
rule, which courts presently apply to measure an article 9 pro-
ceeds security interest in a commingled deposit account.177
Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, any with-
drawal from the deposit account would come first out of funds
not encumbered by the article 9 security interest. 78 If the bal-
ance were to fall below the amount specified in the security
agreement, the secured creditor's interest would be limited to
that "lowest intermediate balance." If a subsequent deposit
were made, it would not be subject to the earlier security inter-
est without the depositor's express consent. In other words,
such a later deposit would not be deemed to be in restitution
for the difference between the sum specified in the security
agreement and the lowest intermediate balance.179
The following series of examples illustrates how this rule,
in conjunction with article 9's provisions, would define the
dimensions of an individual creditor's security interest in a de-
posit account as original collateral. Where appropriate, the re-
sult under article 9 is contrasted with the result under the law
of set-off and the principles governing pledges and security as-
signments. A later section of the Article examines priority bat-
tles among several creditors with interests in the same deposit
account.1 8 0
176. See id. § 9-306(2).
177. See, e.g., Universal CI.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp.
317, 326-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973); C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equipment, Inc.,
89 IlM. 2d 27, 31, 431 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1982).
178. In other words, the withdrawal would first be credited against the
nonencumbered portion of the depositor's chose in action against the bank.
179. Henning, Article Nine's Treatment of Commingled Cash Proceeds in
Non-Insolvency Cases, 35 ARu. L. REV. 191, 228-29 (1981).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 279-373.
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1. Changes in the Account Where There is No "After-
Acquired Deposit" Clause
Example 1:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. No third party has an in-
terest in the account. The depositor grants the bank a security interest
in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. The depositor draws
down the account to $1,000. No repayment is made on the bank loan.
In this example, should the depositor default, the bank
with an article 9 security interest could foreclose on the re-
maining $1,000 of value in the account. Under the lowest inter-
mediate balance rule, it is presumed that $7,000 of the $9,000
withdrawn belonged to others. Under the common law, the
bank, by virtue of a properly executed assignment or the exer-
cise of its right to set-off, could "collect" the $1,000 in the de-
posit account at the time of default. If the bank had insisted on
the delivery of an indispensable writing creating a pledge, the
depositor presumably could not have withdrawn the encum-
bered funds and the bank could have recovered the full $2,000
owed.
Example 2:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. No third party has an in-
terest in the account. The depositor grants an outside creditor a secur-
ity interest in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. The
following activity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000, leaving a balance of $1,000.
Day 3: The depositor deposits $5,000 of wholly owned funds, leaving a
balance of $6,000.
Should the depositor default without repaying the $2,000
loan, the outside creditor with the article 9 security interest can
foreclose on only $1,000 of the $6,000 balance. As in the prior
example, on Day 2, under the lowest intermediate balance rule,
the $1,000 remaining in the account is encumbered, but the
other $2,000 of value subject to the outside creditor's security
interest has been disbursed. The subsequent deposit on Day 3
simply adds "unencumbered" funds.
The same result would occur under the common law of as-
signments and pledge. At the time of the assignment, and prior
to Day 3, the depositor did not have a chose in action against
the depositary institution for the additional $5,000. The assign-
ment did not by its terms purport to transfer such a "future
right";181 if it had, as explained in example 3 below, the assign-
ment would not have been fully effective. Similarly, if the de-
181. See E. FARNSwORTH, supra note 3, § 11.5, at 766.
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posit account were reified and a writing representing $3,000 of
the original balance had been pledged to the outside creditor,
additional steps would have had to be taken to effectively grant
security in the after-acquired deposit.182
Under the common law of set-off, the outside creditor in ex-
ample 2 would have no self-help remedy against the account
because there would be no mutual indebtedness.183 If the cred-
itor were the depositary institution, however, it could set-off
against $2,000 of the $6,000 balance. The common law right to
set-off, available only to the depositary institution, extends,
without agreement, to all the debtor's funds in the account at
the time of default.184 As illustrated in example 3 below, if arti-
cle 9 were substituted for the common law, the depositary insti-
tution would come out as well only if it had bargained with the
depositor for an "after-acquired deposit" clause in the security
agreement. Without such a clause, the secured party would
have to go to court and sue for the $1,000 deficiency.185
These two examples show how the continued existence of
the set-off doctrine would undermine article 9's policies: a de-
positary institution would have no incentive to bargain with a
depositor for an after-acquired deposit clause if it knew it could
reach the debtor's entire chose in action by asserting its more
powerful common law right to set-off. Moreover, even if an af-
ter-acquired deposit clause were included, under the common
law of assignments and pledge, it would create only an "equita-
ble" charge against the after-acquired deposit.18 6
2. Changes in the Account Where There is an "After-
Acquired Deposit" Clause
Example 3:
Same facts as example 2, except that the security agreement includes
an "after-acquired deposit" clause.
Should the depositor default without repaying the $2,000
loan, the article 9 secured creditor now could foreclose on
182. As noted earlier, if the pledge were created by delivery of an indispen-
sable writing, and if the writing was not subsequently released to the depositor,
the withdrawal on Day 2 would not have been possible. See supra notes 139-46
and accompanying text. On the other hand, an unauthorized withdrawal might
take place if the pledge were created by delivery of a symbolic but not indis-
pensable writing. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 1, 10 (1941).
183. The outside creditor is not a party to the deposit agreement contract; it
is an "obligee" but not an "obligor." See supra text accompanying note 159.
184. See Muench v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 11 Mo. App. 144, 150 (1881).
185. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2).
186. See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
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$2,000 of the $6,000 balance. Applying the lowest intermediate
balance rule, the secured party has an interest in $1,000 on Day
2. The subsequent deposit of $5,000, covered by the "after-ac-
quired deposit" clause of the security agreement, increases the
encumbered collateral to $6,000; thus, $2,000 of the account
would be used to repay the loan and the balance would be re-
mitted to the depositor.187 Through bargaining with the debtor,
the secured party would have protected its interest to the same
extent that the depositary institution's interest is protected by
the doctrine of set-off.
Under present law, a nondepositary institution would have
to base its claim to the subsequent deposit on either the com-
mon law of assignments or, if the deposit account was repre-
sented by a "symbolic writing," on the law of pledge. Even if
the debtor explicitly agreed in writing to assign after-acquired
deposits as security, courts often refuse to give full effect to
such purported present transfers of future contract rights not
yet "earned" by performance.188 The reluctance to enforce
such assignments reflects both a historical antipathy to assign-
ments of contract rights in general189 and a conceptual prob-
lem-the debtor is attempting to presently convey a contract
right not yet owned or in existence.190
Exceptions to this common law prohibition have evolved to
meet the needs of participants in a modern credit economy.191
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts would give
full effect to an assignment of a future right to payment "ex-
pected to arise out of an existing employment or other continu-
ing business relationship."' 92 No cases were located, however,
where the depositor's relationship to the bank was character-
ized as the necessary kind of "continuing business relation-
ship."193 Although it is reasonable to predict that an employee-
187. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2).
188. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 321 (1979).
189. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 317 comment c (1979). See generally Cohen & Gerber, The After-
Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 321 comment b (1979).
As explained by Professor Farnsworth, "[t]he common law's answer was
epitomized in the maxim: nemo dat qui non habet ('one cannot give who does
not have')." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.5, at 768.
191. See 1 G. GiLMORE, supra note 19, § 2.4, at 38-39.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 321(1) (1979).
193. The comments and illustrations following § 321 of the Restatement do
not apply its principles to a depositor's relationship with the depositary institu-
tion, although elsewhere the Restatement acknowledges that the law of assign-
[Vol. 68:899
DEPOSIT A CCO UNT FINANCING
assignor who continues to work at the same job will earn future
rights to payment, there is little basis for assuming that a de-
positor will make sufficient future deposits, relative to subse-
quent withdrawals, to generate future rights to payment.
The depositor and creditor in example 3 could also rely on
the common law doctrine of equitable assignments as an ex-
ception to the prohibition of assignments of future rights. The
purported present transfer of the future deposit accounts
would be viewed as a promise by the depositor to assign such
rights when they arise.194 In example 3, if the depositor did not
make a subsequent assignment on Day 3, the creditor could
bring an action against the depositor for specific
performance.195
The equitable assignee, however, would be better off in sev-
eral respects if it could rely on an article 9 floating lien. The
law under article 9 is more consistent and coherent; the credi-
tor need not ensure that the depositor executes subsequent as-
signments when it later acquires future contract rights.
Instead, the article 9 security interest attaches automatically
when a deposit is made and the depositor thereby obtains
rights in the after-acquired collateral.196 The article 9 creditor
thus is spared monitoring and transaction costs which, if the
account were active, could prove quite substantial.
In addition, an article 9 creditor would prevail in circum-
stances where the equitable assignee's rights to future deposits
could be subordinated to interests of competing creditors. If on
the afternoon of Day 3, after the deposit of $5,000 and before the
debtor executed a second assignment to the outside creditor, a
judgment creditor of the depositor garnished the deposit ac-
count, the judgment creditor's execution lien would be senior
to the outside creditor's equitable lien. 97
ments applies to transfers of interests in deposit accounts. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 316-43 statutory note, at 6-7 (1979).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 321(2), 330(1) (1979).
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 330(2) comment d (1979).
196. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1); D. BAeD & T. JACKSON, supra note 57, at 32. Offi-
cial comment 1 to § 9-204 explains:
Subsection (1) makes clear that a security interest arising by virtue of
an after-acquired property clause has equal status with a security in-
terest in collateral in which the debtor has rights at the time value is
given under the security agreement. That is to say: the security inter-
est in after-acquired property is not merely an "equitable" interest; no
further action by the secured party-such as the taking of a supple-
mental agreement covering the new collateral-is required.
197. Mulhall v. Quinn, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 105, 107 (1854); O'Neil v. Helmke,
124 Wis. 234, 237, 102 N.W. 573, 574 (1905); see also supra note 172 and accompa-
nying text; U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 1; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.5, at
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A creditor relying on a common law pledge faces the same
constraints as the assignee. A contract to pledge an intangible
not yet in existence will at most create an equitable interest.19 8
If the deposit account in example 3 is pledgeable, the outside
creditor would acquire only an equitable interest in the $5,000
deposit, which would be subordinated to the interest of a lien
creditor who without notice of the equitable interest extended
credit to the depositor.199 In contrast, if the outside creditor
held a properly perfected article 9 security interest covering af-
ter-acquired deposits, it would prevail over the lien creditor.200
Article 9 limits the enforceability of "after-acquired prop-
erty" clauses against consumer goods.201 Specifically, the se-
cured party cannot contract for an interest in consumer goods
acquired by the debtor more than ten days after the loan is
made.20 2 This restriction protects the unsophisticated con-
sumer-borrower from encumbering all present and future per-
sonal property in exchange for a single advance. The
preservation of a "cushion" of free assets also benefits subse-
quent competing creditors. 20 3
770-71 n.21; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 7.12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 330 comment d (1979).
198. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 10(3) (1941).
199. See id. § 10 comment e, illustration 6.
200. U.C.C. § 9-301, by negative implication, makes a perfected security in-
terest senior to an execution lien. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1) (b), (3). In example 3,
the article 9 creditor's interest would be perfected at the instant the depositor
obtained rights in the collateral-the depositor's chose in action against the de-
positary bank. See id. §§ 9-204(1), -302(1)(c), -303(1). Accordingly, the article 9
creditor's interest would be perfected from the moment the $5,000 was depos-
ited on Day 3, before the lien creditor garnished the account. For a discussion
of other priority disputes, see infra text accompanying notes 279-373 and 374-
440.
201. See U.C.C. § 9-204(2).
202. More precisely, despite the presence of an "after-acquired property"
clause in the security agreement the security interest will not "attach" to the
later-acquired consumer goods. See id.
Under U.C.C. § 9-204(2), the 10-day period begins to run when the creditor
gives "value," which could occur as early as when the creditor makes a "bind-
ing commitment to extend credit." Id. § 1-201(44) (a).
203. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) comment 2. Professor Gilmore explains that the
case for a relatively unrestricted "floating lien" against the property of a busi-
ness debtor "rests not so much on the merits or the positive excellence of the
floating lien as on an argument of fait accompli." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19,
§ 11.7, at 360. As illustrated by the examples in this Article, the common law
right to set-off permits the creditor in some cases to reach more of the deposi-
tor's assets and in other cases less. The primary advantage of the article 9
floating lien in the business context is that the terms of the security agreement
define the lien's dimensions, and depositary institutions must compete with
other creditors to obtain these broad rights against the depositor's present and
future deposit account collateral.
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A similar provision could be enacted restricting after-ac-
quired interests in consumer deposit account collateral, as il-
lustrated in example 4 below. Despite an after-acquired
deposit clause, no security interest in a deposit account used
"primarily for personal, family or household purposes," 204
would attach to subsequent deposits made more than ten days
from the time the secured party gave "value. '205
Example 4:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account used for personal and fam-
ily expenses. No third party has an interest in the account. The depos-
itor grants the depositary bank a security interest in $3,000 of the
account to secure a $2,000 loan. The security agreement includes an
"after-acquired deposit" clause. The following activity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000 and the depositor re-
ceives the $2,000 loan proceeds.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000, leaving a balance of $1,000.
Day 15: The depositor deposits $5,000 of wholly owned funds, leaving
a balance of $6,000.
Under the proposed expanded article 9 the bank, using self-
help procedures, could foreclose against only $1,000--the lowest
intermediate balance. The bank's security interest would not
attach to the subsequent deposit of $5,000 because it was made
more than ten days after the $2,000 loan. In contrast, under the
common law doctrine of set-off, the bank could collect $2,000.
Example 5:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. No third party has an in-
terest in the account. The depositor grants the depositary bank a se-
curity interest in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. The
security agreement includes an "after-acquired deposit" clause. The
following activity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000, leaving a balance of $1,000.
Day 3: The depositor deposits $5,000 of wholly owned funds, leaving a
balance of $6,000.
Day 4. The bank makes a second advance of $10,000. No security
agreement is executed with respect to this loan. The entire
amount is deposited in the account, leaving a balance of
$16,000.
In this example, the depositor owes the bank $2,000 on the
first loan and $10,000 on the second loan. Should the debtor de-
fault on both loans, under an expanded article 9 the bank could
foreclose on only $2,000 because the depositor has not agreed to
secure the second loan of $10,000 with the deposit account.
Under the common law of assignments or pledge, the bank also
could foreclose on only $2,000, and then only if the depositor ex-
204. U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
205. See id. § 9-204(2).
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ecuted a second assignment or made a subsequent pledge of
the after-acquired deposits.206
But if the bank asserts its common law right to set-off, it
can use self-help foreclosure to recover the full $12,000 owed;
the parties are mutually indebted to that extent at the time of
default. To come out as well under article 9, the bank would
have to persuade the depositor to include a "future advances
clause" in the security agreement, as illustrated in example 6
below. Whether such a clause would be effective in an assign-
ment, however, is problematic.
3. Changes in the Account Where There is a "Future
Advances" Clause
The following example illustrates how a bank with an arti-
cle 9 security interest in a deposit account as original collateral
could ensure that subsequent credit advanced to the debtor is
secured by the original deposit account.
Example 6:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. No third party has an in-
terest in the account. The depositor grants the depositary bank a se-
curity interest in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. The
security agreement includes a '"uture advances" clause, but no "after-
acquired deposit" clause. The following activity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000, leaving a balance of $1,000.
Day 3: The depositor deposits $5,000 of wholly owned funds, leaving a
balance of $6,000.
Day 4: The bank makes a second advance of $10,000. The entire sum
is deposited in the account, leaving a balance of $16,000.
On Day 4, the depositor owes the bank $12,000. Moreover,
both loans are secured by the deposit account because of the
"future advances" clause. But, given the absence of an "after-
acquired deposit" clause, the secured creditor can extrajudi-
cially foreclose on only $1,000 because the deposits of $5,000 and
$10,000 on Days 3 and 4 do not augment the encumbered prop-
erty. If both a "future advances" and an "after-acquired de-
posit" clause were included, however, the secured creditor
could collect $12,000 out of the account.
Under the common law of assignments, the prudent
outside creditor, to ensure that its "future advances" clause
would be given full effect, would make a binding commitment
in the original security agreement specifying when the future
advances would be made and in what amount.20 7 In the ab-
206. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
207. Article 9 provides that an advance is made "pursuant to commitment"
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sence of such provisions, the creditor would risk nonenforce-
ment of the future advances clause and subordination of its
claim to a competing claimant who acquired rights after the
original but before the later advance.2 08 The "future advances"
clause in an article 9 transaction, on the other hand, is effective
without such a specific binding commitment.209
The depositary institution asserting its common law right
to set-off would have the easiest time of all. It could recover
$12,000 without ever bargaining with the depositor about after-
acquired deposits or security for future advances. In addition,
the bank could set-off against the debtor's other deposit ac-
counts in the bank, and might even be able to set-off against
the debtor's accounts in the bank's other branches. 210 Presum-
ably the bank would foreclose against the account that is least
profitable for it. For example, the bank might set-off against
the deposit account with the highest "locked in" interest rate or
with the largest penalty for early withdrawals. Under the pro-
posed expanded article 9, the bank's discretion would be lim-
ited by the terms of the security agreement. If the right to set-
off were not abolished, the depositary institution could circum-
vent the terms of the security agreement by relying on this "eq-
uitable" doctrine. 211
4. Changes in Deposit Account Collateral Attributable to the
Depositor's Disposition of the Collateral
A debtor's disposal of collateral encumbered by an article 9
security interest raises two issues concerning the scope of the
secured party's rights: first, whether the security interest con-
tinues in the original collateral-even after the collateral has
passed from the debtor to a third party; and second, whether
when the creditor "has bound himself to make it, whether or not a subsequent
event of default or other event not within his control has relieved or may re-
lieve him from his obligation." U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (k). The term is used in the
same sense in the accompanying text; such a binding commitment is a promise
that would be consideration for a return promise.
208. See U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5; 1 G. GiLMORE, supra note 19, §§ 35.3-.4.
209. U.C.C. § 9-204(3) states that "[o]bligations covered by a security agree-
ment may include future advances... whether or not the advances ... are
given pursuant to commitment." See also id. § 9-312(7).
210. See generally Comment, The Right of Set-Off Against a Branch Bank,
35 FoRfHAM L. REV. 712 (1967); supra note 14.
211. A court might construe the security agreement as a contractual limit
on the equitable right to set-off. But whether it would so hold presumably
would turn on the language of the security agreement in question. There
would be no such uncertainty if the now-obsolete common law right were
abolished.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the secured party has an interest in the '"proceeds" received by
the debtor in exchange for the original collateral. The same
two issues arise with deposit account collateral. When a depos-
itor writes a check on its account or withdraws cash to
purchase goods or services, does the secured party have a con-
tinuing security interest in the original collateral (the deposit
account funds-now transformed into a check or cash) in the
hands of the third party?212 In other words, can the secured
party "trace" its interest out of the deposit account?2 13 If the
third party exchanges property for the depositor's check or
money, is that property "proceeds" in the hands of the deposi-
tor, subject to the interest of the secured party?214 With minor
modifications, article 9's provisions would answer these ques-
tions consistent with sound policy.
a. The Continuing Security Interest in Original Collateral
Section 9-306(2) provides that "a security interest contin-
ues in [original] collateral . . . unless the disposition was au-
thorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise." 2 15 Under most customer agreements, a depositor is
allowed to write checks, withdraw funds, and redeem certifi-
cates of deposit. Although a penalty may be imposed if such
action reduces the balance below an established minimum, ab-
sent an express restriction in the security agreement or an un-
usual past course of dealing between the depositary institution
212. The original collateral is the depositor's chose in action against the de-
positary bank, as reflected by the balance shown on the bank's records. When
the depositor writes a check, the original collateral takes two forms: the re-
duced chose in action against the bank and the formalized order of the deposi-
tor/drawer directing the bank to pay eventual holders of the check. See U.C.C.
§§ 1-201(12), 3-104. Similarly, where the depositor withdraws funds, the original
collateral is transformed into money and a reduced chose in action. Thus,
when the depositor subsequently uses a check or withdraws cash to purchase
an asset, the acquired asset is 'Tirst generation proceeds." The question raised
in the text is whether the secured party has an interest in the check or money
in the hands of the seller of the asset.
The Code's definition of "proceeds" is very broad. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
One could characterize the depositor's receipt of withdrawn funds or a check in
exchange for diminution of the deposit account balance as the receipt of '"irst
generation proceeds." That conceptualization of the transaction, which is not
adopted in this Article, would not change the subsequent analysis.
213. See generally Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank
Account Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL. U.IJ.
120, 144, 152 (discussing rights of secured party against recipients of payments
from account).
214. See U.C.C. § 9-306 ("proceeds"; secured party's rights on disposition of
collateral).
215. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
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and the particular customer the above-described reductions in
the account would be "authorized" by the secured party within
the meaning of section 9-306(2).216 Accordingly, the security in-
terest would automatically terminate and the third party would
receive the check or cash free of encumbrance. 2
17
If the disposition of the collateral is not authorized, section
9-306(2) provides that the security interest continues in the
original collateral into the hands of the third person, "[e]xcept
where this Article otherwise provides." 2 18 Sections 9-307, 9-308,
and 9-309 provide "otherwise" where the third party is a bona
fide purchaser.
A provision should be .added to article 9 specifying pre-
cisely when a third party can receive an unauthorized payment
out of an encumbered deposit account free of the security in-
terest.219 An official comment to the Code suggests that the
"proceeds" interest of a secured party in an unauthorized pay-
216. See, e.g., Kinetics Technology Int'l Corp. v. Fourth Natl Bank, 705 F.2d
396, 402 (10th Cir. 1983) (purchaser took free of bank's earlier perfected security
interest because sale of collateral was authorized by secured party); United
States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 1033, 1034 (D.N.D. 1972) (course
of conduct manifested consent by creditor); Poteau State Bank v. Denwalt, 597
P.2d 756, 759 (Okla. 1979) (authorization may but need not be in security agree-
ment). In this respect, deposit account collateral is similar to inventory. When
a creditor engages in inventory financing, it knows that its collateral is held by
the debtor primarily for later sale to third parties. In order to protect itself
from the inevitable "erosion" of its collateral as the debtor operates its busi-
ness, the creditor obtains a "floating lien"; the security interest attaches to new
supplies of after-acquired inventory received by the debtor, to returned or re-
possessed inventory, and to proceeds received by the debtor when it sells pres-
ent inventory. Advances are often made in the form of a line of credit covered
by a "future advances clause." By keeping accurate records, and "policing" the
debtor, the creditor will ensure that the ratio of the amount of credit outstand-
ing to the value of the inventory in the hands of the debtor at any one moment
does not exceed an acceptable "debt/collateral" ratio, often specified in the se-
curity agreement. See B. CLARY, supra note 44, 1 10.5 [1].
If a creditor were to make a loan based on deposit account collateral, it
could discover the terms of the deposit agreement, including the debtor's au-
thority to draw down the account. If concerned about the diminution of its se-
curity, the deposit account financier also could take a "floating lien." See supra
text accompanying notes 171-236.
217. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 44, 3.4 (discussing U.C.C. § 9-
307(1)).
218. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
219. The Code has no provision that specifically and comprehensively ad-
dresses the contest between a third party paid out of a deposit account and an
earlier creditor claiming a security interest in the deposit account as original
collateral.
Section 9-307 is not directly applicable-it protects various bona fide pur-
chasers of goods from the interests of earlier secured parties in the same prop-
erty as original collateral. Whether the original collateral here is categorized as
the money withdrawn, see U.C.C. § 1-201(24), the check used as payment (an
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ment out of a checking account should be cut off in favor of a
third party who receives such payment in exchange for value
given to the depositor in good faith and without notice.220 A lib-
eral definition of what type of third party qualifies as a bona
fide purchaser in this context is necessary.221 Otherwise, appli-
cation of article 9 to deposit account collateral could prejudice
third parties, 2 22 thereby undermining the negotiability of
checks223 and the free use of funds2 24 withdrawn from deposi-
tary institutions.225
The new section could provide, for example:
"instrument" under id. § 9-105(i)), or the deposit account, see id. § 9-105(e), it
clearly is not a "good" within the meaning of article 9, see id. § 9-105(h).
The Code does provide an answer if a check is used to pay the third party.
As long as the recipient qualifies as a "holder in due course," see id. § 3-302, or
is a "purchaser in the ordinary course of business" who gives "value," the
holder or purchaser takes priority over the earlier security interest in the
check, see id. §§ 9-308(a), -309. Article 9 makes it clear that the mere fact that
the creditor with the earlier security interest has filed a financing statement
does not give the later recipient of the instrument "constructive notice," de-
stroying its status as a bona fide purchaser. See id. §§ 9-308, -309.
220. Official comment 2 to U.C.C. § 9-306 states:
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking ac-
count and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients
of the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party
may have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to pay-
ments and transfers in ordinary course.
Id. comment 2(c) (emphasis added).
221. As has been noted in the context of the battle between an earlier se-
cured party claiming a "proceeds" security interest in the general account and
a later third party recipient of a payment out of the same account, the rights of
the third party should not turn on the form of the payment-whether cash or
check-but rather on whether the third party is a bona fide recipient. See
Skilton, supra note 213, at 150-51. California, which recognizes article 9 security
interests in deposit accounts as original collateral, see supra note 22, has not
enacted any special article 9 provision to resolve this problem.
222. Consider the problems that confront an appliance retailer receiving
cash and check payments from its customers. If notice could be imputed to the
retailer based on earlier creditors' filings against customer deposit accounts,
the retailer would have to search the public records for earlier deposit account
encumbrances before closing every sale. If a security interest were discovered,
the retailer would have to investigate further. If the proposed payment were in
cash, the retailer would need to ascertain whether the funds used had been
withdrawn from the deposit account; if the proposed payment were by check,
the retailer would have to determine whether the earlier secured party had
"authorized" the payment. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
Even if the payment were authorized, the retailer would have to apply common
law tracing rules to calculate whether the actual funds that would be received
in payment were encumbered. See supra text accompanying notes 171-236.
223. A central policy underlying articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code is to promote the free flow of negotiable instruments.
224. See generally Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758)
(stolen bank notes are property of bona fide recipient).
225. See Skilton, supra note 213, at 145-52.
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In the case of any payment by the debtor out of deposit account collat-
eral, the payee takes free of a security interest created by the debtor
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the
payee knows of its existence, if the payee receives the payment in good
faith and for value.2 2
6
Such a provision in conjunction with section 9-306(2) would
prevent secured parties with interests in deposit accounts
either as original collateral or as proceeds from tracing their se-
curity interests into funds held by third parties. Presently, de-
positary institutions have no common law right to set-off
against funds disbursed by the depositor.227
b. The Security Interest in Assets Purchased by the Depositor
with Funds Taken from the Encumbered Deposit
Account
Section 9-306(2) provides that irrespective of whether the
sale of collateral is authorized by the secured party, the secur-
ity interest "continues in any identifiable proceeds ... re-
ceived by the debtor."228 The Code presumes that the security
agreement, unless it expressly provides otherwise, gives the
creditor a security interest reaching such "proceeds."229 "Pro-
ceeds" are defined broadly to include "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of col-
lateral or proceeds."2 30
Where the original collateral is the "deposit account" (or
the check or cash into which it has been transformed), the first
generation "proceeds" are the assets received by the debtor in
exchange for payments out of the account. Under this Article's
proposal, if those assets are "identifiable"--that is, if the se-
cured party can show that the assets were purchased with en-
cumbered deposit account funds-they are "proceeds" subject
to the security interest under article 9.231
Such an application of article 9 in place of the common law
226. This recommendation combines language from both the article 1 defini-
tion of a "buyer in ordinary course of business," see U.C.C. § 1-201(9), and § 9-
307's protection of bona fide purchasers of goods claimed to be encumbered by
the interests of earlier secured creditors, see id. § 9-307(1). Because of the im-
portance of payments by check and of funds withdrawn from bank accounts in
nonbusiness transactions between the debtor and third parties, no requirement
is included that the depositor make the payment out of the account in the "or-
dinary course of business." See Skilton, supra note 213, at 152.
227. The third party recipient of the funds is not '"mutually indebted" with
the bank. See supra text accompanying note 159.
228. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
229. Id. § 9-203(3).
230. Id. § 9-306(1).
231. See Skilton, supra note 213, at 152.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
would sometimes enhance, rather than diminish, a depositary
bank's self-help remedies. Business and consumer customers
frequently maintain general bank accounts in order to have a
safe and convenient way of paying for purchases. Creditors' in-
terest in first generation "proceeds" paid for by check could
provide an additional incentive for their reliance on deposit ac-
count collateral. In contrast, a bank exercising its common law
right to set-off has no claim beyond the balance remaining in
the account upon default.
There are, however, important restrictions on this interest
in proceeds. Section 9-306(2) requires that the proceeds be
"identifiable." To meet this requirement, the secured party
would have to establish that the purported "proceeds" were
purchased with funds from the encumbered deposit account.232
In addition, the secured party would have to demonstrate that
the deposit account funds used to purchase the proceeds were
subject to the creditor's original security interest under the
lowest intermediate balance rule.233 The following examples il-
lustrate how these factors could reduce the secured party's
claim against assets purchased with deposit account funds.
Example 7:
A business depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. No third party has
an interest in the account. The depositor grants the bank a security in-
terest in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. The following ac-
tivity occurs in the account:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000 for payment of employee sala-
ries, leaving a balance of $1,000.
Day 3: The depositor purchases a typewriter for $500, paid for by a
check drawn on the deposit account.
On Day 2, the bank had a security interest of $1,000 under
the lowest intermediate balance rule. Although $2,000 of "en-
cumbered funds" were used to pay employee salaries, no asset
was purchased to which a security interest in proceeds could
attach. Following the purchase of the typewriter on Day 3-
made with "encumbered" funds-the bank had a security inter-
est in deposit account collateral of only $500 and a security in-
terest in the $500 typewriter as proceeds. 234
232. In some cases, this element would be relatively easy to establish. If
payments were made by check, the secured creditor could simply produce the
cancelled check. If payment were made in cash, the secured creditor might in-
troduce evidence establishing that on the day of the purchase the debtor with-
drew funds from the encumbered account in an amount that approximates the
purchase price of the asset claimed as proceeds.
233. See supra text accompanying note 179.
234. Under the common law, the bank with a right to set-off would only re-
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In the next example, "encumbered" funds are commingled
with "unencumbered" funds at the time the asset is acquired.
Example 8:
A business depositor has a $10,000 account. No third party has an in-
terest in the account. The depositor grants the bank a security inter-
est in $3,000 of the account to secure a $2,000 loan. There is no "after-
acquired deposit" clause in the security agreement. The following ac-
tivity occurs in the account.
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor withdraws $9,000 to pay employee salaries, leav-
ing a balance of $1,000.
Day 3: The depositor deposits $5,000 of wholly owned funds, leaving a
balance of $6,000.
Day 4: The depositor purchases a computer for $5,500, paid for by a
check drawn on the account.
Immediately prior to the purchase of the computer on Day
4, the bank had a security interest of $1,000 under the lowest in-
termediate balance rule.2 35 Money paid out of the account is
presumed to come first from unencumbered funds; thus only
$500 of the purchase price came from "encumbered" funds.236
Accordingly, the bank would have a $500 security interest in
the deposit account as original collateral and a $500 security in-
terest in the computer as proceeds-an equitable outcome.
As shown in the preceding eight examples, if the common
law of assignments and pledge, as modified by statute, and the
doctrine of set-off are displaced, article 9 could provide a worka-
ble legal framework within which an individual debtor and its
creditors could bargain concerning the dimensions of the secur-
ity interest granted in deposit account collateral. If a business
debtor were willing to give the secured creditor a "floating lien"
over deposit account collateral, the security agreement could so
provide by the inclusion of "after-acquired deposit" and "future
advances" clauses. On the other hand, if the debtor were to
conclude that the size of the advance, the terms of the repay-
ment, or other factors warranted the grant of a less expansive
interest, such clauses could be omitted from the security agree-
cover the $500 from the account and would have no security interest in the
typewriter. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
235. In all of the examples considered thus far, the simplifying assumption
has been made that there are no third party interests in the deposit account as
original collateral. This assumption is not made in subsequent examples con-
cerning priority battles. It would be more realistic to assume in example 8 that
there was an "after-acquired deposit" clause in the security agreement, but
that some other earlier creditor had a superior claim to $5,000 of the $6,000 bal-
ance in the account on Day 3. The outcome would be the same: the bank
would have a $1,000 interest at the time the computer was purchased on Day 4.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 279-373.
236. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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ment and an express waiver of the secured party's interest in
proceeds could be included.
C. PERFECTION OF THE SECURrrY INTEREST IN DEPOSrr
ACCOUNTS AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL
Creditors bargain for security interests in collateral to in-
crease the likelihood that they will be repaid should the debtor
default.237 Unlike general creditors, article 9 secured parties
have a claim to specified items of the debtor's personal prop-
erty to cover the balance owed.2 38 There may, however, be
competing creditors of the debtor holding security interests,
statutory liens, or judicial liens against the same personal prop-
erty. Before entering into a transaction, a potential creditor
thus will want to know how its interest ranks against the con-
flicting interests of others.239
Under article 9, a creditor who creates a security interest
and gives the requisite public notice obtains the "exalted" sta-
tus240 of a creditor holding a "perfected" security interest.241
Depending on the type of collateral, a creditor ordinarily "per-
fects" either by filing a financing statement in the appropriate
state office, 2 42 or by taking possession of the collateral.2 43 The
general rule is that the first creditor to give public notice, and
thus perfect its security interest, has priority over all compet-
ing creditors.244 Once such notice has been given, subsequent
creditors who rely on the same collateral do so at their peril. If
prudent, they will discover the earlier security interest and
charge a higher interest rate to cover their enhanced risks upon
default, negotiate a subordination agreement with the earlier
creditor, ask for additional collateral, or simply decide not to
extend credit.245 Similarly, potential purchasers of the encum-
bered personal property from the debtor can discover the ear-
lier credit transaction and adjust their behavior to protect their
interests. Thus, the debtor's opportunity to defraud third par-
ties by claiming full ownership of already encumbered personal
237. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 57, at 179.
238. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502 to -505.
239. Baird & Jackson, supra note 57, at 175-76, 179.
240. See B. CLARiK, supra note 44, 1 1.2[2].
241. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1).
242. See id. §§ 9-302(1), -401, -402.
243. See id. § 9-305.
244. See id. § 9-312(5) (a). But see id. § 9-312(3), 9-312(4) (exceptions to this
rule).
245. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-51 (1979).
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property will be diminished.246
These public notice requirements and first-in-time priority
rules should also be applied to the proposed article 9 security
interest in deposit accounts as original collateral. The present
law places the risk of "ostensible ownership" of deposit ac-
counts on the subsequent creditor to a substantially greater ex-
tent than does article 9. Under the common law, a depositary
institution has no obligation to warn subsequent creditors or
purchasers of its inchoate right to set-off. Pledge transactions
afford public notice by requiring the debtor to relinquish pos-
session of indispensable writings, thus making it difficult for
the pledgor to obtain "false credit from apparent ownership of
the pledged property."247 In many states, however, the debtor
can avoid this restriction if the creditor accepts a security as-
signment rather than a pledge.248 An assignee of either an in-
corporeal or reified deposit account need not give general
public notice to protect its interest against successive claim-
ants.249 Although in California and Hawaii the Code has been
modified to authorize retention of an article 9 security interest
in all deposit account collateral, the secured party has no obli-
gation to provide general public notice.25 0
246. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 57, at 175-90.
247. Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affld, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976).
248. Id. at 472 n.18; Rosenstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 304 N.C. 541,
543-44, 284 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1981). See generally infra text accompanying notes
283-309.
249. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACTs § 342 comment a (1979).
250. The California statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security in-
terests except the following. (g) A security interest in a deposit
account. Such a security interest is perfected: (1) As to a deposit ac-
count maintained with the secured party when the security agreement
is executed; (2) as to a deposit account not described in subparagraph
(1) when notice thereof is given in writing to the organization with
whom the deposit account is maintained.
CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1) (g) (West 1984); see also HAwArr REV. STAT. § 490:9-
302(h) (1983).
The rationale for giving notice to the depositary institution is traceable to
the common law. Under the law of assignments, absent such notice the obligor
(the depositary bank) can continue to make payments to the principal debtor
(the depositor) without incurring any risk of double liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 170(1) (1979). The same rule is carried forward into
California's and Hawaii's versions of article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-318(3).
In addition, by providing such notice to the depositary bank the outside
creditor will prevent the bank from subsequently foreclosing against the funds
that by virtue of the notice may be transformed from a "general" account to a
"special" account. See Annot., 8 A.LR.4TH 998, § 4 (1981). There is no right to
set-off against "special" accounts. Id.
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To justify departing from the common law, one must care-
fully examine both the benefits and costs of the article 9 public
notice requirements in the specific context of deposit account
collateral. Such an analysis must first address the difficult is-
sue of how public notice would be given, if required. The Code
could treat all deposit accounts as "general intangibles" and
provide that a security interest in a deposit account could be
perfected solely by filing a financing statement.25 ' Alterna-
tively, the Code could distinguish between deposit accounts
represented by symbolic writings and all other deposit ac-
counts. As to the former, the Code could either require that
the secured party take possession of the writing symbolizing
the depositor's chose in action or could allow the parties to
choose either possession or filing. As to the latter, the incorpo-
real accounts, filing would be the only permissible mode of
perfection.
The "perfection by possession" alternative should be elimi-
nated, leaving filing as the only method of perfecting article 9
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral.252
Creditors, debtors, and courts would no longer need to deter-
mine which deposit accounts are represented by symbolic writ-
ings, an increasingly difficult task with electronic funds
transfers and a wide variety of deposit arrangements. 2 3 In ad-
dition, there would be no need to ascertain when the debtor
had relinquished sufficient control to transfer possession.254
The Code defines precisely what constitutes an effective fil-
ing.25 5 Moreover, filing provides better and more accessible
public notice to potential creditors and purchasers than does
perfection by possession.25 6
If perfection can only be accomplished by filing, then deci-
251. See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, -302(1).
252. Recent articles argue persuasively that perfection by filing is superior
to perfection by possession. See, e.g., McDonnell, A Reevaluation of Public No-
tice Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1A P. COOGAN, W. Ho-
GAN & D. VAGTS, supra note 5, §§ 6C.01-6C.08; Coogan, supra note 140; Phillips,
Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 (pts. 1-2), 59
B.U.L. REV. 1, 209 (1979).
253. Litigation thus could be avoided over whether perfection was accom-
plished by delivery of a checkbook, a debit card, or a nonnegotiable certificate
of deposit (generally the size of a check and without "seals, ribbons, [or] gilded
edges"). See Harris, supra note 25, at 373 n.191.
254. See Phillips (pt. 1), supra note 252, at 24-28.
255. See U.C.C. § 9-403(1) (filing occurs when the creditor presents the fi-
nancing statement and tenders the filing fee).
256. See Coogan, supra note 140, at 1033-36; Phillips (pt. 1), supra note 252,
34-43.
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sions concerning control of the deposit account during the loan
repayment period could be based on the business needs of the
depositor and the creditors' assessment of the risks of the
transaction. If the depositor had a short-term liquidity prob-
lem, the original secured party might allow hypothecation of an
interest in the same account to a less risk-averse creditor; that
subsequent creditor also could file to obtain a perfected, but
junior, security interest.25 7 In contrast, if possession of an in-
dispensable writing were required for perfection, the debtor
would have to meet its additional financing needs by negotiat-
ing with the original secured creditor for a future advance, by
purchasing credit elsewhere at a higher unsecured rate, or by
persuading the original creditor to enter into a subordination
agreement with the later creditor. Such measures would be
needlessly costly and inconvenient, particularly where the orig-
inal creditor was overcollateralized. 25 8
If the depositor remains in control of the encumbered de-
posit account, both the proceeds of the loan and the "collateral
funds" to the extent allowed by the loan agreement can be
used in the depositor's business. 259 Efficient and good faith use
of resources by the business debtor best ensures repayment of
the loan.260 Moreover, under article 9, unlike the common law,
the secured creditor who perfects by filing could retain a float-
ing lien that would encumber equipment or inventory
purchased with deposit account funds.261
Proponents of "perfection by possession" rely on its preva-
lence in current commercial practice.262 Professor Phillips has
257. See Phillips (pt. 1), supra note 252, at 14-18.
258. Id. at 15-16.
259. When perfection occurs through possession, the debtor "trade[s] one
asset for another." Id. at 9.
260. Id. at 17.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 228-36.
262. See U.C.C. § 9-304(1) comment 1; Harris, supra note 25, at 275-83. Pro-
fessor Harris's article, however, is based on the assumption that the Code will
not be amended. See id. at 376. Moreover, he writes only about nonnegotiable
certificates of deposit, which he urges should be treated as "instruments." Ac-
cordingly, possession would be the only method of perfection.
Of all the collateral which would be classified as a "deposit account" under
this proposal, the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit has the most indisputable
tangible physical embodiment. In other words, it is the most attractive candi-
date for perfection by possession. Nonetheless, filing is recommended even for
such collateral. The rule proposed here would permit perfection by possession
solely for interests in certificates of deposit, which are negotiable under article
3. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1), (2). Such a rule would be easier for banks to apply
and would result in less litigation. Approximately 23.5% of the accounts in
commercial banks are demand deposits, another 31% are savings accounts and
only 45.5% are time deposits. See supra note 6.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
pointed out the circularity of this reasoning: lenders take pos-
session because the current law affords them maximum protec-
tion of their interests if they do so. 263 Surely, the Code need
not blindly follow practices developed when banking transac-
tions were tied to paper-based formalities. By eliminating the
"perfection by possession" alternative, the parties could decide
in each transaction who could best use the collateral during the
loan repayment period.
The benefits of requiring filing in the deposit account con-
text would outweigh the costs involved.264 A depositor left in
possession of a deposit account will ordinarily exercise broad
control with only minimal restrictions. 2 65 Because these re-
strictions do not ordinarily apprise potential creditors of the
earlier encumbrance, the depositor has the opportunity to mis-
represent ownership of the collateral. If the transaction costs
of filing are minimized, the imposition of article 9 filing require-
ments on deposit account financing could improve the function-
ing of credit markets by enabling all participants to consider all
the risks in their decisionmaking.
Numerous potential creditors will need information about
prior security interests in deposit accounts. 2 66 A creditor plan-
263. See Phillips (pt. 2), supra note 252, at 239.
264. Article 9 contains exceptions to the public notice requirement where
the costs to the secured party of filing or taking possession of the collateral out-
weigh the benefits to later creditors. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 57, at 190-
94. For example, § 9-302(1) (d) provides that a purchase money security inter-
est in consumer goods is automatically perfected at the time of attachment.
See U.C.C. § 9-109, -302(1) (d). The justifications for this exception are that the
cost of filing in a multitude of individual retail transactions is great and that the
relatively inexpensive, rapidly depreciating encumbered goods are not likely to
serve as collateral for subsequent creditors. See Baird & Jackson, supra note
57, at 192-93 (articulating this justification and expressing reservations); see
also B. CLARK, supra note 44, 2.7[1].
It is difficult to predict whether there would be a substantial secondary
market for financing against deposit accounts. If the balance in the account
were substantial, subsequent creditors might be extremely interested in this
additional source of collateral, which will not depreciate, so long as information
about the existence and dimensions of earlier encumbrances is readily
available.
265. For example, the depositor's freedom is limited by bank rules concern-
ing service charges, deposits, and withdrawals. Article 4 provides additional
limitations on the bank's obligation to comply with the depositor's directions.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4-303(1), -404.
266. Under the present system, a subsequent creditor needs, but may not
have, information about the depositary institution's right to set-off. This is the
case whether the subsequent creditor has a security interest in proceeds in a
deposit account or is unsecured and thus must look to the debtor's general as-
sets (including deposit accounts) for ultimate satisfaction of its claims. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 267-69.
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ning to retain a security interest in the deposit account as origi-
nal collateral will obviously want to discover earlier
encumbrances. An inventory financier considering a debtor's
request for unrestricted use of cash proceeds during the loan
repayment period needs to know whether the deposit of such
proceeds in the debtor's general bank account will affect the
priority of its security interest.267 A creditor contemplating an
unsecured advance may look to the article 9 files for supple-
mental information about the debtor's general financial well-be-
ing. If such creditors examine financing statements indexed
under the debtor's name268 and discover that all deposit ac-
counts have been hypothecated, they may change the terms of
their offers.26 9
All of these creditors, of course, could question the debtor
or rely on "private markets" for information about the debtor's
earlier transactions. 270 For instance, if the depositary institu-
tion is the potential creditor, it could include a term in the de-
positary agreement requiring disclosure by the debtor of all
transactions secured by the deposit account. But the reason
for the article 9 public notice requirement is to provide infor-
mation from a source other than the debtor-the potential per-
petrator of fraud.
If the subsequent creditor is an outside creditor, it may be
able to discover the whereabouts of the debtor's different de-
posit accounts and question each depositary institution con-
cerning encumbrances. 271 But those depositary institutions
may be unaware of the encumbrances of other creditors. More-
over, they may be unwilling to divulge what they do know for
fear of potential liability2 72 or loss of customer goodwill. De-
positary institutions have no common law duty to provide such
267. See infra text accompanying notes 310-32.
268. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
269. Professor Phillips, arguing for elimination of perfection by possession,
points out that even if unsecured creditors do not actually check article 9 files
themselves, "most likely the debtor's accountants, institutional creditors and
credit agencies do check such filings before preparing or certifying any state-
ments, extending credit, or transmitting or formulating any credit rating to in-
terested parties." Phillips (pt. 1), supra note 252, at 39. In this indirect way,
the public filing system may help trade creditors test the validity of debtors'
representations about their financial well-being. Id.
270. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 57, at 182-83.
271. In the case of a debtor with numerous deposit accounts in different in-
stitutions, this task would be expensive and time-consuming, particularly when
contrasted with a search of article 9 files under the debtor's name.
272. In part because of the reluctance of creditors to divulge such informa-
tion, the Code sets up a procedure whereby a potential creditor, with the help
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information.273 In addition, they may have economic reasons to
not report the extent of customer indebtedness accurately. If a
bank, for example, believes its depositor can no longer operate
profitably without inventory financing from the inquiring credi-
tor, the bank may understate the extent of the depositor's out-
standing obligation. On the other hand, if the depositary
institution fears that the debtor is overextended, or if the bank
is competing with the outside creditor for the opportunity to
extend a future advance, it may overstate outstanding
obligations.
In the absence of a reliable and convenient source of infor-
mation, all potential creditors may charge a premium for lend-
ing based on the conservative assumption that deposit
accounts are encumbered. Such behavior would not maximize
the interest of the honest debtor, the honest depositary institu-
tion, or the honest outside creditor.
The article 9 public filing system provides "concrete and
trustworthy" information which creditors may use to supple-
ment knowledge gained through private sources. 274 Certain
factors suggest that the costs would not be excessive. The arti-
cle 9 filing system is already in place for other types of collat-
eral-there are detailed rules concerning the requirements for
the financing statement, where it must be filed, how it should
be indexed, the consequences of errors, and how the statement
can be amended, terminated, or continued.275 State offices are
of the debtor, can demand information about the amount outstanding on the
earlier loan and the extent of the encumbrance. See U.C.C. § 9-208.
Banks have incurred liability for fraud and deceit or negligent misrepre-
sentation for providing erroneous or incomplete information about a depositor's
creditworthiness and thereby inducing third parties to extend loans or make
credit sales. See 5B MIcIHE, supra note 32, § 312 (1983); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 6
(1977). In order to establish a case of intentional fraud, the following factors
must be established:
(1) a misrepresentation or an omission of a (2) material (3) fact; (4)
knowledge or belief on the part of the bank ... that the misrepresenta-
tion is false, misleading, or incomplete; (5) an intention to induce the
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the representation;
and (6) justifiable or reasonable (7) reliance to the plaintiff's (8)
detriment.
77 A.L.R.3D at 14. To establish negligent misrepresentation, the scienter re-
quirement (factor (4) above) is "speaking about... creditworthiness in a reck-
less or negligent manner." Id. at 14.
273. 5B MicmE, supra note 32, § 308, at 222 (1983).
274. As explained by Professors Baird and Jackson, information given
through public filings is 'trustworthy" because the information is "conveyed"
by the occurrence of an "event"-the filing or its absence. Baird & Jackson,
supra note 57, at 184.
275. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-401 to -404, -406.
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established, indexing systems exist, and creditors have devel-
oped the necessary forms. A creditor retaining a security inter-
est in more traditional collateral as well as deposit accounts
could prepare a single financing statement, describing all the
collateral, and would pay only one, minimal filing fee.276
At present no study has been made concerning the actual
costs of filing to creditors and to the state;27 7 accordingly, a leg-
islature might experiment for a trial period with a full filing re-
quirement for deposit account collateral. If costs proved
excessive, the legislature could establish a more limited notice
system. For example, filing could be required only for exten-
sions of credit secured by deposit accounts of $1,000 or more, or
for advances with repayment periods exceeding ninety days.27 8
For the remainder of this Article, it is assumed that filing is re-
276. The "out of pocket" costs for filing and searching the files in a particu-
lar transaction are modest, with fees ranging from $2.00 to $10.00 per filing. See
generally 4 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-403:3 (2d ed. Supp.
1983). For examples of filing fees in various jurisdictions, see ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 85-9-403(5) (1983) (fee not to exceed $3.00); CAL. COM. CODE § 9403(5) (West
1984) ($3.00 fee if statement in standard form, otherwise $4.00); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:9-403(5) (1984) ($2.00 fee); GA. CODE § 11-9-403(5) (1982) ($2.50 fee); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-403(5) (Smith-Hurd 1983) ($4.00 fee if statement in stan-
dard form, otherwise $8.00); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 9-403(5) (1983) ($5.00
fee); MICH. Comp. LAws § 440.9403(5) ( 1983) ($3.00 fee if statement in standard
form, otherwise $6.00); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A.9-403(5) (West 1983) ($10.00 fee);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-403(5) (1983) (fee is the greater of $5.00 or $1.00 for each
full year the statement shall be in effect plus $.50 for each page in excess of two
pages); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-403(5) (1984) ($4.00 fee if statement in
standard form, otherwise $5.00). Additional clerical and legal expenses are in-
curred, however, in preparing the documents prior to filing.
277. The state's overhead costs might increase because of the larger volume
of filings. Some of these costs could be passed on to creditors in the form of
increased filing fees. Some of the costs to creditors might be passed on to debt-
ors. If states take advantage of improved computer technology, the costs could
be minimized while creditors would have access to more information more rap-
idly. See Coogan, supra note 140, at 1051-53.
In testimony before Congress in connection with the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, lawyers representing a large association of bankers opined that bankers
would not object to "footnoting" by accountants indicating which balances are
subject to set-off. But when asked about article 9 filings, the bankers replied
that "in that the vast majority of borrowers maintain balances" it "would pose
great expenses to our economy and to whatever governmental agency would
have the task of maintaining these records." Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hear-
ings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2508-09 (1976)
(testimony of John J. Jerome and David L. Bleich, Esqs.). No statistics were
provided.
278. The amount of security would be reflected in the description of the col-
lateral contained both in the security agreement and the financing statement.
See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. A few states have modified the
purchase money security interest in consumer goods exception to require filing
where the loan is for more than a certain amount. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
quired to perfect all security interests in deposit accounts as
original collateral. The time of the filing will in large part deter-
mine the priority of the creditor's claim, as explained in the fol-
lowing section.
I. BASIC PRIORITY PROBLEMS
The article 9 drafters codified priority rules that earlier se-
curity statutes simply left to judges with little or no gui-
dance.27 9 According to Professor Gilmore, the pre-Code law
was inadequate both because of the difficulty of finding ade-
quate legislative solutions and because many priority problems
arose "in the no-man's land between the various security de-
vices." 280 As will be seen in the analysis of some illustrative
priority problems below,281 article 9 resolves neither the con-
flict between a bank asserting its common law right to set-off
and an article 9 creditor with a security interest in proceeds in
a deposit account, nor the contest between such a bank and a
creditor with a judicial lien against the account.2 82 If article 9 is
expanded so that banks must create security interests in de-
posit accounts as original collateral, and cannot rely on the
common law right to set-off, another "no-man's land" will be
§ 4-9-302(1) (d) (1983) ($250); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-302(1) (d) (1983)
($1,000); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 409.302(1) (d) (1983) ($500).
Saskatchewan's Personal Property Act treats leases as security interests
requiring "public notice" where the leasehold is for more than one year. See 1
P. CooGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, supra note 5, §§ 4A.01 [5] [C].
Professor Kripke and Mr. Coogan urge taking a similar approach in article 9.
See Coogan, Is there a Difference Between a Long Term Lease and an Install-
ment Sale of Personal Property?, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1036, 1047 n.61 (1981); Kripke,
Book Review, 37 Bus. LAWYER 723, 728 (1982).
279. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 655.
280. Id.
281. This Article does not discuss all the basic priority rules that would be
affected. One important issue not addressed is whether the Code's rules pro-
viding priority to later-in-time purchase money security interests should apply
to deposit accounts. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). In the context of tradi-
tional collateral, there has been thoughtful criticism of these "superpriority"
provisions. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 245. The "conven-
tional" explanation is that without these provisions the debtor would lose ac-
cess to important secondary sources of credit. See B. CLARK, supra note 44,
3.9[1]. In order to retain a "purchase money security interest" in deposit ac-
counts, the creditor would advance funds which the debtor then would deposit
in the account-in effect "purchasing" with the loan proceeds an augmented
chose in action. See U.C.C. § 9-107. In the remainder of this Article, it is as-
sumed that there should not be special rules favoring purchase money security
interests in deposit account collateral.
282. The term "lien creditor" is used hereinafter to describe a creditor hold-
ing a judicial lien. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) ("lien creditor" is "a creditor who has
acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like").
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crossed and these and other priority problems will be resolved
under article 9's general propositions.
A. THE PRIORITY BATrLE BETWEEN Two CREDITORS WITH
ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE SAIE DEPOSIT
ACCOUNT AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL
In a classic priority battle, each competing creditor asserts
that its interest in an item of the debtor's property is superior
to that of the other claimant. The creditor who prevails has the
right to full satisfaction of its claim out of the collateral before
the subordinate creditor can obtain any satisfaction. This sec-
tion examines a contest between two creditors with article 9 se-
curity interests in the same deposit account as original
collateral. Should article 9 be amended as proposed, this prior-
ity problem could arise frequently because it would be more
practicable for debtors to hypothecate deposit accounts to cred-
itors other than to depositary institutions. 283
Example 9:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. The following activity
occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor grants the depositary bank a security interest in
$3,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure a
$5,000 loan. The security agreement includes an "after-ac-
quired deposit" clause.
Day 3: The depositor grants a finance company a security interest in
$5,000 of the account as original collateral to secure a $10,000
advance. The security agreement does not include an "after-
acquired deposit" clause.
Day 4: The depositor withdraws $6,000 to pay wages, leaving a bal-
ance of $4,000.
Day 5: The finance company ifies a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 6: The depositary bank files a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 7: The depositor deposits $1,000 in its account, leaving a balance
of $5,000.
In resolving this contest between the depositary bank and
the finance company, it is useful to first determine to what ex-
tent these creditors' interests are in conflict. 284 The size of each
creditor's interest in the account on Day 7 should be indepen-
283. Article 9 already covers the priority battle between two creditors claim-
ing security interests in proceeds traceable to a deposit account. See B. CLARK,
supra note 44, 1.8[12].
284. The same approach also could be used with traditional collateral. For
example, if the resale value of an automobile is sufficient to satisfy the balance
owed to each of two competing creditors, there is no need to determine which
creditor is senior to the other.
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dently calculated, ignoring the interest of the other. The depos-
itary bank holds a perfected security interest in $4,000 of the
$5,000 balance if one applies the lowest intermediate balance
rule285 and ignores the interest of the finance company.28 6 If
the bank's interest is ignored, the finance company also holds a
perfected security interest in $4,000 of the $5,000 balance.2 87 Ac-
cordingly, the contest between the creditors is over $3,000;
neither creditor can get more than $4,000 and each is assured a
minimum of $1,000.
Rather than "inventing" a new rule to govern this basic pri-
ority dispute, the article 9 solution should be applied. Under
section 9-312(5) (a), the first party to give "public notice" of its
interest wins.28 8 Here the finance company, because it filed its
financing statement first, would prevail as to the contested
$3,000. Adding the $1,000 of uncontested funds, the finance com-
pany could foreclose on a total of $4,000 in the deposit ac-
count.2 89 As the junior creditor, the bank would take the
remaining $1,000 for its debt.290 The finance company could sue
the debtor for a deficiency of approximately $6,000 (assuming
no repayment on the $10,000 loan)2 91 and the depositary bank
could sue for approximately $4,000.292
The justification for this "first-to-file" priority rule in dis-
putes over deposit account collateral is the same as where
traditional collateral is involved. Although the finance com-
pany in example 9 was the second creditor to advance funds,
and may even have had "actual" knowledge of the depositary
285. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
286. On Day 2, the depositary bank had an interest in $3,000 of funds. The
withdrawal of $6,000 on Day 4 is presumed to come first from funds not subject
to the bank's interest. Because of the "after-acquired deposit" clause in the se-
curity agreement, see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text, the bank's se-
curity interest automatically attaches to the $1,000 deposit on Day 7, leaving
$4,000 of the $5,000 balance subject to the bank's encumbrance.
287. On Day 3, the finance company had an interest in $5,000 of funds. The
withdrawal of $6,000 on Day 4, even if presumed to first come from funds not
subject to the finance company's interest, reduces the finance company's claim
to $4,000. Because there is no after-acquired deposit clause in the agreement,
the finance company's interest is not augmented by the deposit on Day 7.
288. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (a) provides in pertinent part: "Conflicting security in-
terests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection."
289. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1).
290. See id. § 9-502(2).
291. See id. The finance company may also recover its "reasonable ex-
penses of realization from the collections." Id. In this case the finance com-
pany's reasonable expenses would reduce the depositary bank's share of the
account.
292. See id.
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bank's interest, it wins under article 9's '"pure race" rule.2 93
The Code adopts this approach because it is simple, certain,
and promotes reliance on public records.2 94 Both creditors are
ordinarily professionals; the depositary bank could have pro-
tected itself simply by filing a financing statement on Day 2.295
In the absence of such a filing by the bank, the finance com-
pany had no reliable way to discover the earlier encumbrance
before it extended credit on Day 3.
It may be tempting, with such easily divisible collateral, to
prorate the contested amount of the deposit account. 295 For ex-
ample, the $3,000 could be allocated to the bank and the finance
company according to the ratio of the unpaid balances on their
two advances.297 But such an approach, by adding unnecessary
complexity to an already complex set of common law rules,
would not further the article 9 goal of creating a simple system
of priorities based on public notice.298
The next example shows how the above-described applica-
tion of article 9's priority rule would make the law more certain
and uniform than the common law of assignments or pledge.
Example 10:
The depositor has a $10,000 Money Market Deposit Account. The fol-
lowing activity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor grants a finance company a security interest in
$6,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure an
$8,000 loan.
Day 3: The depositor grants a thrift institution a security interest in
$9,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure a
$10,000 loan.
293. See id. § 9-312 comment 5, example 2.
294. See B. CLARY, supra note 44, T 3.8[1]; D. BArD & T. JACKSON, supra
note 57, at 406-09 (any system taking into account the knowledge of the compet-
ing creditors may lead to circular priority problems, less information being ad-
ded to the filing system, and difficulties for the debtor who tries to persuade a
creditor to extend credit). But see Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Deter-
mining Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.UJ. Rav. 246
(1967).
295. See B. CLARY, supra note 44, 3.8[1].
296. The Code adopts such an approach with respect to original collateral
that becomes part of a "product or mass." U.C.C. § 9-315. See 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 19, § 31.4, at 846-47 (difference between a "commingled mass," to
which U.C.C. § 9-315 applies, and "commingled proceeds" governed by U.C.C.
§ 9-306).
297. Under such a rule, if the debtor had not repaid any part of either loan,
the bank, because its loan accounted for one-third of the total indebtedness,
would recover $2,000 ($1,000 of uncontested funds plus one-third of the con-
tested $3,000); the finance company would recover $3,000 ($1,000 of uncontested
funds plus two-thirds of the contested $3,000).
298. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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Day 4: The thrift files a properly completed financing statement.
Day 5: The thrift formally notifies the depositary institution of its
interest.
Were it not for the thrift institution, the finance company
would have an interest in the Money Market Deposit Account
in the amount of $6,000; were it not for the finance company, the
thrift would have an interest of $9,000. Accordingly, there is a
conflict over $5,000. Since it filed first, the thrift would prevail
under article 9. It could foreclose on the account for $9,000; the
finance company would obtain $1,000 from the account and sue
for a deficiency of $7,000.299
The result under the common law of assignments depends
on where the dispute is heard. If the jurisdiction has adopted
the "New York" rule, the result would be opposite that reached
under article 9: the finance company (the first assignee of the
contested chose in action for $5,000) would win over the thrift
institution (the successive assignee of the same contract
right).300 The rationale is that the depositor lost the contract
right when the first assignment was made to the finance com-
pany and thus had no right left to convey to the thrift.301 The
giving of public notice, a paramount consideration under article
9, is ignored.
More facts would be necessary to resolve this dispute in a
jurisdiction that had adopted the "four horsemen" rule.302 The
first assignee (the finance company) would prevail over the
second assignee (the thrift institution) unless one of four
events had occurred. If the thrift (the second assignee) had
persuaded the depositary institution to pay the full $9,000, or
obtained a judgment for $9,000 against the depositary institu-
tion, or entered into a novation with the depositary institution,
or could have and did take possession of a "symbolic writing"
representing the deposit account, the thrift would prevail over
the finance company.303
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which endorses
299. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5) (a), -502, -504(2).
300. See E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 3, § 11.9, at 791; see, e.g., Salem Trust
Co. v. Manufacturers' Financing Co., 264 U.S. 182, 197 (1923); Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. Harvard Trust Co., 344 Mass. 160, 168, 181 N.E.2d 673, 679
(1962); Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 A.D. 525, 526-27, 212 N.Y.S. 473,
475 (1925).
301. See sources cited supra note 300.
302. See E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 3, § 11.9, at 791-92; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNmAcTs § 342 (1979).
303. See sources cited supra note 302; see, e.g., Judson v. Corcoran, 58 U.S.
612 (1854); In re Gillespie, 15 F. 734, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Bagg, 292 Mass. 125, 128-29, 197 N.E. 481, 483 (1935); Rabinowitz v. Peo-
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the "four horsemen" rule, explains that the reason the first as-
signee loses when any of the four events occur is that its "equi-
table interest" is subordinated to the legal rights of the second
assignee, a bona fide purchaser for value.30 4 In addition, if the
first assignee does not demand and receive a symbolic writing
from the assignor, it is estopped from defeating a subsequent,
more diligent assignee who obtained such a writing.3 05 Provid-
ing general public notice thus is significant only with the last of
the four events.
Finally, if the dispute in example 10 arose in a jurisdiction
that applies the English rule, the thrift institution would win
for another reason: it was the first assignee to notify the obli-
gor-the depositary institution.3 06 This approach is sometimes
justified by a "public notice" rationale; once informed by the
assignee, the depositary institution could notify subsequent po-
tential creditors and debtors.307 The depositary institution,
however, may not be a reliable source of information.308
The common law of pledge, like article 9 and unlike secur-
ity assignments, emphasizes the giving of notice to subsequent
creditors and purchasers. If example 10 had involved a deposit
account represented by a "symbolic writing," the debtor might
first have pledged the writing to the finance company and, after
temporarily regaining possession, might have repledged the
writing to the thrift institution. Assuming both pledgees were
ple's Nat'l Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N.E. 289 (1920); Bridge v. Connecticut
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 152 Mass. 343, 25 N.E. 612 (1890).
In example 10, because there is no formal, physical embodiment of a
money market deposit account, the thrift would have to establish its priority by
the other methods described in the accompanying text.
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS § 342 comment e (1979); see,
e.g., Judson v. Corcoran, 58 U.S. 612 (1854).
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 342 comment f (1979).
306. See, e.g., Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434, 441 (1943); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 411 F.2d
755, 757 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1969); Nuckolls v. Bank, Nat'l
Ass'n, 10 Cal. 2d 278, 287, 74 P.2d 271, 276 (1937); City of Los Angeles v. Knapp, 7
Cal.2d 168, 171, 60 P.2d 127, 129 (1936); see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3,
§ 11.9, at 791; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 342 comment b (1979).
307. This rule is expressed in Rhode Island and Connecticut statutes re-
quiring notification of the depositary bank before a pledgee of a savings ac-
count can prevail over claimants other than the depositor. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 36-113 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 19-11-5 (1982). California and Hawaii
have enacted a version of the English rule: the security interest in a deposit
account is deemed automatically perfected and good against third parties as
long as the depositary institution has notice. See supra note 250; see also Jen-
kinson v. New York Fin. Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 247, 82 A. 36 (N.J. Ch. 1911).
308. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text; Salem Trust Co. v. Man-
ufacturers' Financing Co., 264 U.S. 182, 197 (1923).
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without notice, the thrift-the creditor in possession-would
win even if second in time.309
If article 9 were expanded as proposed here, these common
law rules would be largely displaced. Priority of interests in
deposit accounts, as in other personal property, would turn on
which claimant had first given public notice, thereby permitting
diligent subsequent creditors to adjust their behavior to the in-
creased risk of extending credit.
B. THE PRIORITY BATTLE BETWEEN A CREDITOR WITH AN
ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST IN A DEPOSIT ACCoUNT
AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL AND A CREDITOR wrrT
AN ARTICLE 9 PROCEEDS SECURITY INTEREST
IN THE SAME DEPOSIT ACCouNT
Courts have difficulty determining when and to what ex-
tent a depositary bank can set-off against a deposit account that
includes proceeds from property subject to another creditor's
article 9 security interest. The Code, however, has rules for
resolving conflicts over an item of personal property claimed as
encumbered original collateral by one creditor and as encum-
bered proceeds by another. The following discussion of exam-
ple 11 shows how application of article 9 rules would simplify
the law in this area.
Example 11:
The business depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. The following ac-
tivity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor grants the depositary bank a security interest in
$4,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure a
$5,000 loan. The security agreement includes an "after-ac-
quired deposit" clause.
Day 3: The depositor grants a security interest to a finance company
in "all present and after-acquired inventory and proceeds
thereof" to secure a $10,000 loan.
Day 4: The finance company files a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 5: The depositary bank files a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 6: The depositor deposits $1,000 cash in its account. The cash
represents the proceeds of a sale of inventory covered by the
finance company's security agreement. The balance in the ac-
count is $11,000.
Day 7: The depositor withdraws $6,000 to pay employee expenses,
leaving a balance of $5,000.
Ignoring the finance company's interest, on Day 7 the de-
309. See, e.g., Ambler Natl Bank v. Maryland Credit Finance Co., 147 Pa.
Super. 496, 503, 24 A.2d 123, 127 (1942).
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positary bank has an interest in the account as original collat-
eral in the amount of $5,000. The depositor's subsequent
agreement with the finance company on Day 3 does not change
the terms of its earlier contract with the depositary bank which
covers after-acquired deposits. Similarly, ignoring the deposi-
tary bank's interest, the proceeds interest of the finance com-
pany is $1,000.310 Because there is only $5,000 in the account,
there is a priority battle over $1,000 of the funds.
Article 9 provides that "[c] onflicting security interests rank
according to priority in time of filing" and that "a date of filing
... as to [original] collateral is also a date of filing... as to
proceeds." 3 11 A straightforward application of these rules to
the facts of example 11 indicates that the finance company will
prevail. The finance company filed on Day 4 as to the inventory
and can claim that date as to its interest in the proceeds of the
inventory as well. By filing on Day 5, the depositary bank lost
the race to the public records. The finance company can fore-
close against $1,000 of the deposit account and the bank can
keep the remaining $4,000.312 This result is sound because had
the depositary bank given notice promptly on Dak 2, the fi-
nance company might not have extended credit on Day 3.
There is one further complication under article 9. Section
9-312(5) (a) states that "[p]riority dates from the time a filing is
first made... provided that there is no period thereafter when
there is neither filing nor perfection."313 Section 9-306(3) sets
forth rules for maintaining a continuously perfected security
interest when original collateral (the inventory in example 11)
310. The 1972 amendments to article 9 make it clear that a security interest
in proceeds can be traced into a "commingled deposit account" by using com-
mon law principles such as the lowest intermediate balance rule. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Courts that have considered the issue recently have uni-
formly taken such an approach. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974); Universal C.LT. Credit Corp. v. Farmers
Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Rodi Boat Co. v. Provident Tradesmen's
Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa.), affld, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964);
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 217
S.E.2d 108 (1975); see also Henning, supra note 179, at 216-24.
Applying the lowest intermediate balance rule to the facts presented in ex-
ample 11, on Day 6 the finance company had a claim against $1,000 of the $11,000
in the account. The withdrawal by the depositor on the following day is pre-
sumed to first come out of funds other than those impressed with the finance
company's interest thus leaving the $1,000 claim intact.
311. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5)(a), 9-312(6).
312. Had the bank filed its financing statement on Day 4, and the finance
company filed its financing statement on Day 5, the bank would have been se-
nior to the extent of its $5,000 security interest.
313. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (a) (emphasis added).
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is transformed into proceeds (the deposit account).314 Under
some circumstances, a new financing statement must be filed
within ten days after the debtor receives the proceeds. 3 15
Article 9 affords potential creditors better notice of an ear-
lier security interest where proceeds are "non-cash" personal
property than where the proceeds are deposit accounts, as in
example 11.316 The sponsors of the Code assumed that few
creditors would retain security interests in deposit accounts as
original collateral. Indeed, there is no procedure under article 9
for creating such an interest. There would thus be little de-
mand for information about whether a deposit account might
be the proceeds of some earlier and more senior creditor's in-
terest in other property.317
If article 9 were expanded as proposed here, more potential
creditors will want to know whether particular deposit ac-
counts are encumbered as proceeds before they rely on those
accounts as original collateral. Section 9-306(1) could be
amended to provide such notice by deleting "deposit accounts"
from the definition of "cash proceeds." As a result, section 9-
314. Section 9-306(3) applies in the absence of insolvency proceedings; § 9-
306(4) applies where the debtor institutes insolvency proceedings under state
law or under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. and amending scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(22), (23), 9-306(3), (4); infra notes 354-73 and accompanying
text.
315. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(c).
316. A secured party is not required to file a second financing statement
describing proceeds if "a filed financing statement covers the original collateral
and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (b). Thus, a
potential creditor who contemplates advancing funds secured by an article 9 in-
terest in a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit must search all the article 9 pub-
lic filing records in the state under the debtor's name to determine whether
that deposit account is impressed with some earlier creditor's security interest.
In addition, the potential creditor must make further inquiries to ascertain
whether the debtor had received the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit as a
result of a disposition of property described in any of these financing state-
ments.
In contrast, if a potential subsequent creditor wants to rely on non-cash
collateral, its search for earlier encumbrances is more limited. In such in-
stances, the creditor must file a second financing statement covering the pro-
ceeds unless
a fied financing statement covers the original collateral and the pro-
ceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by
filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been
filed and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the descrip-
tion of collateral in the financing statement indicates the types of prop-
erty constituting the proceeds.
U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (a); see infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
317. See Harris, supra note 25, at 347-53.
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306(3) (a) and (c) would govern "deposit accounts" as well as
"non-cash proceeds."
This change would affect the secured creditor in example
11. The original collateral in example 11 was inventory. The
cash received by the depositor from the sale of inventory was
first generation proceeds. When those funds were deposited,
the depositor received as second generation proceeds an aug-
mented chose in action against the depositary bank. Under
each of the three alternative versions of section 9-401 (1), the fi-
nancing statement covering the original collateral (the inven-
tory) and the ultimate proceeds (the deposit account) would be
filed in the same place.318 Under section 9-306 as modified, the
first financing statement would be adequate to cover proceeds
so long as its description of collateral expressly included de-
posit accounts. 19 A subsequent creditor who contemplated
making a loan in reliance on the deposit account as original col-
lateral could uncover the earlier interest in proceeds by search-
ing the state or local fie designated for encumbrances on
deposit accounts.
In contrast, the outcome of the priority contest in example
11 would be uncertain if the depositary bank asserted its com-
mon law right to set-off instead of an article 9 security interest
in deposit accounts as original collateral. Courts and commen-
tators disagree about what legal rule to apply, and some of the
standards, in turn, raise difficult factual issues.
Assume, for instance, that the bank in example 11 asserted
its right to set-off against the entire balance in the account on
Day 7. The finance company would claim a senior perfected se-
curity interest in the $1,000 of proceeds deposited in the ac-
count. The threshold issue would be whether the article 9
318. The proper place to file would be in the office of the secretary of state
under alternatives one and two, and in the office of the secretary of state and
the county where the debtor has its place of business under alternative three.
See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (b) (first alternative), (c) (second alternative), (c) (third
alternative).
319. Because there is a cash interval, deposit accounts would have to be de-
scribed for the first financing statement to remain effective. See U.C.C. § 9-
306(3) (a). If the legislature wanted to place more pressure on secured credi-
tors to police their debtors, it could require that the description of the deposit
account in the financing statement covering proceeds include the identity of
the depositary institution and the account number. See supra note 116 and ac-
companying text. Under such a requirement, a secured creditor would have to
ascertain whether the depositor in fact deposited proceeds in the designated
general deposit account.
In example 11, the ten-day period of temporary automatic perfection of pro-
ceeds has not yet elapsed. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
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priority rules apply to a dispute between a creditor asserting its
right to set-off and a creditor holding a perfected proceeds se-
curity interest under article 9. Courts that conclude that article
9 priority rules apply give victory to the secured creditor in
every case.320 Their analysis is straightforward but ultimately
unfair to depositary institutions. The proponents of this view
reason that article 9 proclaims that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by this Act a security agreement is effective... against
creditors."321 The depositary bank, even with an inchoate right
to set-off, is only a general creditor 322 and thus loses to the fi-
nance company, which holds a perfected security interest in
proceeds.
It is not unfair to require the depositary institution to
search the public files for the financing statement of the finance
company; that burden would be placed on the depositary insti-
tution by the reform proposed here.32 3 It is unfair, however,
that the diligent depositary institution cannot obtain the article
9 secured status necessary to prevail because article 9 excludes
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral.3 24
Other courts and commentators conclude that article 9 pri-
ority rules do not govern325 and that one of two different com-
mon law priority rules should be applied. The majority adopt
the "legal" rule: the bank's right to set-off is superior to the ar-
ticle 9 perfected security interest in proceeds only if the bank
had no actual knowledge of the secured party's proceeds inter-
est in the deposit account and had no reason to inquire
whether the deposit account was so encumbered.326 The mere
320. See, e.g., First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626
F.2d 764, 769-70 (10th Cir. 1980); Citizens Natl Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 177
Ind. App. 548, 554-59, 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1247-50 (1978); Domain Indus., Inc. v. First
Sec. Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Iowa 1975); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 357-58, 268 A.2d 330, 332
(1970).
321. U.C.C. § 9-201; see Citizens Nat'l Bank, 177 Ind. App. at 555, 380 N.E.2d
at 1248; see also National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.
Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1980).
322. See, e.g., Associates Discount Corp., 111 N.J. Super. at 357-58, 268 A.2d at
332.
323. See supra Examples 9-11.
324. U.C.C. § 9-104(l). The depositary institution's only other option would
be to obtain a common law assignment from its depositor, or if the deposit ac-
count is reified, to obtain a common law pledge.
325. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d
671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974); B. CLARY, supra note 142, 11.7, at 11-23; Henning,
supra note 179, at 238-39, 241; Skilton, supra note 213, at 203-04.
326. In National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1980), a depositor disclosed to the bank's president at the
time deposit accounts were opened that money "would be wired" into the de-
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filing of the secured creditor's financing statement does not
constitute notice.327
In a jurisdiction following the legal rule, the dispute in ex-
ample 11 could not be resolved without more information con-
cerning the depositary bank's knowledge. For example, if the
depositary bank knew that the finance company had been fi-
nancing the debtor's inventory for a number of years and that
the debtor sent the finance company checks drawn against the
deposit account on a weekly basis, further inquiry may have
been warranted and the bank might lose.328
The legal rule is unsatisfactory as a priority rule because of
the difficulty in ascertaining whether an organization, such as a
bank, has knowledge.329 Moreover, this rule favors depositary
institutions over all other creditors by excusing such institu-
tions from the obligation to search the article 9 files.
The minority common law priority rule, described as the
"equitable" rule, provides that the bank with a right to set-off
prevails only if it was without actual knowledge of the compet-
ing article 9 interest and it changed its position in reliance on
the debtor's deposit account.330 But what constitutes sufficient
detrimental reliance? Presumably, releasing other collateral,
posit accounts "pursuant to an accounts receivable financing arrangement." Id.
at 1086. The bank's cashier knew "there was a strong likelihood" that funds
were being generated out of an accounts receivable arrangement and "sus-
pected that there were security agreements supporting the financing arrange-
ment." Id. Despite this knowledge, bank officials made loans without checking
article 9 records for properly filed financing statements. The court held that the
bank's knowledge precluded any right to set-off. Id.; see also Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325 (E.D. Mo. 1973); see gener-
ally Henning, supra note 179, at 239 (describing legal rule).
327. Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions-Part 1. Scope
of Article 9, 34 ARm L REV. 377, 421 n.216 (1980).
328. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 325.
329. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (notice), (26) (receipt of notice or notifica-
tion), (27) (when notice, knowledge, or notice or notification received by organ-
ization is effective).
One commentator has suggested that the following factors should be, but
are not usually, considered in determining whether a bank has sufficient notice
to bar exercise of its right to set-off. First, the court should determine whether
there is a "close working relationship" between the depositary institution and
its customer. If so, the bank may have learned that the demand account in-
cluded periodic deposits of proceeds. Under such circumstances, the bank
would need to investigate the source of the funds in the account before effect-
ing set-off. Second, the court should examine the extent to which the deposi-
tary institution, through credit bureau reports or other similar credit checks,
received information regarding filed financing statements against the deposi-
tor's collateral at the time the depositary institution made its advance. If in-
ventory was encumbered, the bank ordinarily should make further inquiries.
See 3 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 567, 571-72 (1972).
330. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d
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deferring collection, or extending additional credit on the de-
positor's express promise to maintain a minimum balance
would suffice.331
The equitable rule suffers from the same shortcomings as
the legal rule. Although the depositary bank is more likely to
lose under the equitable rule, notice is still not imputed from
an article 9 filing.
By expanding article 9 to cover security interests in deposit
accounts, abolishing the common law right to set-off, and mak-
ing the proposed minor modifications in section 9-306,332 a
"pure race" priority rule would displace the nonuniform and in-
equitable law that presently governs these disputes. Deposi-
tary institutions could obtain article 9 security interests in
deposit accounts. They would have the corollary responsibility
of publicizing their own interests and searching the public ifies
for earlier encumbrances.
C. THE PRIORITY BATTLE BETWEEN A CREDITOR WITH AN
ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST IN A DEPOSIT AccoUNT
AS ORIGINAL COLLATERAL AND ANOTHER
CREDITOR WITH A JUDICIAL LIEN AGAINST
THE DEPOSIT AccouNT
This section explores contests over a deposit account be-
tween a general creditor with a judicial lien and a creditor who
is an assignee or pledgee under the common law, or who as-
serts a right to set-off, or who claims an article 9 security inter-
est in deposit accounts as original collateral. In most states,
when a creditor brings an in personam action on the debt and
obtains a favorable judgment, a judgment lien3 33 arises against
all the debtor's real property that is subject to the jurisdiction
of the court but not against the debtor's personalty.3 34 To ob-
tain an execution lien against personal property, in most states
the sheriff, pursuant to a writ of attachment or garnishment is-
sued by the clerk of court, must levy on the property.335
671, 680-83, 214 N.W.2d 33, 37-39 (1974); see generally Henning, supra note 179, at
239-42 (describing equitable rule).
331. See B. CLARK, supra note 142, 11.7, at 11-24; Henning, supra note 179,
at 24042.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 316-19.
333. "A 'judgment lien' is one form of 'judicial liens.'" D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-
CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 46 n.* (1980).
334. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 79, at 71-72; S. RiESENFELD,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 94-
96 (3d ed. 1979).
335. S. RIESENFELD, supra note 334, at 94-96.
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Under section 9-301(1) (b), if the secured creditor perfects
its security interest before the competing creditor acquires its
execution lien through service of the appropriate writ, the se-
cured creditor prevails over the creditor relying on the execu-
tion lien.3 36 This rule is yet another example of the Code's
preference for pure race priority rules;3 3 7 the creditor who acts
first, either by giving public notice or by enforcing its judgment,
wins irrespective of its knowledge of the other creditor's charge
against the property.338 If the creditor relying on judicial pro-
cess discovers the secured creditor's financing statement
before service of the writ, it can direct the sheriff to execute
against unencumbered property of the debtor.
If article 9 were expanded to cover deposit accounts as
original collateral, the priority rules discussed above relating to
judicial liens could be applied, as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 12:
The depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. The following activity
occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor grants the depositary bank a security interest in
$3,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure a
$2,000 loan.
Day 3: A judgment for $10,000 is entered in favor of the finance com-
pany in state court. (The finance company had sued the de-
positor for breach of its obligation to repay $10,000 of
advances.)
Day 4: The depositor defaults on the loan extended by the depositary
bank.
Day 5: The sheriff, on behalf of the finance company, serves the de-
positary bank with a writ of garnishment.
Day 6: The depositary bank fies a financing statement.
There is a contest between the finance company and the
depositary bank over $2,000 of the $10,000 balance in the deposit
account. Under section 9-301(3), the finance company becomes
a "lien creditor" when it acquires a "lien" on the "property in-
volved."339 The finance company would have achieved that sta-
tus, in most jurisdictions, when the sheriff served the writ on
336. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b), (3).
337. See supra notes 283-309 and accompanying text.
338. Under the 1962 version of § 9-301(1) (b), to prevail against a secured
creditor, the judicial lienor had to be "without knowledge of the security inter-
est." U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b) (1962). Deletion of this requirement in 1972 reflects
the drafters' desire to limit the role of knowledge in the resolution of priority
issues. See 1972 Official Text Showing Changes Made in Former Text of Article
9, Secured Transactions, and of Related Sections and Reasons for Changes,
U.C.C. § 9-301.
339. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
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Day 5.340 On that day, the depositary bank's unperfected secur-
ity interest would be subordinate to the interest of the finance
company under section 9-301(1) (b). The finance company
could foreclose on the debtor's entire chose in action against
the depositary bank; the bank would have to go to court to col-
lect from the depositor.
In contrast, if the deposit account had been pledged or as-
signed under the common law, or if the bank had asserted its
common law right to set-off, the bank would prevail. Yet only if
the deposit account had been pledged would any form of public
notice have been given.
If, in order to effect a pledge, an indispensable writing for a
reified account had been delivered on Day 2, the depositary
bank's interest would be senior to the finance company's later-
acquired judicial lien.3 41 As under article 9, the lien creditor
would have notice through the bank's possession of the indis-
pensable writing.342
If the depositary bank had obtained a security assignment
rather than a pledge, it would still prevail, even though it gave
no general public notice. The depositor's rights would have
been partially extinguished by the assignment on Day 2.343 The
finance company's judicial lien, arising on Day 3 at the earli-
est,344 could not attach to the portion of the deposit account al-
ready alienated.345
If the assignee in example 12 were a creditor other than the
depositary institution, it would have to notify the depositary in-
340. See B. CLARK, supra note 44, 3.3[2].
341. See Stevan v. Union Trust Co., 316 F.2d 687, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Duncan Box & Lumber Co. v. Applied Energies, Inc., 270 S.E.2d 140, 146 (W. Va.
1980); see also RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 28 (1941).
342. The notice afforded by the pledge, however, is likely to be less effective
than the notice provided by the filing of a financing statement. See supra notes
240-50 and accompanying text.
343. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341(1) (1979) ("[T]he
right of an assignee is superior to a judicial lien subsequently obtained against
the property of the assignor .... "); id. comment a; see also Commercial Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 100, 104-06, 184 N.E. 434, 435-36 (1933); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.9, at 793.
344. It would be necessary to verify under state law that the judicial lien
arose in favor of the finance company on Day 3. The Restatement refers to the
definition of judicial lien in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341 comment a (1979). The Act defines a 'Judi-
cial lien" as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or
equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1982).
345. See supra note 343. "Since the assignee gave value to the assignor in
reliance on the particular claim, whereas the attaching creditor relied upon the
general credit of the assignor, it is thought that the assignee has the greater eq-
uity .... ." J. MURRAY, supra note 150, § 310.
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stitution to protect its priority against the competing finance
company. If the third-party depositary bank, without notice of
the assignment, paid the finance company pursuant to a writ of
garnishment, it would be discharged from any obligation to pay
the assignee.346 The outside assignee would be left with only a
claim for unjust enrichment against the depositor (the
assignor).347
The depositary bank in example 12 also would prevail
against the finance company if it had asserted its right to set-
off. The depositor and the bank were mutually indebted on
Day 4 and the bank had an inchoate right to set-off.348 The
bank would not be precluded from subsequently exercising
that mature right simply because it received notice of the fi-
nance company's interest on Day 5.349 For example, the deposi-
tary bank could have effected set-off on Day 6 by manifesting
an intent to set-off and either adjusting its formal records or no-
tifying the depositor.3 0 Had set-off been accomplished, the fi-
nance company could collect only $8,000 from the depositary
bank and would direct the sheriff to execute against the deposi-
tor's other property for the balance of the judgment.351
Courts in set-off cases, like courts in security assignment
cases, reason that the depositary bank prevails under these cir-
cumstances because the garnishing finance company has no
346. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 11.9, at 793 n.28; J. MuRRAY, supra
note 150, § 310; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341(2) (1979); see also
Ornbaun v. First Natl Bank, 215 Cal. 72, 76, 8 P.2d 470, 472 (1932).
347. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341 comment c (1979).
348. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
349. See T & B Gen. Contracting Co. v. W.W. Williams Co., 13 Bankr. 686, 688
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); Valley Natl Bank v. Hasper, 6 Ariz. App. 376, 378-79, 432
P.2d 924, 926-27 (1967); Reeves v. Don L. Tullis & Assocs., 305 So.2d 813, 815-16
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d
575, 581-83, 421 N.E.2d 808, 812, 439 N.Y.S. 2d 316, 320 (1981); Marrison v. Hogue,
57 Ohio L. Abs. 571, 576, 95 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1950); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lundquist, 172 Okla. 453, 454-55, 45 P.2d 524, 526 (1935); Aarons v. Public Serv.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 318 Pa. 113, 116-18, 178 A. 141, 142-43 (1935); see also Annot.,
106 A.L.R. 62 (1937).
350. In Baker v. National City Bank, 387 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1974),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975), the court held that this test of when a set-off
is effective was not satisfied where an officer of the bank telephoned the bank's
general counsel and advised him of the bank's intention to set-off immediately.
Id. at 1149. In addition, a bank memorandum directing that the necessary book
entries be entered was insufficient to effect a set-off. Id. at 1150; see also In re
Saugus Gen. Hosp., Inc., 698 F.2d 42, 47-48 (lst Cir. 1983).
351. The finance company would not have to obtain a new judgment. In-
stead, it would seek a second writ of execution (an alias writ). See S. RiESEN-
FELD, supra note 334, at 86 n.1.
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greater right to the deposit account than the debtor.35 2 On Day
5, the debtor's interest in the deposit account was subordinate
to the bank's inchoate right to set-off; accordingly, the finance
company's judicial lien is subordinate.
That explanation, however, assumes the answer to the criti-
cal question: whether in all circumstances the depositary
bank's rights against competing creditors should be identical to
the bank's rights against the debtor. Several article 9 provi-
sions give the secured creditor fewer rights against competing
creditors than against the debtor.35 3 Indeed, the priority rule
under section 9-301(1) (b) would be reversed if the Code spon-
sors had given secured creditors the same rights against lien
creditors that they have against debtors. Instead, article 9 re-
quires the secured creditor who seeks victory over a lien credi-
tor to perfect by giving public notice, a matter primarily of
concern to competing creditors, but not to the debtor. If the se-
cured party delays, the potential penalty is subordination.
Example 12 demonstrates the futility of extending the cov-
erage of article 9 without abolishing the common law doctrines.
If the depositary bank could obtain a senior interest in the con-
tested $2,000 by assignment or set-off, it would lose its incentive
to comply with article 9 public notice requirements. Accord-
ingly, sections 9-301(1) (b) and 9-301(3) should be applied to de-
posit account collateral without modification.
D. THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHTS IN A DEPOSIT ACCOUNT iN
THE EVENT OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
Section 9-306(4) (d) governs the disposition of a debtor's
deposit account among competing creditors when the account
contains commingled funds and insolvency proceedings have
been instituted.35 4 The section articulates a formula for calcu-
lating an outside secured party's interest in proceeds in a de-
352. See, e.g., T & B Gen. Contracting Co., 13 Bankr. at 688; see also supra
notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1) (b), 9-312(3); see also supra notes 336-40 and
accompanying text.
354. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) provides:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
has a perfected security interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit ac-
counts containing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is
neither commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit ac-
count prior to the insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like
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posit account and incorporates the common law right to set-off
to define the parameters of the depositary bank's interest.
Generally, section 9-306(4) (d) restricts the outside secured
creditor's claim; presumably, the drafters' goal was to en-
courage better policing of the debtor.3-5 The secured creditor's
interest in a commingled deposit account, however, is not simi-
larly restricted if insolvency proceedings have not been com-
menced. Moreover, the depositary bank's interest is not
restricted whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent.
Section 9-306(4) (d) has generated considerable confu-
sion356 and extensive criticism. 357 As shown by the following
example, the uncertainty could be reduced by substituting arti-
cle 9 for the common law right to set-off. Such reform, however,
only makes the overall unfairness of the rule more apparent.
which are not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which pro-
ceeds have been commingled with other funds, but the perfected secur-
ity interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any
cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the insti-
tution of the insolvency proceedings less the sum of (I) the payments
to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by the
debtor during such period and (II) the cash proceeds received by the
debtor during such period to which the secured party is entitled under
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
Article I defines "insolvency proceedings" as "any assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the es-
tate of the person involved." U.C.C. § 1-201(22). If the debtor files a petition for
bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, "insolvency proceed-
ings" are "instituted" within the meaning of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 301
(1982); U.C.C. § 1-201(23). Section 9-306(4) (d) is not likely, however, to be suc-
cessfully attacked under § 545 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act as an avoidable
statutory lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982); B. CLAreK, supra note 44, 6.5, at 6-36
n.67; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 24-6, at 1017 (2d ed. 1980). Compare In re Dexter Buick--GMC
Truck Co., 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 243 (Bankr. D.R.L 1980) (not void-
able under Bankruptcy Act of 1898) with Countryman, Code Security Interests
in Bankruptcy, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 35, 46-49 (1971) (grounds on which the § 9-
306(4) (d) interest is susceptible to attack).
355. See Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account
under Section 9-306(4) (d) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J.
60, 64-66, 92-93; infra notes 369-73 and accompanying text. In addition, Code
sponsors believed this section would obviate some tracing problems for the se-
cured party. See infra note 364.
356. Compare In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977) with Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir.
1974). See generally B. CLARK, supra note 44, 6.5; J. WHrrE & R. SUmmERS,
supra note 354, § 24-6, at 1014-17; Skilton, supra note 355.
357. See, e.g., Murphy & Peitzman, Without a Trace: The Secured Creditor's
Interest in Deposit Account Proceeds, 49 Am. BAN~aL I.U. 303 (1975); Skilton,
supra note 355.
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Example 13:
The business depositor has a $10,000 deposit account. The following ac-
tivity occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The depositor grants the depositary bank a security interest
in $5,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure
a $5,000 loan. The security agreement includes an "after-ac-
quired deposit" clause.
Day 3: The depositor grants the finance company a security interest
in "all present and after-acquired inventory and proceeds
thereof" to secure a $10,000 loan.
Day 4: The finance company files a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 5: The depositary bank files a properly completed financing
statement.
Day 6: The depositor deposits $1,000 in its account, received when in-
ventory covered by the finance company's security agreement
was sold. The balance in the account is $11,000.
Day 17: The depositor deposits another $2,000 in its account, received
when additional encumbered inventory was sold. The bal-
ance in the account is $13,000.
Day 18: The depositor withdraws $8,000 to pay employees, leaving a
balance of $5,000.
Day 20: The depositor institutes insolvency proceedings.
The size of the finance company's interest in the deposit
account under section 9-306(4) (d) is determined by calculating
the statutory minuend and then deducting the statutory subtra-
hend.358 The minuend is "the amount of any cash proceeds re-
ceived by the debtor within ten days before the institution of
the insolvency proceedings."359 In example 13, the minuend
would be $2,000. The subtrahend would be zero. 360 Accord-
ingly, the finance company would have a perfected security in-
terest in $2,000 of proceeds in the deposit account.
Section 9-306(4) (d) further provides, however, that this re-
stricted perfected security interest in proceeds is "subject to
any right to set-off."361 Courts uniformly hold that this phrase
requires application of the ordinary priority rule governing the
contest between an article 9 creditor with a perfected security
interest in proceeds and a depositary bank with a right to set-
358. See Skilton, supra note 355, at 70-77.
359. On Day 6, more than 10 days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings on Day 20, the debtor received and deposited the $1,000 of pro-
ceeds. The debtor received and deposited $2,000 during the ten-day period
before insolvency on Day 20. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii).
360. During the period between Day 10 and Day 20, the debtor did not make
any payments to the finance company and the debtor did not receive any cash
proceeds that were placed in separate deposit accounts or that were otherwise
identifiable and noncomrningled. See id.
361. Id. § 9-306(4) (d) (i).
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off.362 As explained above, however, there is substantial disa-
greement about what that rule is.363
If article 9 were expanded, section 9-306(4) (d) would have
to be amended to reflect the abolition of the depositary bank's
right to set-off. One approach, which would minimize the
change to this section, would provide that the outside secured
creditor's restricted security interest in proceeds is "subject to"
any article 9 security interest in the deposit account as original
collateral taken by the depositary bank. The phrase "subject
to" would refer to other article 9 priority rules. The complexity
caused by incorporation of the varying priority rules governing
contests between the right to set-off and the security interest in
proceeds could thus be avoided.364
Applying this modified version of section 9-306(4) (d) to ex-
ample 13, the finance company would prevail over the deposi-
tary bank as to the $2,000 of proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days of insolvency because the financing company
filed first.365 It is possible that the same result would be
reached under the common law, but only if the case were heard
in a jurisdiction where the secured party always prevails
against a bank asserting its right to set-off,366 or if the finance
company established under the legal rule that the depositary
bank knew, or had reason to know, of the finance company's in-
terest 367 or established under the equitable rule that the depos-
itary bank did not rely on the deposit account to its
detriment.3 68
Replacing the bank's right to set-off with an article 9 secur-
ity interest thus would simplify the measurement of outside
creditors' security interests in proceeds in commingled bank
accounts under section 9-306(4) (d); but this change would not
362. See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp.
1078, 1084 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1980); Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super.
474,481-85, 274 A.2d 306, 310-12 (1971); Middle At. Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Bank-
ing & Trust Co., 199 Pa. Super. 456, 459-61, 185 A.2d 818, 820 (1962); see generally
B. CLAic, supra note 142, 11.7, at 11-25.
363. See supra notes 320-32 and accompanying text.
364. Id. One justification for § 9-306(4) (d) is that it reduces, although it
does not eliminate, the need for the outside secured party to trace. See Skilton,
supra note 355, at 77-79. The proposal here reintroduces the lowest intermedi-
ate balance rule to calculate the interest of the depositary bank. An assump-
tion made throughout this Article is that most credit institutions keep daily,
accurate records so that such tracing is possible and not overly burdensome.
Id. at 79.
365. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a); supra note 288 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
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make the section any more effectual or equitable. The primary
purpose of the section is to encourage the secured party to po-
lice the debtor's use of the encumbered proceeds by requiring
the debtor to remit proceeds directly, or to keep proceeds in a
segregated account, or to remit commingled proceeds every ten
days. But the statutory formula has been aptly described as a
"rather crude carrot and stick."369 Moreover, it is difficult to ex-
plain why the institution of insolvency proceedings, which
might occur regardless of the secured party's failure to police
the debtor, triggers the statutory penalty.37 0
Section 9-306(4) (d) also penalizes the secured party, but
not the depositary bank, for inadequately supervising the
debtor's use of proceeds. 371 Yet both creditors rely on the com-
mingled deposit account as collateral whether the bank's inter-
369. Skilton, supra note 355, at 93. Professor Skilton explains the purposes
and shortcomings of § 9-306(4) (d) as follows:
[S] ection 9-306(4) (d) has the effect of a carrot or a stick. As a car-
rot, the section induces the secured party to adopt careful policing
practices and to insist that the debtor remit within ten days of receipt
all cash proceeds deposited in his bank account. As to unremitted cash
proceeds so deposited, a special claim is accorded under section 9-
306(4) (d). As a stick, section 9-306(4) (d) penalizes lax practices by de-
nying a claim on the debtor's bank account, as to cash proceeds depos-
ited in the debtor's bank account received by the debtor more than ten
days prior to the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Section 9-306(4) (d) is however a rather crude carrot and stick, suf-
fering from inconsistency and the potential of injustice. The best polic-
ing would be to require the debtor to remit all cash proceeds directly,
or at least to require the debtor to deposit them in a separate account.
But even a diligent secured party, conscious of the strictures of section
9-306(4) (d), may not be able to control the situation. Such strict polic-
ing practices cannot always prevent a debtor from suddenly turning
untrustworthy and departing from authorization and depositing cash
proceeds in his general bank account rather than a special bank ac-
count or remitting them intact to the secured party. The ten days of
section 9-306(4) (d) begins to run from the time of receipt and not from
the time the secured party learns of the fact. And suppose through ex-
treme diligence or luck the secured party within ten days discovers
what has happened and demands payment from the debtor? The coop-
eration, demanded but not always forthcoming, must be consummated
with great dispatch, otherwise the ten days will have run, in case of
subsequent insolvency proceedings. And if a more permissive secured
party allows the debtor to deposit cash proceeds in his (the debtor's)
general bank account, on the condition that all proceeds so deposited
be remitted within ten days, a debtor turned suddenly untrustworthy
may, in violation of understanding, fail to pay the secured party.
Id.
370. Id. at 93-96. If the finance company's interest were not limited to iden-
tiflable cash proceeds received during the ten days immediately preceeding
bankruptcy, the finance company would have a senior claim to all $3,000 of
identifiable proceeds in the deposit account because it was first to file. See
U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii).
371. See U.C.c. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
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est is described as an inchoate right to set-off or an article 9
security interest. The depositary bank could also police the
debtor by requiring, as a condition of its loan, that the debtor
maintain a separate loan collateral account or a minimum de-
posit of funds not encumbered by other creditors. 372
In addition to being excused from any obligation to control
the commingled account, under section 9-306(4) (d) the deposi-
tary bank often has first claim to the proceeds that a secured
creditor who fails to exercise control must relinquish. In exam-
ple 13, as a result of the imposition of a penalty on the finance
company, the depositary bank's recovery out of the deposit ac-
count increases from $2,000 to $3,000.3 73
Given the functional equivalence of the right to set-off and
the article 9 security interest in a deposit account as original
collateral, section 9-306(4) (d) should be revised to treat deposi-
tary banks and outside creditors equally, imposing the same
statutory penalty on all, however measured. Under such a revi-
sion, all general creditors, not solely depositary banks, would
benefit from the enforcement of sanctions for failing to police
the debtor.
As shown in the previous discussion of the four different
basic priority problems, the general propositions of article 9
could be applied beneficially to disputes over deposit account
collateral. Replacement of nonuniform and uncertain common
law principles with the bright line rules of article 9 would bet-
ter enable depositary and nondepositary creditors to protect
their own interests and discover and rank the interests of their
competitors.
IV. PRIORITY PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Aware of the importance of intermeshing the priority provi-
sions of federal commercial statutes with the nearly uniform
372. See generally Wallick v. First State Bank, 532 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (bank required debtor to place borrowed funds in a segregated deposit
account requiring the signature of both the bank and customer for
withdrawals).
373. In example 13, the depositary bank can foreclose against the balance in
the account after the senior claim of the finance company is satisfied. Thus, al-
though the debtor deposited $3,000 of proceeds from the sale of inventory in its
account, only $2,000 was deposited within 10 days of the institution of insol-
vency proceedings. Consequently, under § 9-306 (4) (d), the finance company
would have a senior claim to only $2,000 of proceeds rather than the full $3,000.
Concomitantly, the bank's share would increase from $2,000 to $3,000.
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state law created by enactment of the Code,374 Congress in-
cluded provisions in the Federal Tax Lien Act375 and the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act 376 that recognize the special status of
secured creditors who give public notice under article 9.377
This approach permits creditors to assess prospectively their
risks in the event of default against one coordinated set of pri-
ority rules. 37 8 If a creditor acts promptly to protect its interest
in relation to other claimants under article 9, it simultaneously
protects its interest in the collateral against the Internal Reve-
nue Service, should a tax lien arise, and against the trustee in
bankruptcy, should insolvency proceedings be instituted. Sub-
stitution of article 9 for the common law doctrines of set-off, se-
curity assignments, and pledge would accomplish even greater
uniformity and coherence.
A. THE "NEW" ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST UNDER THE
FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT
When federal taxes have been assessed, a demand for pay-
ment has been made, and an individual fails to pay, a statutory
lien in favor of the United States government attaches to all the
taxpayer's real and personal property by operation of the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act.379 If a private creditor of the taxpayer ob-
tains a perfected article 9 security interest before the Internal
Revenue Service files notice of its tax lien in the proper state
office,380 the secured creditor obtains priority with respect to
the property described in its security agreement; if the Internal
Revenue Service files first, it obtains the senior claim.381 The
374. The Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted by the District of Co-
lumbia and by every state but Louisiana. Many states, however, have substan-
tially varied the provisions of article 9. See B. CLAPX, supra note 44, app. C.
375. See supra note 17.
376. See supra note 18.
377. The Federal Tax Lien Act defers to article 9's definition of what consti-
tutes a perfected security interest. See I.R.C. § 6323(h) (1) (1982); see also H.R.
REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966).
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains its own rules of priority for
general creditors, if a claimant holds an article 9 security interest that is "valid
in bankruptcy," the creditor's nonbankruptcy entitlement will be recognized
and the claimant will receive more than other creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§§ 506-507, 544-548, 725-726 (1982); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28
U.C.L. L. REv. 953, 963-64 (1981); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Enti-
tlements, and the Creditor's Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 901-06 (1982).
378. See Eisenberg, supra note 377, at 968.
379. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). I.R.C. § 6331(a) (1982) authorizes the Internal Rev-
enue Service to levy on the delinquent taxpayer's property.
380. I.R.C. § 6323(f) (1982).
381. See United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 11 (1973); Fred Kraus & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 369 F. Supp.
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Federal Tax Lien Act thus treats the Internal Revenue Service
as a "lien creditor,"382 thereby avoiding frustration of the ex-
pectations of private lenders who give public notice under arti-
cle 9. By substituting an article 9 security interest in deposit
accounts as original collateral for the common law right to set-
off, contests between private creditors and the federal govern-
ment over deposit accounts could be resolved under these
same provisions without modification, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing example.
Example 14:
The taxpayer has a $10,000 deposit account. The following activity
occurs:
Day 1: The account has a balance of $10,000.
Day 2: The taxpayer grants the depositary bank a security interest in
$3,000 of the deposit account as original collateral to secure a
$2,000 loan.
Day 3: The taxpayer's failure to pay federal income tax results in a
delinquency assessment of $10,000.
Day 4: The taxpayer defaults on the loan extended by the depositary
bank.
Day 5: The Internal Revenue Service properly files a notice of tax
lien.
Day 6: The depositary bank files a financing statement.
The United States government and the depositary bank
have conflicting claims to $2,000 of the $10,000 balance in the de-
posit account.383 Under sections 6323(a) and 6323(h) of the
Federal Tax Lien Act, the depositary bank would lose because
it delayed in giving public notice.3 84
If the bank were asserting its common law right to set-off,
the result in example 14 would be the same. Although an in-
choate right to set-off prevails over a subsequent private execu-
tion lien,385 it is subordinate to a federal tax lien filed after the
1089, 1091 (N.D. Ind.), a'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974); Nevada Rock & Sand
Co. v. I.R.S., 376 F. Supp. 161, 172 (D. Nev. 1974); LB. Smith, Inc. v. Foley, 341 F.
Supp. 810, 813-14 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 536 F.2d
1354, 1357-58 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1982) provides that the tax lien is "not... valid as against
any... holder of a security interest." To qualify as a "holder of a security in-
terest," the creditor must take whatever steps are necessary under state law so
that its "interest has become protected ... against a subsequent judgment lien
arising out of an unsecured obligation." Id. § 6323(h) (i). U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b)
subordinates an unperfected security interest to a subsequent lien creditor, but
a perfected security interest prevails.
382. See L.B. Smit; Inc., 341 F. Supp. at 813-14.
383. The bank's security interest attaches to $3,000, but the taxpayer owes
the bank only $2,000 unless the bank makes a claim for collection costs. See
U.C.C. § 9-502.
384. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text.
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right to set-off matures but before the set-off is actually ef-
fected.386 The taxpayer-depositor has a property right in the
deposit account, defined by state law, to which the federal tax
lien attaches.387 As a matter of federal law, unless the deposi-
tary bank effects set-off before the government files, the com-
peting tax lien prevails over the bank's common law right to
set-off.3 8
8
Although the outcome in example 14 would be the same
under either the common law or an expanded article 9, substi-
tution of the latter for the former would have beneficial conse-
quences. Under current law, a diligent depositary bank,
concerned about its customer's potential tax liability, should ef-
386. Even before the Internal Revenue Service files the notice of its tax lien,
it would prevail over an inchoate right that is not protected under I.R.C.
§ 6323(a) (1982). The bank's right to set-off is not one of the listed protected
liens. Id. § 6323(a), (h). See, e.g., Citizens & Peoples Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 570 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
538 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Bank of
Am. v. United States, 345 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Sterling
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajfd in part rev'd
in part on other grounds, 494 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 348 F. Supp. 388, 389 (D. Ariz. 1970), affd, 458 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1972).
The Third Circuit recently departed from the majority view. In Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1981), the court held for the
bank over the Internal Revenue Service on the theory that under Pennsylvania
law, set-off was effected automatically when the depositor's obligation to the
bank matured. Because that event occurred prior to the service of the tax levy
notice, the court held that the bank's failure to make affirmative bookkeeping
entries was not fatal. Id. at 38-40. But see Baker v. National City Bank, 387 F.
Supp. 1137, 1144 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975) (Ohio law
of set-off is not self-executing; otherwise "a bank depositor who is also indebted
to a bank upon a demand loan would never in fact have a bank account since
all deposited funds would be automatically set off against the depositor's loan
account").
387. See, e.g., Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d at 1105-07; Sterling Nat7
Bank & Trust Co., 360 F. Supp. at 920-22.
388. See supra note 386. Even where a bank relies on a non-Code consen-
sual lien against a deposit account, the Internal Revenue Service prevails be-
cause the definition of "security interest" under § 6323(a) includes only an
article 9 security interest. See Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 F. Supp. at
924.
The discussion in the text assumes that the deposit account is not a pass-
book savings account. Under an exception to the Federal Tax Lien Act, a de-
positary institution that takes possession of such a passbook as security for
credit extended without knowledge of the federal tax lien prevails over the In-
ternal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 6323(b) (10) (1982). If article 9 were substi-
tuted for the present law governing deposit account collateral, there would be
no need for this exception. The depositary institution would take an article 9
security interest in the savings account. Perfection would occur through filing.
See supra notes 237-78 and accompanying text. The bank's interest would be
superior to that of the Internal Revenue Service only if the bank filed first. See
supra notes 380-81 and accompanying text. The bank's knowledge of the fed-
eral tax lien would be irrelevant.
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fect set-off as soon as there is "mutual indebtedness."389 If arti-
cle 9 displaced set-off, however, the depositary bank, as a
secured creditor, could protect its interest against the govern-
ment merely by filing a financing statement, without foreclos-
ing.390 The depositary bank could thus inexpensively monitor
the balance in the deposit account and give its customer addi-
tional time to regain financial health.391 Premature foreclosure,
which might otherwise trigger a chain of events leading to
bankruptcy, could be avoided.
Substitution of article 9 for the common law right to set-off
would also eliminate factual controversies. Although it is often
difficult to ascertain the precise moment when set-off is ef-
fected,392 the hour and date of an article 9 filing is usually
marked by a public officer on the financing statement itself.393
Finally, the suggested reform would create a more inter-
nally logical priority scheme.394 Under current law, in contests
involving a bank's right to set-off the Internal Revenue Service,
a public lien creditor, has rights superior to those of a private
lien creditor.395
B. THE "NEW" ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST, AS INTEGRATED
INTO THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
reveals that Congress recognized the functional equivalence
389. In many jurisdictions, the mutual indebtedness requirement is relaxed
and the depositary institution is permitted to set-off if it deems itself insecure.
In these jurisdictions, the problems discussed in the text would be even more
acute. See Murray, supra note 71, at 453-54 Annot., 37 A.L.R.2D 850, 853-56
(1954). Often, the loan agreement or promissory note will provide that the bor-
rower's obligation to repay the balance may be accelerated if the depositary in-
stitution is concerned about its borrower's insolvency. See Murray, supra note
71, at 453.
390. See supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text. The Federal Tax Lien
Act thus provides an additional incentive for secured creditors to give public
notice of their interests.
391. See Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE LJ. 49, 56 (1982) ("A typical commercial bank... appears to
have excellent monitoring ability. It is experienced, enjoys economies of scale,
is financially sophisticated, and has ready access to many of the assets and
records of the debtor and its business associates.").
392. Set-off is effected when the bank has both manifested a sufficient in-
tent and made an adequate bookkeeping entry or given sufficient notice to its
depositor. See supra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
393. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
394. See TeSelle, supra note 70, at 62-66.
395. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text; see generally United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (discussing priority of contrac-
tual liens arising from federal loan programs).
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under nonbankruptcy law of the common law right of deposi-
tary institutions to set-off and the rights of creditors holding
perfected security interests under article 9.396 The Act at-
tempts to treat both types of creditors similarly in bankruptcy,
ignoring the substantial differences in the prerequisites to
achieving each status. But even that limited goal is not fully
realized.
The substitution of an article 9 security interest in deposit
accounts as original collateral for the common law right to set-
off would have significant consequences under the bankruptcy
law. A depositary institution would no longer be automatically
entitled to preferred treatment over general creditors. Instead,
like other creditors without statutory or judicial liens, the de-
positary institution would have to establish that it had created
a security interest under article 9, that it had satisfied nonban-
kruptcy public notice requirements prior to the commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings, and that its interest in the property
of the bankrupt's estate could withstand the full panoply of the
bankruptcy trustee's powers of avoidance.
1. Incorporation of the Shortcomings of Nonbankruptcy Law
into the Bankruptcy Reform Act
The Bankruptcy Reform Act incorporates by reference the
common law requirements for creation of an inchoate right to
set-off3 97 and the article 9 requirements for the creation of a se-
curity interest in traditional collateral.3 98 The Act thereby frus-
trates the bankruptcy goal of treating similar creditors
similarly. The special privileges that depositary institutions en-
joy under nonbankruptcy law, which are unavailable to secured
and general creditors, are carried forward into the bankruptcy
system.399 Under nonbankruptcy law, the depositary institu-
tion, without debtor consent, can set-off against the entire bal-
ance in the account at the time of default.400 This rule enables
396. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-86, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6143-47.
397. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 553 (1982); see 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANK-
Rurcy 553.06 (15th ed. 1979); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy
Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 BANKinG L.J. 484, 485-90 (1980); Weintraub &
Resnick, Freezing the Debtor's Account: A Banker's Dilemma Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 100 BANKING L.J. 316, 317 (1983).
398. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(37), 506(a) (1982).
399. See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 185-86, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6145-47 (indicating Congress's aware-
ness of the relative advantages of having a right to set-off rather than a security
interest under current nonbankruptcy law).
400. See supra notes 171-236 and accompanying text.
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the depositary institution to obtain a larger bankruptcy
recovery.
A creditor's claim, if not fully collateralized, is character-
ized in bankruptcy as partially "secured" and partially "un-
secured."40 ' The larger the secured portion of the claim, the
more the creditor will recover.40 2 Consider the depositor who,
at the time the petition for bankruptcy was filed, owed $10,000
to the depositary bank and had an account with an $8,000 bal-
ance. Under nonbankruptcy law, without bargaining with the
debtor403 or giving notice to other creditors, 404 the bank could
set-off against the entire balance of $8,000. In bankruptcy, the
bank would hold a secured claim of $8,000 and an unsecured
claim of $2,000.405
If article 9 were substituted for the common law right to
set-off, the size of the bank's entitlement would be limited by
the terms of the security agreement. Thus, if the security
agreement encumbered only $3,000,406 under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act the bank would hold a secured claim of $3,000 and
an unsecured claim of $7,000. The remaining $5,000 of value in
the deposit account would be used to satisfy administrative ex-
penses and would then be distributed on a pro rata basis to the
general creditors. 07 Moreover, if the bank failed to give public
notice of its interest prior to bankruptcy, it would lose its se-
cured status altogether. The bank would then hold only a gen-
eral claim for $10,000 and the entire $8,000 balance of the
deposit account would become the property of the estate, avail-
able for distribution on a pro rata basis to all general
creditors. 40 8
401. Section 506(a) of the Act sets forth the bankruptcy standard for divid-
ing claims. It provides in pertinent part:
[A] claim. . . of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553...
is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount
subject to setoff ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the
value of such creditors's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is
less than the amount of such ... claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
402. The secured claims are satisfied before administrative expenses are
paid and before all the claims of the general creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 554,
722, 725 (1982); see generally D. EPsTm & J LAND.s, supra note 79, at 377.
403. See supra notes 108-236 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 237-78 and accompanying text.
405. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
406. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
407. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 726 (1982).
408. The trustee in bankruptcy may assume the status of a hypothetical lien
creditor who extends credit and obtains a judicial lien on the day of the filing of
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If article 9, rather than the common law right to set-off, pro-
vided the basis for defining the depositary institution's share of
the estate, a more equitable and uniform law of nonbankruptcy
entitlements would be incorporated in the federal bankruptcy
law.409
2. Favored Treatment of Depositary Institutions Under the
Fraud Section of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
Not all of the differences in the bankruptcy treatment of
deposit accounts, as contrasted with other collateral, are attrib-
utable to the shortcomings of nonbankruptcy law. 4 10 For exam-
ple, the trustee's power to avoid fraudulent transactions
involving set-off is more limited under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act than the trustee's power to avoid other fraudulent transac-
tions. Under section 548 of the Act, the trustee may avoid the
grant of an article 9 security interest if the interest was con-
veyed with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" other
creditors, or under circumstances warranting a finding of con-
the petition for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1) (1982). Like such a lien
creditor, the trustee will prevail in a contest with a creditor holding an un-
perfected article 9 security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b); see generally 4 W.
COLLIER, supra note 397, 544.02. If the trustee exercises this strong arm
power in the example set forth in the text, the deposit account would be freed
from the encumbrance and would become part of the estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544(a) (1), 550(a) (1982).
Section 544(a) does not give the trustee power to reverse a set-off that has
occurred and no cases were located where this power was used to avoid an in-
choate right to set-off. The statute permits challenges to "transfer[s] of prop-
erty of the debtor." Id. §§ 101(41), 544(a). Although the grant of a security
interest is such a transfer, set-off is not. Id. Earlier versions of the definition of
transfer included set-off, but that language was omitted from the definition that
was eventually enacted. See B. CLARK, supra note 44, 6.4[2] [b]; B. CLARK,
supra note 142, 11.10, at 11-30; 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 397, 553.15, at 553-62
n.15; Freeman, supra note 397, at 491 n.16. Furthermore, even if the creation of
an inchoate right to set-off were treated as a transfer, the trustee, as a subse-
quent lien creditor, would lose to the depositary institution. See supra notes
333-53 and accompanying text.
409. Congress clearly has the constitutional power under the bankruptcy
clause to preempt state law and create a uniform bankruptcy law. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Instead, "the bankruptcy system provides . . . a government
subsidized debt collection and liquidation mechanism permitting creditors of a
common debtor to enforce more effectively their private rights of payment cre-
ated by credit contracts and nonbankruptcy commercial law." Zubrow, Credi-
tors with Unclean Hands at the Bar of the Bankruptcy Court: A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1983); see Eisenberg, supra note 377,
at 955-56; Jackson, supra note 377, at 859.
410. This Article discusses only a few of the provisions of the Act which af-
fect deposit account collateral differently than other collateral. Other commen-
tators have written concerning the application of the Act's automatic stay and
turnover provisions to deposit account collateral. See, e.g., Weintraub & Res-
nick, supra note 397.
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structive fraud.411 The transfer of the security interest may oc-
cur any time within one year before bankruptcy.412 If the
security interest is avoided, the creditor will be treated as
unsecured.4 13
In contrast, section 553(a), which defines the trustee's
power to avoid transactions involving set-off, describes a nar-
row group of transactions that may be avoided and provides
that the period of vulnerability to challenge is ninety days
rather than one year.4 14 Suppose that a depositor, in collusion
with its bank and with the intent to defraud other creditors, in-
creased the funds in its deposit account less than one year but
no more than ninety days before bankruptcy. Suppose further
that the bank effected a set-off against the augmented account
during the same period. Under section 553, the trustee could
not avoid the set-off and recover the fraudulent buildup of the
deposit account for the estate.415
Moreover, the trustee could not make use of the more flexi-
ble and broad fraud standards of section 548, which would per-
mit avoidance of a fraudulent article 9 floating lien under
similar circumstances. 4 16 Section 548 applies only to a "transfer
of an interest of the debtor."417 When the debtor makes a de-
411. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or in-
curred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if the debtor-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or be-
came, on or after the date that such transfer occurred or such obliga-
tion was incurred, indebted; or
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in busi-
ness or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was in unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured.
412. Id.
413. Id. §§ 502(h), 550.
414. Id. § 553(a) (2), (3).
415. When the depositor made the fraudulent deposits, the bank incurred
an obligation to repay additional sums to the depositor on demand. Moreover,
this "debt... was incurred... for the purpose of obtaining a right of set-off
against the debtor." Id. § 553(a) (3) (C). The debt, however, was not incurred
"after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition." Id. § 553(a) (3) (A).
416. See Freeman, supra note 397, at 497-98.
417. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982).
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posit in the bank account, title to the funds passes to the bank
and thus a transfer occurs.4 18 Congress, however, excluded set-
off from the definition of transfer 4 19 and the language of section
553 strongly implies that it is the only section that curtails the
exercise of the right to set-off.420 At most, section 548(a) could
be read to permit avoidance of a pattern of fraudulent deposits,
but not the exercise of the right to set-off against those depos-
its. Carried to its logical extreme, this construction would per-
mit the trustee to recover fraudulent deposits made during the
period between one year before bankruptcy and ninety-one
days before bankruptcy only if the bank did not effect set-off
during that period. Courts may be reluctant to endorse such a
strained reading of section 548,421 but even if they did, the bank
could still benefit from the fraudulent conduct if the debtor
agreed to delay filing the bankruptcy petition until more than
ninety days after set-off.
Whether the trustee's powers are defined exclusively by
section 553 or are supplemented by section 548 in the limited
manner suggested above, the trustee has less power to attack
set-off tainted with fraud than to challenge a fraudulent se-
cured transaction.4 2 2 Yet depositary institutions, along with
other secured creditors, are paid first in bankruptcy based on
the view that the right to set-off is the functional equivalent of
an article 9 security interest. This anomaly and comparative
advantage for depositary institutions would be eliminated if
418. See supra text accompanying note 32. Section 101(41) of the Act de-
fines transfer as including "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." 11
U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982). The senate report accompanying the senate bill, which
included this definition of "transfer," states that "[a] deposit in a bank account
... is a transfer." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5813; see also 4 W. CoLLIER, supra note 397,
1 547.0811].
419. An early version of the definition of transfer stated that "transfer
means every mode ... of parting with property or with an interest in property,
including retention of title as a security interest, and set off." H.&. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(39) (1977) (emphasis added). The version that was en-
acted did not include the final three words "and set off." See supra note 418.
420. Section 553 (a) states in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided
in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect
any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt .... ." 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (empha-
sis added).
421. No case was located where § 548 was applied to either a pattern of de-
posits in advance of set-off or an exercise of the right to set-off.
422. The trustee's subrogational powers under § 544(b) also are limited to
"transfers." Thus, it appears that state fraudulent conveyance law could not be
used to challenge a set-off tainted with fraud. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
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set-off were displaced by article 9 under nonbankruptcy law.
The broad provisions of section 548 then could be applied to
protect uniformly all creditors from any fraudulent creditor
claiming the benefits of secured status in bankruptcy.
3. Favored Treatment of Depositary Institutions Under the
Preference Sections of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
Section 553(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act empowers
the trustee in bankruptcy to challenge preferential preban-
kruptcy set-offs, and section 547 allows the trustee to attack
preferential prebankruptcy article 9 floating liens.42 3 If the
trustee had no such power, the debtor could liquidate assets
and deposit the funds in an existing or newly created deposit
account immediately before bankruptcy and thereby increase
the eventual recovery of a favored bank with an inchoate right
to set-off. Similarly, the debtor could prefer a creditor with a
floating lien by converting resources into property to which the
creditor's security interest would automatically attach.42 4
423. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable ... ex-
cept to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the trans-
feree caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and
to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded
the value of all security interest for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b) (4) (A) of
this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or (ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b) (4) (B) of this
section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition;
and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such interest ....
11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(1) ... [Ihf a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor
against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date
of the filing of the petition, then the trustee may recover from such
creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any insufficiency on the
date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the later of-
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the
date of the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which
a claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor
by the holder of such claim.
424. The security agreement often contains a clause covering after-acquired
property. Under article 9, the creditor's security interest does not attach and
become enforceable until the debtor has rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-
203(1) (c). When a security interest thus attaches to property acquired by the
debtor during the period immediately before bankruptcy, a preferential trans-
fer of the debtor's property to the creditor holding the floating lien occurs. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (e) (1982); see generally Ward & Shulman, In Defense of the
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By exercising powers to challenge preferences, the trustee
can force both types of benefited creditors to disgorge a portion
of such a preferential buildup, whether or not fraud is estab-
lished and whether the buildup is fortuitous or the result of de-
cisions made during the period immediately before bankruptcy.
The trustee's recovery for the estate is measured by the reduc-
tion of the favored creditor's undercollateralization between
two fixed points in time.4 25 Under section 553(b), however, the
trustee is permitted to challenge only consumated set-offs, not
the mere creation of a right to set-off. Thus, unlike an article 9
creditor, if a bank with an inchoate right to set-off does not
foreclose prior to the commencement of bankruptcy, it may be
able to transform its prebankruptcy improvement of position
into an augmented secured claim.4 26
The operation of these bankruptcy preference sections is il-
lustrated by example 15, involving an article 9 floating lien, and
example 16, involving the bank's right to set-off. If article 9
were to displace the common law right to set-off in modem
banking transactions, section 547 could be applied to prefer-
ences in deposit account collateral in the same manner that it
Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Com-
mercial Financing, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 28-36, 46-47 (1983).
425. The use of two discrete points in time obviates the need to keep track
of daily fluctuations in the value of the collateral and in the outstanding obliga-
tion.
Different points in time are used in § 547 and § 553. Under § 547, the period
of vulnerability begins either 90 days before bankruptcy or one year before the
date of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4), (c) (5) (1982). The longer
period applies where the benefited creditor is an "insider" with reason to know
of the insolvency of the debtor. Id. § 547(b) (4) (B). Section 101(25) defines "in-
sider" broadly to include any creditor with whom the debtor might not deal on
an "arms length" basis. Id. § 101(25); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
25, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5487, 5810-11. A preferential
transfer to such an individual as early as one year before bankruptcy can be
avoided because of the greater opportunity for and likelihood of fraud. For no
apparent reason, the preference section for set-off does not extend the period of
vulnerability beyond ninety days when the benefited depositary institution is
an insider. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). If the nonbankruptcy reform pro-
posed here were enacted, this advantage for insider banks also would be elimi-
nated.
The later point in time is also different for set-off. Under § 547, the time of
the filing of the petition governs; under § 553(b), the time that the bank actually
effects set-off marks the end point for the calculation. Id. §§ 547(b) (4), (c) (5),
553(b).
426. The following discussion focuses on the preference powers of the
trustee. If the trustee could establish that deposits were made during the
ninety-day period before bankruptcy for the fraudulent purpose of providing
the creditor with a right to set-off, a challenge could be raised under the fraud
provision. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (3) (1982); see supra notes 411-22 and accompany-
ing text; see generally B. CLARK, supra note 142, 11.10, at 11-32.
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is now applied to article 9 floating liens over inventory or ac-
counts receivable.
Example 15:
The debtor receives a loan of $20,000 from its bank and grants the bank
an article 9 security interest in "present and after-acquired accounts
receivable." The bank files a financing statement. The following activ-
ity occurs:
90 days before bankruptcy: The debtor has accounts receivable worth
$10,000 and has not repaid the loan.
30 days before bankruptcy: The debtor has accounts receivable worth
$15,000 and has not repaid the loan.
15 days before bankruptcy: The debtor has accounts receivable worth
$16,000 and has not repaid the loan.
Bankruptcy petition ified: Everything is the same as fifteen days
earlier.
Under section 547(b) and (c) (5), the trustee in bankruptcy
could avoid $6,000 of the bank's security interest in the ac-
counts receivable. This figure represents the amount of the re-
duction of the bank's undercollateralization between the
ninetieth day before bankruptcy (when the bank was undercol-
lateralized by $10,000) and the day the bankruptcy petition was
filed (when the bank was undercollateralized by $4,000). In-
stead of holding a secured claim in bankruptcy in the amount
of $16,000, the bank would be left with a secured claim of only
$10,000 and would be a general creditor for the remaining
$10,000 owed.42 7
Example 16:
A depositor with a $10,000 checking account in a bank receives a loan of
$20,000 from the same bank.
90 days before bankruptcy: The depositor owes the bank $20,000; the
checking account balance is $10,000.
30 days before bankruptcy: The depositor makes a deposit of wholly
owned funds increasing the balance in
the checking account to $15,000. The loan
has not been repaid.
15 days before bankruptcy: The depositor makes another deposit of
wholly owned funds increasing the bal-
ance in the checking account to $16,000.
The loan has not been repaid.
Bankruptcy petition filed. The balance in the checking account is
$16,000. The loan has not been repaid.
As in example 15, the bank has improved its position by
$6,000 during the period of vulnerability. On the ninetieth day
before bankruptcy, the bank was undercollateralized by $10,000
($20,000 owed, less $10,000 in the checking account) and on the
day the bankruptcy petition was filed, it was undercollateral-
ized by $4,000 ($20,000 owed, less $16,000 in the checking ac-
427. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 547(b), 550 (1982).
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count). Nonetheless, if the bank refrained from effecting set-off
in advance of bankruptcy, the trustee may not be able to chal-
lenge the bank's improved position as a preference. Section
553(b) does not appear to apply to an inchoate right to set-
off.28 Accordingly, unlike the similarly situated secured credi-
428. Section 553(b) (1) provides that the trustee can recover from the credi-
tor the "amount ... offset" to the extent of the reduction of undercollateraliza-
tion if the "creditor offsets a mutual debt.., on or within 90 days before the
date of the filing of the petition." Id. § 553(b) (1) (emphasis added). Section
553(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362
and 363 .. , this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual
debt . . . " Id. § 553 (a) (emphasis added).
When read together, these two sentences suggest that the improvement of
position test of § 553(b) limits set-offs that have already been effected but not
the mere inchoate right to set-off retained by the bank that does not foreclose
on the deposit account before bankruptcy commences.
The only detailed explanation of § 553 appears in the House report accom-
panying House Bill 8200. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-86, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 6143-47. That bill, however,
differed significantly from the final version of the Act, thus making the House
report less probative. The earlier version of the improvement of position test
contained in the House bill may have had broader applicability than the test in
the final version of the Act. The language of the bill could be read to subject
both inchoate and exercised rights to set-off to the improvement of position
test. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(39), 547(c) (6), 553(a)(4) (1977);
infra note 436.
The House report accompanying House Bill 8200 indicates Congress's in-
tent to allow some postpetition set-offs in order to discourage precipitous and
premature foreclosures immediately before bankruptcy and to limit certain
prepetition set-offs. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-86, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6143-47. The report, however, contains
no analysis of the situation posited here, where there is a preferential buildup
that would permit avoidance of a prepetition set-off but the bank refrains from
foreclosing until after bankruptcy commences. See generally B. CLARi, supra
note 142, 11.10, at 11-30, 11-32; 4 W. ComuR, supra note 397, 1 553.15[2], at 553-
62; Freeman, supra note 397, at 498-500.
As discussed above in the context of fraudulent conveyances, the argument
could be made that § 547 should be applied where the bank has an inchoate
right to set-off. The trustee would argue that § 553 covers only the actual set-off
transaction, that deposits are transfers of the debtor's property, and that the
deposits accordingly can be challenged under § 547, independent of the right to
set-off. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 547(b), (c)(5), 553(b) (1982); supra notes 418-21
and accompanying text.
This construction, however, is not supported by the history of the drafting
of § 553. Section 553 was enacted to address expressly preferential set-offs re-
solved under the general preference section of the earlier Bankruptcy Act of
1898. The House bill included set-off in the definition of "transfer" and dealt
with the issue of preferential set-offs in both § 547 and § 553. H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(39), 547(c) (6), 553(a) (4) (1977). But the senate bill and
the final act deleted all references to set-off from the definition of transfer and
from § 547. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(40), 547(c) (6) (1977); Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 101(40), 547(c), 92 Stat. 2549,
2554, 2598 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 547(c) (1982)). The cryptic explana-
tion for these changes in the joint explanatory statement of the House and Sen-
ate floor managers is that "section 547(c) (6) ... is treated in a different fashion
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tor in example 15, the bank may hold a valid secured claim of
$16,000 in bankruptcy.
The bank, like any other secured creditor during bank-
ruptcy, may have difficulty foreclosing on this deposit account
collateral. The automatic stay would prohibit postpetition set-
off against the deposit account before the close of the case 42 9
unless the trustee abandoned the property to the bank430 or the
bank persuaded the court to grant relief from the stay.431 In a
reorganization proceeding, the automatic stay could thus mean
a substantial delay before the bank could foreclose; in a liqui-
dation case, the postponement would be shorter. Nevertheless,
the bank ultimately would receive more favorable treatment
than general creditors to the extent of its $16,000 secured claim
under either chapter 7 or chapter 11.432 The article 9 creditor in
example 15 is in an identical position with respect to its re-
duced secured claim of $10,000 but would lose its secured status
as to the $6,000 that was avoided under section 547.433
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act indi-
cates that Congress decided to allow banks to retain their in-
choate right to set-off after bankruptcy to encourage them to
refrain from effecting set-offs immediately before bank-
ruptcy.4 34 Such restraint would permit depositors to pursue in-
in section 553." 124 CONG. REC. 32,400 (1978). In the final debate in the Senate
on the compromise bill, Senator DeConcini explained: 'The effect [of the dele-
tion of set-off from the definition of transfer] is that a 'set-off' is not subject to
being set aside as a preferential 'transfer' but will be subject to special rules."
124 CONG. REC. 33,993 (1978); see B. CLARK, supra note 44, 6.4[2] [b]; 4 W. COL-
LIER, supra note 397, 547.16, 553.01[4], 553.15 [2].
No cases were located in which § 547 was applied to avoid an inchoate right
to set-off.
429. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (7), (c) (2) (A) (1982).
430. Id. §§ 362(c) (1), 554.
431. Id. § 362(d).
432. In a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, it is less likely that the deposit
account will be used, so the trustee may agree to the postpetition set-off or the
bankruptcy court may grant an order permitting such set-off. See id. § 363;
Freeman, supra note 397, at 522.
Under Chapter 11, the bank should be able to obtain, absent consent to a
lesser amount, the amount of the right to set-off ($16,000) in "cash," or in "de-
ferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim," or
"the indubitable equivalent" of such claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (A) (i), (iii)
(1982); see Freeman, supra note 397, at 519-22.
433. If the trustee avoids the security interest, the secured creditor becomes
a holder of an unsecured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). The discharge
following the bankruptcy distribution extinguishes any unpaid portion of the
debt. See id. § 524(a).
434. See HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 184-86, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6143-47; see generally B. CLARK, sUpra note 44,
6.4[2] [b]; B. CLARY., supra note 142, 11.10, at 11-32 to 11-33.
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formal measures short of bankruptcy, such as composition and
extension agreements, to improve their finances. If the Act
went no further, a bank with an inchoate right to set-off would
be treated similarly to a creditor holding a perfected article 9
floating lien that was not subject to attack by the trustee as a
preference.435 Section 553, however, when read literally, per-
435. The Act treats banks that effect set-off before bankruptcy the same as
article 9 creditors that foreclose on floating liens. In examples 15 and 16, each
creditor would end up with approximately $10,000 in cash and an unsecured
claim for $10,000. In other words, each creditor would be returned to the posi-
tion it occupied at the commencement of the period of vulnerability.
Assume in example 16 that the bank actually effected set-off on the four-
teenth day before bankruptcy, thereby triggering application of § 553(b). The
bank would alter its records to show that the depositor owed only $4,000 and
that the balance in the depositor's checking account was zero. Following set-
off, the bank would be undercollateralized by $4,000. After the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the trustee in bankruptcy would be able to recover $6,000,
the reduction of undercollateralization from the ninetieth day before bank-
ruptcy (when the bank was undercollateralized by $10,000) to the date of the
actual set-off (when the bank was undercollateralized by $4,000). See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 502(h), 553(b) (1) (1982); see generally Freeman, supra note 397, at 499 n.34.
The bank would keep $10,000 and it would be an unsecured creditor in bank-
ruptcy for $10,000 (the $4,000 still owed by the depositor plus a $6,000 general
claim to compensate for the trustee's recapture of the $6,000 preference).
The article 9 creditor in example 15 would end up in an identical position if
it foreclosed on the fourteenth day before bankruptcy, repossessed accounts re-
ceivable with a fair market value of $16,000, and resold them at the market
price. Applying the formula of § 547(c) (5), the reduction of undercollateraliza-
tion would be $6,000. The trustee would recover that amount from the article 9
creditor-the cash from the sale of the repossessed accounts represents its
prebankruptcy improvement in position.
The repossession of accounts receivable on the fourteenth day before bank-
ruptcy could be treated analytically as a separate transfer of the debtor's prop-
erty which the trustee could avoid as a preference unless the transfer is saved
by an exception in § 547. Each of the elements of § 547(b) is satisfied and it
does not matter if the transfer is involuntary. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 547(b)
(1982).
Section 547 excepts "contemporaneous exchange[s]." Id. §547(c)(1).
Here, the creditor gave value in exchange for the transfer of the accounts re-
ceivable by the release of its security interest. Such a release, however, will
qualify as "new value" under § 547(c) (1) only if the security interest was not
itself gained in an earlier transaction that the trustee could avoid. See id.
§ 547(a) (2). On the facts presented, the creditor gave "new value" only to the
extent of the release of a security interest of $10,000; its security interest in the
other $6,000 was gained by an independently voidable preferential buildup.
The outcome would be the same in examples 15 and 16 if set-off or repos-
session occurred on the twenty-ninth day before bankruptcy. In example 16,
under § 553(b), the trustee could recover only $5,000 from the bank-the reduc-
tion of undercollateralization during the first sixty days of the period of vulner-
ability. The bank would keep $10,000 and would be a general creditor in
bankruptcy for the remaining $10,000 ($5,000 owed by the depositor after set-off
and $5,000 to replace the funds recaptured by the trustee).
Similarly, if the creditor in example 15 repossessed and resold $15,000 of ac-
counts receivables on the twenty-ninth day before bankruptcy, under
§ 547(c) (5), the reduction of undercollateralization during the entire preference
1004 [Vol. 68:899
DEPOSIT ACCOUNT FINANCING
mits the bank to retain an inchoate right to set-off even if a
prebankruptcy preferential buildup has augmented the deposit
account balance.4 36 It is by no means clear that a bank thus al-
lowed to effect postpetition set-off will forebear foreclosing
against a debtor in dire financial straits.43 7 In any case, there is
no basis for providing a greater inducement to depositary insti-
period would be $6,000. On the ninetieth day before bankruptcy, the creditor
was undercollateralized by $10,000; on the date the bankruptcy petition was
filed, it was undercollateralized by $4,000 (there is $1,000 worth of accounts re-
ceivable left and the debtor still owes $5,000). The trustee's recovery would
take the form of avoiding the $1,000 security interest and recovering $5,000 in
cash from the creditor. The repossession of the $15,000 of accounts receivable
was a separate preferential transfer that would only qualify partially as a con-
temporaneous exchange; the creditor did not give "new value" when it released
the $5,000 security interest which attached on the thirtieth day before bank-
ruptcy and which was voidable.
436. The original bill introduced in the House is less susceptible to a con-
struction that would allow the bank to retain an inchoate right to set-off against
a preferentially augmented deposit account. The bill provided that "this title
does not affect any right of a creditor to offset after the commencement of the
case, except to the extent that" there was a preferential buildup during the des-
ignated prebankruptcy period. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(a) (4)
(1977) (emphasis added). In other words, unlike the final version of § 553, the
House bill apparently limited the postpetition right to set-off by the improve-
ment in position test. In contrast, the Senate bill, like the final version of the
Act, applies the improvement in position test only where a creditor "offsets a
mutual debt on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition"
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 553(b) (1978); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 553(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2603 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(1982)). Neither the original Senate report accompanying the Senate bill nor
the joint explanatory statement of the floor managers prior to their agreement
on a compromise bill contains an explanation of the change. See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5877-78; 124 CONG. REC. 33,400 (1978).
437. Representatives of a large banking association testified before Con-
gress that under the prior Act, in most cases banks effected set-off when they
learned that the borrower-depositor had filed a petition for bankruptcy. Hear-
ings on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2505-06 (1976). They
claimed that banks engage in "cash management" when they uncover the
debtor company's financial problems before bankruptcy. Under such circum-
stances, the debtor rarely ends up with "much money" in its bank account
when the bankruptcy petition is filed. Id. at 2510. The bankers did not elabo-
rate on how the money in the deposit account is ordinarily used during the
prepetition "work-out" period nor did they explain what steps, if any, banks
take to protect their interests. Id. at 2484-511. The bankers testified that banks
would work "assiduously" with debtors in an "out-of-court environment" in-
stead of "hitting and running and quickly leaving the environment" if they
knew they would be "adequately protected at the end of the road." Id. at 2486.
But they also explained that many bankers think that "in a failing corporation,
it represents an unrealistic waste of assets to have them squandered in the fi-
nal gasp of an effort to rekindle an ongoing business when our experience indi-
cates, regrettable as it is, that in bankruptcies particularly of your smaller and
medium-sized companies, that most of these companies have a tough time reor-
ganizing." Id. at 2508.
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tutions than that afforded creditors holding perfected article 9
security interests. If the nonbankruptcy law were altered as
proposed in this Article, section 547(c) (5) could be amended to
add "deposit accounts" to its coverage and a single section of
the Act would thus govern all preference challenges.
This Article does not exhaustively examine the ramifica-
tions of the recommended alteration of nonbankruptcy law on
the bankruptcy distribution.43 8 The exemption sections of the
Act also deserve careful consideration.4 39 For example, Con-
gress might exempt the individual debtor's interest, up to a
specified dollar figure, in any deposit account held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or the
debtor's dependents. Similarly, Congress might give the debtor
the power to avoid an article 9 security interest in, or a judicial
lien against, such a personal deposit account to the extent that
the creditor's interest would impair an exemption to which the
debtor would otherwise be entitled A40
In sum, the proposed improvements in the nonbankruptcy
law should also benefit the bankruptcy system. If the debtor
has greater control over the deposit account collateral, if all
creditors have a fair chance to compete for the lending opportu-
nity, and if information can be more readily obtained concern-
ing whether the debtor is overextended, the number of
bankruptcies might be reduced. Should a bankruptcy petition
be filed, depositary institutions would be treated the same as
other creditors with rights in the bankrupt's personal property.
The law would thus become more simple and equitable.
V. DEFAULT
This Article has proposed that deposit accounts be brought
within the framework of article 9 and that the common law of
security assignments, pledge, and set-off be displaced. This
proposal raises the question whether the default provisions of
article 9, which have been described elsewhere as creating a
438. For example, the substitution of article 9 for the law of security assign-
ments, which would alter the outcome of a nonbankruptcy contest with a lien
creditor, would affect the timing of transfers under § 547(e) (1) (B). See 11
U.S.C. § 547(e) (1) (B) (1982); supra notes 339-40, 343-45, and accompanying text.
Some transactions that would not constitute preferences if controlled by the
common law would be voidable if subject to article 9. A creditor's failure to
give public notice under article 9, not a requirement under the common law,
could postpone the transfer, thereby making it "on account of an antecedent
debt." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) (2), (e) (1) (B), (e) (2) (1982).
439. See id. § 522.
440. See id. § 522(f).
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procreditor "deficiency judgment machine," should govern the
secured creditor's rights against the defaulting debtor's deposit
account.441 The Code encourages nonjudicial foreclosure and
validates deficiency judgments.442 Default, which is often
broadly defined in the security agreement, triggers article 9
remedies,44 3 and the Code does not effectively limit insecurity
and acceleration clauses. 4 4 Moreover, the secured creditor's
remedies against the debtor are cumulative.445 In contrast, the
debtor has only a limited right of redemption 446 and some po-
tentially powerful but ambiguous statutory remedies 447 which
441. See B. CLARK, supra note 44, 1 12.5[1l.
442. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-503, 9-504(2).
443. Id. § 9-501(l).
444. U.C.C. § 1-208 limits enforcement of an acceleration clause to circum-
stances where the secured party "in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired." The debtor, however, has the difficult
burden of establishing the absence of good faith. See id. §§ 1-201(19), 1-208; see
also B. CLARK, supra note 44, 4.2[1], 12.5[11.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code has a more objective definition of
"consumer default." It provides in pertinent part: "An agreement... with re-
spect to default ... is enforceable only to the extent that: (1) the consumer
fails to make a payment . . . or (2) the prospect of payment... is significantly
impaired . . . ." U.C.C.C. § 5.109 (1974).
445. U.C.C. § 9-501(1); see, e.g., In re Hill, 472 F. Supp. 844, 845-48 (D. Kan.
1979); Hubbard v. Lagow, 576 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
446. To redeem collateral under the Code, the debtor, whether a commer-
cial entity or a consumer, must tender "fulfillment of all obligations secured by
the collateral" as well as the secured creditor's reasonable expenses in "retak-
ig, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the
sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohibited by law,
his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses." U.C.C. § 9-506 (emphasis
added). In other words, the debtor must pay the entire balance owed on the
obligation and expenses, not just the missed installments.
In contrast, under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, consumer bankrupts, under
specified circumstances, can redeem by tendering the amount of the creditor's
"allowed secured claim," which is, in effect, the value of the encumbered prop-
erty. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 722 (1982). Under the Uniform Commercial Credit
Code, the debtor only has to repay the "amount of all unpaid sums due at the
time of the tender, without acceleration, plus any unpaid delinquency or defer-
ral charges." U.C.C.C. §§ 5.110, 5.111 (1974).
447. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) permits recovery of "any loss caused by failure to
comply with the provisions of this Part." Damages are awarded on either a
contract or tort theory. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 44.9.2, at 1256. Some
courts have awarded punitive damages. See, e.g., Davidson v. First Bank &
Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1976). Where consumer goods are encum-
bered, a minimum civil penalty can be imposed. U.C.C. § 9-507(1); see, e.g.,
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386-87, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05
(1972).
Some courts have held that the secured party forfeits its right to sue for a
deficiency if it fails to comply with article 9. See B. CLARK, supra note 44,
4.12[4] (citing cases). Some states have enacted consumer credit protection
statutes requiring an election of remedies. See infra notes 480-82 and accompa-
nying text. It is not clear whether the three monetary sanctions provided in the
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are effective on a showing of a violation of the rules of this
"loosely organized, informal, anything-goes ... foreclosure
pattern."448
A state legislature that is concerned that the default provi-
sions of article 9 are too creditor oriented, particularly where
the debtor is a small commercial entity or a consumer, might
choose to treat deposit account financing similarly to true con-
signments and only partially integrate these transactions into
the Code. Article 9 rules concerning creation of an interest in
deposit account collateral, public notice, and priorities could be
applied and other law could define the consequences of
default.449
The common law remedies for a depositary institution,
however, are also expansive.450 Like a secured creditor, the
bank with a right to set-off may extinguish cross-demands ex-
trajudicially and then bring an in personam action for the defi-
ciency. The bank may define default broadly to ensure early
satisfaction of the mutual indebtedness requirement for set-
off.451 Set-off is only one of numerous cumulative remedies; a
depositary institution may also set-off against the debtor's bal-
ance, enforce an article 9 security interest or other lien against
the debtor's tangible property, and bring an action in court
against the debtor.452
Code are cumulative or whether the debtor must make an election. B. CLARK,
Supra note 44, % 4.12[5].
448. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 43.1, at 1183.
449. See U.C.C. §§ 2-326, 9-114.
450. The discussion in the text focuses on the common law right to set-off,
but pledgees and assignees also have expansive remedies. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT OF SECURrrY § 48 (1941).
Professor Gilmore notes that the movement under the common law during
the nineteenth century from different independent security devices to a unified
concept of security in personal property is "nowhere ... more apparent and
more thoroughgoing than in the area of rights after default." 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 19, § 43.1, at 1181. Moreover, the doctrine that a creditor must elect
between an action on the debt and foreclosure against the collateral was never
applied in connection with pledges or security assignments of intangibles. Id
§ 43.6, at 1224.
451. See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Hasper, 432 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967)
(event of default was to remove other collateral from state); Barsco, Inc. v.
H.W.W., Inc., 346 So.2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (event of default under se-
curity agreement triggering right to set-off was failure to insure other tangible
collateral); see generally B. CLARK, supra note 142, 11.511], [3]; supra notes
159-62 and accompanying text.
452. See Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975); Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aOd, 657 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1981); Bee Jay's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 86 Ill. App. 3d
7, 407 N.E.2d 755 (1980); Duncan v. Coahoma Bank, 397 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1981);
Allied Sheet Metal Fabricator's, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530,
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This Article suggests a number of changes in the article 9
default sections which are intended to afford greater protection
to the debtor in default under the Code than under the com-
mon law of set-off.45 3 Providing remedies for default within the
framework of article 9 will ensure that nondepositary creditors
have the same remedies as depositary institutions and that the
law is more uniform from state to state. From a broader per-
spective, should the Code's default provisions be revised,
whether through amendment or enactment of separate con-
sumer credit protection statutes, credit transactions secured by
deposit accounts, as an integral part of article 9, could share in
the reform.
A. REMEDIES IN CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
SECURED BY DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
Section 9-502, which provides for enforcement of a security
interest in general intangibles, allows the creditor with an arti-
cle 9 security interest in a deposit account as original collateral
to collect extrajudicially simply by asking the account debtor to
pay the creditor directly.4 54 A depositary institution that has
518 P.2d 734 (1974). But see, e.g., In re Saugus Gen. Hosp., Inc., 7 Bankr. 347
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Melson v. Bank of N.M., 65 N.M. 70, 332 P.2d 472 (1958).
A California statute requires a depositary institution to first foreclose
against real estate security before exercising a right to set-off against deposit
accounts. California, however, has no similar statute with respect to personal
property. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); CAL. COM.
CODE § 9501(1) (West 1964 & Supp. 1984); see generally supra note 9.
453. Substitution of article 9 for the common law right to set-off would pro-
vide some additional protection to a surety. Under U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (b), a se-
cured creditor who permits the principal debtor to "impair" the "collateral"
discharges a surety. The majority of courts, however, have held that a bank
does not risk discharging a surety by failing to effect set-off once mutual in-
debtedness occurs. See, e.g, Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. Supp. 233, 246 n.57 (W.D. Okla. 1953), affd, 218
F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955); Bank of Cal. v. Starrett, 110 Wash. 231, 236, 188 P. 410,
412 (1920). But see Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Seitz, 150 Pa. 632, 637-38, 24 A.
356, 357 (1892). See generally 5A McwE, supra note 32, ch. 9, § 150. If the de-
positary institution were treated as an article 9 secured creditor, and deposit
accounts were treated no differently than other forms of personal property, the
depositary institution would have to foreclose in order to avoid releasing the
surety under § 3-606(1) (b), absent a contrary agreement with the surety. See
B. CLARr, supra note 142, § 11.13.
454. See, e.g., Kersten v. Continental Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 48-49, 628 P.2d 592,
596-97 (1981) (no duty to inform principal debtor); Western Decor & Furnish-
ings Indus., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 91 Cal. App. 3d 293, 302-
03, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291-92 (1979) (no duty under Code to inform the principal
debtor of § 9-502 collection from the account debtor).
Specifically, U.C.C. § 9-502 provides:
(1) When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party
is entitled to notify account debtor or the obligor on an instrument to
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made a loan to a customer, and consequently is both a secured
party and an account debtor, would pay itself by making the
appropriate bookkeeping entries.455 A secured party that is an
outside creditor would ask the depositary institution (the ac-
count debtor) to pay it, rather than the depositor (the principal
debtor), out of the deposit account.456
When applied in this manner, section 9-502 affords the prin-
cipal debtor less protection than other article 9 self-help fore-
closure provisions. None of the default provisions require the
secured creditor to notify the debtor in advance of reposses-
sion.457 Otherwise, the debtor might dissipate the collateral-a
matter of particular concern if the collateral is a liquid deposit
account. Under the other Code sections, however, the secured
party must give notice after repossession and before final dis-
position of the property.458 For example, the debtor ordinarily
must receive written notice before a sale by a secured party of
repossessed tangible collateral. 459 If the secured party retains
such collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, a written propo-
sal must be given to the debtor, who then may object.4 60
make payment to him whether or not the assignor was theretofore
making collections on the collateral, and also to take control of any pro-
ceeds to which he is entitled under Section 9-306.
(2) A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge back
uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against
the debtor and who undertakes to collect from the account debtors or
obligors must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and may
deduct his reasonable expenses of realization from the collections. If
the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
U.C.C. § 9-105 includes in the definition of an "account debtor" a person
who is obligated "on [a] ... general intangible."
455. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
456. Stated more precisely, instead of performing its obligation under the
deposit agreement by making payment to the depositor, the depositary bank
would discharge its obligation by paying the secured party.
457. See, e.g, U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-503. But see V.L CODE ANN. tit. llA, § 9-503
(Supp. 1982) (secured party must give debtor five days written notice of its in-
tent to repossess the collateral). Similarly, notice generally need not be given
to the depositor prior to a bank effecting set-off under the common law. See
Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1980); F.D.I.C. v. First
Mortgage Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 455 (E.D. Wis. 1980); see generally 5A
MCiE, supra note 32, ch. 9, § 115a, at n.47.
A New York statute requires notice to the depositor "prior to, or on the
same business day of [set-off]," but failure to give notice does not defeat the
set-off. See N.Y. BANXING LAw § 9-g(2),(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
458. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(3), 9-505(2).
459. Such notice need not be given if the "collateral is perishable or threat-
ens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market." Id. § 9-504(3).
460. See id. § 9-505(2).
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Such post-repossession notice allows the debtor to redeem
the collateral before final disposition. 46 1 The debtor may decide
to repurchase the repossessed property from the creditor4 62 be-
cause the value of the goods to the debtor exceeds their fair
market value, or because the debtor fears that the creditor will
not realize a fair return on resale, or for some other reason.4 63
These considerations may be less important when the collat-
eral is a deposit account. In such instances, there would be lit-
tle dispute over value. Nevertheless, a debtor faced with
substantial penalties under the deposit agreement for reduc-
tion of the balance below a minimum level, or with an unfavor-
able change in interest rates, may find it more economical to
borrow money elsewhere and redeem the deposit account.
Post-repossession notice would be useful for other reasons
as well. Such notice may be the first communication to the
debtor of the creditor's decision to seek relief.464 If there is a
dispute about whether default has occurred, or if an informal
repayment arrangement is feasible, early notice may be invalu-
able. If the debtor is a consumer, or if the amount involved is
insubstantial, informal negotiation may be the only opportunity
for the debtor's views to be presented.4 6 Early notice also
would enable the debtor to stop writing checks on a repos-
sessed demand account. As under other article 9 sections, no-
tice in any reasonable written form, and within a reasonable
period following repossession, would suffice without placing an
onerous burden on creditors.4 66
461. See id. § 9-506.
462. See id. The debtor must tender "fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral" as well as the secured party's expenses. Id.
463. "[E]very aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time,
place and terms must be commercially reasonable." Id. The debtor, however,
may not want to litigate this issue. Courts rarely invalidate a sale by a secured
party on the sole ground that the resale price was too low; an inadequate price
is only one indicia of commercial unreasonableness. See B. CLARK, supra note
44, T 4.8[8].
464. Secured creditors frequently overlook one or two late payments before
exercising their right to repossess. If there is a pattern of accepting late pay-
ments, the secured creditor may have difficulty establishing that a default has
occurred that justifies remedial action. See B. CLARKi, supra note 44,
T 12.5[l][b].
465. Litigation may be avoided for several reasons: it is time consuming
and expensive; the debtor may not recognize the violation of rights; or the cred-
itor may not initiate a lawsuit because it has already recovered a substantial
part of the obligation through the use of informal collection methods and self-
help remedies.
466. See, e.g, U.C.C. § 9-505(2). At a minimum, such notice would identify
the creditor, the loan, the deposit account foreclosed on, and the secured credi-
tor's view of the amount of the obligation outstanding. Commercial debtors, as
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The section 9-502 procedure, unless modified, also may
cause problems for the depositary institution when it acts
solely as an account debtor and not also as a secured party.
Under such circumstances, the depositary bank will want proof
that the claim of the secured party, an outside creditor, is bona
fide before making payment. Wrongful payment could result in
claims by the bank's customer, the principal debtor, that the
bank made an unauthorized charge against the customer's ac-
count or wrongfully dishonored checks drawn by the
customer.467
The Code could be supplemented to give an account
debtor, notified under section 9-502, protections similar to those
explicitly afforded an account debtor when the principal debtor
assigns its contract.468 For example, the secured party could be
required to deliver a copy of the security agreement (revealing
the sum encumbered) and an affidavit swearing that a default
has occurred and stating the balance outstanding. If the se-
cured party failed to furnish this proof, the account debtor
could refuse to pay.469
The debtor could limit the secured party's self-help reme-
dies by including protective provisions in the security agree-
ment.4 7 0 The depositary bank would discover such provisions
when the security agreement was delivered as part of the sec-
tion 9-502 notice. Alternatively, the principal debtor, when
opening the account, could bargain with the depositary institu-
tion for a provision in the deposit agreement forbidding pay-
ment of outside creditors without prior approval by the debtor.
A potential subsequent creditor, if diligent, would learn of the
loss of the section 9-502 remedy when it read the deposit agree-
ment and could adjust the terms offered the debtor. Even with-
well as consumers, would be entitled to such notice, although the consumer no-
tice could be more elaborate. See infra note 487 and accompanying text.
467. See U.C.C. §§ 4-401(1), 4-402.
468. See id. § 9-318(3). The account debtor faces the same risk of double lia-
bility if it pays the wrong entity following receipt of a purportedly valid § 9-502
notice as it does if it pays after learning that the principal debtor assigned the
contract. At least one court has read the notice requirements of § 9-318(3) into
§ 9-502. See Surety Say. & Loan Co. v. Kanzig, 53 Ohio St. 2d 108, 113, 373 N.E. 2d
602, 605-06 (1978). U.C.C. § 9-318(3) requires that the account debtor receive no-
tice that "the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that pay-
ment is to be made to the assignee." In addition, the notice must "reasonably
identify the rights assigned." Id. The account debtor may request "reasonable
proof... that the assignment has been made." Id.
469. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (account debtor may pay assignor until account
debtor receives reasonable proof of assignment).
470. Such protective clauses are enforceable under the current Code. See
id. § 9-501(1)-(3).
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out a self-help remedy, a perfected security interest in the
deposit account would be of value. For example, if the secured
creditor obtained a judicial lien, its priority date would relate
back to the time when the security interest was perfected by
filing.471
B. SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER DEBTOR IN
DEFAULT
The sponsors of article 9, to ensure widespread enactment
of the proposed Code, did not address many of the controver-
sial issues raised in secured transactions involving consumer
debtors.472 The civil penalty provision,473 one of the few article
9 consumer protection sections, easily could be broadened to
cover creditor misbehavior in foreclosing against consumer de-
posit accounts. 4 74 A debtor that established that a secured
party had enforced its security interest in violation of article 9
could recover "the credit service charge plus ten percent of the
principal amount of the debt."475 The debtor would not need to
establish actual loss. 476
Non-Code law regulating consumer credit, including stat-
utes and cases that curb the power of creditors when debtors
default, supplements and supersedes article 9 provisions.477 If
article 9 were expanded to cover deposit account collateral, this
non-Code law also could be extended to protect consumer debt-
ors who hypothecate their deposit accounts.
Article 9 has been criticized for allowing creditors to both
repossess encumbered property and sue for deficiency judg-
ments. Consumer advocates argue that creditors, unless re-
quired to elect one remedy, are likely to resell repossessed
collateral below fair market value and. to add unwarranted col-
lection costs, as well as attorneys' fees, to their claims in subse-
quent deficiency actions.4 78 Where the collateral is a consumer
deposit account, few valuation disputes will occur. Excessive
collection costs and attorneys' fees, however, may be added if
471. Id. § 9-501(5).
472. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 9.1, at 293-94.
473. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
474. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (possible definitions of con-
sumer deposit account); see also CAlj Fnr. CODE § 864(a) (1), (2) (West Supp.
1984); infra note 487.
475. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
476. Id.; see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 44.9.3.
477. U.C.C. §§ 9-102 official note, 9-203 (4) official note.
478. See, e.g., Report of the Presiding Officer, Federal Trade Commission
Proposed Credit Practices Rule 240-44 (Aug. 11, 1978).
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the security agreement so provides. 479
In response to these concerns, states have enacted a vari-
ety of statutes restricting secured creditors' remedies in con-
sumer transactions. Some states require the creditor to elect a
remedy, an approach that could be used to protect consumer
deposit accounts. In Massachusetts, for example, if the trans-
action were secured by a consumer deposit account and if the
outstanding loan balance were less than $1,000, the creditor
could be required to choose between self-help foreclosure or an
action on the debt.480 A Wisconsin creditor seeking self-help
repossession of a consumer deposit account would have to ob-
tain the consent of the debtor.481 Another alternative would be
to ban self-help foreclosure if it would reduce the balance in a
consumer deposit account below a statutorily prescribed mini-
mum, for example, $1,000.482
Many states limit the enforceability of attorneys' fees
clauses in security agreements signed by consumers, thereby
superseding the Code.483 The same rules could apply where
consumer deposit accounts were given as collateral. Wisconsin,
for example, prohibits such provisions altogether.484 The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code prohibits all attorneys' fees
clauses where the loan is less than $1,000. For loans of $1,000 or
more, attorneys' fees are either banned or are allowed up to a
maximum of fifteen percent of the unpaid debt.485
California's innovative legislation protecting consumers
from the common law right to set-off suggests yet another ap-
proach to limiting self-help enforcement against consumer de-
posit accounts.4 86 A state could require the depositary
479. Article 9 explicitly sanctions such charges. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-
504(1) (a).
480. Cf. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 255B, § 20B (d) (West 1980) (motor vehi-
cle installment sales).
481. Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 425.206 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
482. See infra note 486.
483. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-504(1) (a).
484. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.411 (West 1974).
485. U.C.C.C. § 2.507 (alternatives A, B) (1974).
486. See CAI. FIN. CODE § 864 (West Supp. 1984). As mentioned above, Cali-
fornia is one of the few states that provides for the creation of an article 9 se-
curity interest in deposit accounts. See supra note 22. A bank may rely on
such a security interest or on its common law right to set-off. Where the de-
posit account is other than a checking account and the bank retains a security
interest, it need not comply with the consumer protection statute set out below.
CAL. FIN. CODE § 864 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
(a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Customer" means one or more natural persons.
(2) "Debt" means an ... obligation... arising from an extension of
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institution to immediately and temporarily freeze the consumer
deposit account for twenty days after receipt of a request to
credit to a natural person primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, and does not mean a charge for bank services or a debit for
uncollected funds or for an overdraft of an account imposed by a bank
on a deposit account.(b) A bank is limited in exercising any setoff for a debt claimed to be
owed to the bank by a customer in that a setoff shall not result in an
aggregate balance of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) as shown
on the records of the bank for all demand deposit accounts maintained
by a customer with the bank or any branch thereof.
(c) Not later than the day following the exercise of any setoff with re-
spect to a deposit account ... the bank shall deliver to each customer
... a written notice... containing the following.
(1) A statement that the bank has setoff a debt... against the cus-
tomer's deposit account, identifying the account, and giving the respec-
tive balances before and after the setoff.
(2) A statement identifying the debt setoff... and giving the respec-
tive balances due before and after the setoff.
(3) A statement that if the customer claims that the debt has been
paid or is not now owing, or that the funds in the deposit account con-
sist of moneys expressly exempt.., and listed in the notice, the cus-
tomer may execute and return the notice to the bank ... not later than
20 days after the date of mailing or personal delivery.
(4) A statement that if the notice is executed and returned, the bank
may file an action in court to collect the debt; that if a lawsuit is filed,
the customer will be notified and have an opportunity to appear and
defend; and that if the bank is successful, the customer will be liable
for court costs, and attorney's fees, if the debt so provides.
(5) A response form ... containing substantially the following:
'The debt described in the Notice of Setoff received from the bank
is - is not - my debt or the debt of another person in
whose name the account is maintained.
"I claim that the debt:
has been paid.
is not now owing.
is not subject to setoff because the money in the account is:
_ _ Paid earnings (CCP 704.070)
Proceeds from execution sale of or insurance for loss of a
motor vehicle (CCP 704.010)
Proceeds from execution sale of household furnishings or
other personal effects (CCP 704.020)
_ ._ Relocation benefits (COP 704.180)
_ Life insurance proceeds (CCP 704.100)
Disability and health insurance benefits (CCP 704.130)
_ Workers' compensation benefits (CCP 704.160
-. Unemployment or strike benefits(CCP 704.120)
_ Retirement benefits including, but not limited to, social se-
curity benefits (CCP 704.080, 704.110, 704.115)
_ Public assistance benefits including welfare payments and
supplemental security income (SSI) or charitable aid (CCP
704.170)
_ Proceeds from sale of or insurance for damage or destruc-
tion of a dwelling (CCP 704.720, 704.960)
_ Proceeds from execution sale of or insurance for loss of
tools of a trade (CCP 704.060)
_ Award of damages for personal injury (CCP 704.140) or
wrongful death (CCP 704.150)
_ Financial aid paid by an institution of higher education to a
student for expenses while attending school (CCP 704.190)
1984] 1015
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
foreclose by an outside creditor or after the bank's internal de-
cision to foreclose.4 87 The secured party would send a notice,
similar to the post-repossession notice discussed above but
warning of imminent foreclosure, to the debtor on the day fol-
lowing the freeze. The notice would inform the debtor that an
enclosed form could be returned averring that the debt was not
owed or that the funds in the deposit account were not subject
to seizure because of insulation afforded by state exemption
statutes. 4 88 If the debtor returned a properly completed re-
sponse form within the twenty-day period, the freeze on the de-
posit account would be lifted and the secured party would have
to pursue other means to collect the debt. Thus, the debtor
would have the opportunity to raise objections, on limited
grounds, to self-help foreclosure.
In sum, if the default provisions of article 9 are to be ap-
plied to deposit account collateral, principal debtors and ac-
count debtors will need more information than the Code
presently provides. Limitations on creditor self-help remedies
against consumer deposit accounts also will have to be
developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
More than ever before, there is a need today for a uniform,
(d) If the response form described in subdivision (c) ... is received
by the bank not later than 20 days after the date of mailing or personal
delivery of the written notice, the amount of the setoff for any debt
claimed to be owed to the bank by a customer, . . . shall be reversed
and such amount shall be credited to the deposit account ....
(e) The limitations provided in this section do not apply to a deposit
account, other than a demand deposit account, in which the bank has a
security interest expressed by a written contract as collateral for the
debt owing to the bank by the customer.
(f) The limitations provided in this section do not apply when a cus-
tomer previously has authorized a bank in writing to periodically debit
a deposit account as the agreed method of payment of the debt.
487. Unlike the California statute, which permits set-off and then directs the
bank to reverse the set-off on receipt of the consumer objection, the proposal
here is for a temporary freeze. Otherwise, an outside secured creditor that al-
ready received payment from the bank would have to return funds when the
bank received the consumer objection. See id. § 864(d).
488. See, e.g., id. § 864(a) (5).
A related and important consumer protection issue raised by this proposal,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, is the effect of granting a security in-
terest in a deposit account containing otherwise exempt funds in the absence
of a consumer credit statute. Many states have statutes and case law providing
that the grant of a consensual lien operates as an automatic waiver of the
debtor's right to claim that the encumbered collateral is exempt. See B. CLARK,
supra note 44, 6.212], 12.5[10].
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coherent, and certain body of law regarding the rights and lia-
bilities of parties using deposit accounts as collateral in credit
transactions. Depositary institutions, recently freed from sig-
nificant federal restrictions on their ability to offer a wide range
of investment opportunities, will continue to attract an increas-
ing volume of consumer and business funds. The law should
afford depositors the flexibility to hypothecate this personal
property-worth billions of dollars in the aggregate-in favor of
the lenders they prefer.
Application of the general principles of article 9, displacing
non-Code law governing the assignment or pledge of interests
in bank accounts and the now obsolete common law right to
set-off, is the best way to accomplish this goal. As with other
secured transactions within the scope of article 9, lenders
would have access to the information necessary for effective
competition with respect to credit-extending opportunities and
could protect their interests in deposit accounts by prompt fil-
ing. By replacing non-Code security devices in deposit account
collateral with the unitary article 9 security interest, the law
governing contests among creditors and between the debtor
and any particular creditor, both in and out of bankruptcy,
would become more certain, more equitable, and more respon-
sive to the needs of participants in modern banking
transactions.
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